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English summary 
The overall purpose of this PhD thesis is to investigate different aspects of fishermen’s 
behaviour using production economic models at the individual and industry levels.  
 
Three parts make up this thesis. The first part provides an overview of the thesis. The second 
part consists of four papers analysing efficiency at the vessel level and factors influencing 
this. The third part consists of two papers and presents industry level analyses and focuses in 
particular on the likely impacts of implementing individual transferable quotas. The models 
are able to allow for changes in fishermen’s behaviour via individual learning and 
adjustments in output mix. 
 
All the papers included in Part II: Modelling and Evaluating Fishermen’s Behaviour 
consider factors influencing fishermen’s behaviour. Knowledge about these factors is 
important to give a correct description of fishermen’s behaviour. However, including all 
relevant factors in specific analyses is impossible, and it is therefore important to be aware of 
the most essential ones. 
 
As demonstrated in the literature review of Paper 1, a large number of factors may 
significantly influence fishermen’s short run behaviour, i.e. choice of gear type or fishing 
location. Behaviour can be viewed as being determined by the fishermen’s objectives subject 
to different restrictions, given by physical resources, time, mental capacity and information, 
and institutions. The review of the extensive literature gives reasonable support to the 
neoclassical assumption of utility maximisation through profit maximisation. Furthermore, 
the literature has demonstrated the importance of physical restrictions and time. The 
emphasis on these may of course be a consequence of the relatively easy access to such data.  
 
In the following three papers, specific aspects of fishermen’s behaviour are analysed. In 
Paper 2, technical efficiency and reasons for inefficiency are estimated using the Stochastic 
Production Frontier Approach. The results suggest that the level of technical efficiency is not 
influenced by the choice of revenue or weight as the output measure. Also, it has no profound 
impact whether inputs are measured by including fishing power and fishing time separately 
or as a composite measure. However, the output elasticities are influenced by these choices. 
Furthermore, vessel size, employment status and experience is found to influence 
inefficiency. 
 
Paper 3 considers how to include fish stocks in efficiency analyses. The biological 
developments are important in relation to fisheries, because fish stocks are one of the primary 
components in the production process. It is worthwhile to evaluate whether different methods 
of including fish stocks give rise to different conclusions. Three methods are investigated as 
possible ways to include fish stocks. The first method is based on catch data, while the two 
other methods are based on independent stock measures. It is shown that estimations based 
on the former give different results from the ones based on the latter. This conclusion is 
independent of the choice of time horizon and choice of other input/output measures. 
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Paper 4 considers fishermen’s behaviour to counteract uncertainty. When performing 
efficiency evaluations, this is done on ex post data. However, in relation to fisheries such an 
approach may be too harsh, because the fishermen are operating in an uncertain environment 
with variations in fish stocks, weather, etc. Fishermen therefore seek in their ex ante 
decisions to cope with uncertainty. If the conditions are better than expected, this may result 
in some inputs not being used. In ex post efficiency evaluation, this is interpreted as 
inefficiency, although it was - in an ex ante perception - rational to bring the inputs along. 
This type of inefficiency can be denoted rational inefficiency. By further developing the 
method from Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003), an evaluation of 308 Danish fishing vessels is 
performed. The results indicate that these vessels seek to insure themselves against 
uncertainty by allowing for the highest flexibility in crew payments, followed by fuel costs, 
sales costs and costs for ice/provisions respectively.  
 
Accounting for changes in fishermen’s behaviour at the industry level is investigated in Part 
III: Industry Models of Fishermen’s Behaviour and Individual Transferable Quotas. Many 
bioeconomic models have been set-up through time to evaluate such changes, but none of 
these have to the author’s knowledge allowed for the behavioural flexibilities, as included in 
the modelling framework presented here. 
 
The starting point for Paper 5 is the fact that management changes will most likely result in 
different behaviour by the fishermen. It is necessary to account for these changes, when 
evaluating the expected gains to be derived. Based on the Data Envelopment Analysis 
approach, a framework to calculate these gains is provided. The gains are calculated by 
comparing industry profits in the initial management system with industry profits in a 
management system based on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Two types of 
behavioural flexibility are allowed in the system. They concern the ability to learn best-
practice (catch-up) and the ability to change the input and output composition (mix). The 
framework is then adapted to a dataset from the Danish fishery. Not surprisingly, the gains 
rise with increased behavioural flexibility. Under the most restrictive assumptions, 
reallocation of the ITQs will alone result in a 50% increase in gross profits, while this level 
increases to 87% in the most flexible situation. 
 
The final Paper 6 provides an extension of the framework developed in Paper 5. A complex 
of restrictions is included to obtain more realistic estimations of the potential reallocations 
gains, when applied to specific fisheries. The restrictions relate to the determination of best-
practice, possible levels of individual learning and changes in output composition. By using a 
dataset covering the entire Danish commercial fishery, we obtain estimates of the plausible 
tradability gains if Danish fisheries had been regulated by ITQs in 2002. In the most flexible 
(optimistic) situation, a 92% increase in gross profits can be expected, but this level is 
significantly reduced if vessel behaviour is restricted. Furthermore, a series of policy implica-
tions are considered in relation to an ITQ system, including concentration, specialisation, 
market activity and price changes. Finally, plausible consequences of exogenous chocks and 
changes in management practice in the form of mesh size increases are considered. 
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Dansk sammendrag 
Formålet med denne ph.d. afhandling er at undersøge forskellige aspekter af fiskeres adfærd 
ved anvendelse af produktions økonomiske modeller på individ- og industriniveau. 
 
Afhandlingen består af tre dele. Den første del giver en oversigt over afhandlingen. Den 
anden del består af fire papirer, som analyserer efficiens på fartøjsniveau og faktorer som 
påvirker efficiens. Den tredje del består af to papirer, hvor der gennemføres analyse på 
industriniveau og fokuseres specielt på konsekvenserne af at indføre individuelle omsættelige 
kvoter. De opstillede modeller tillader ændringer i fiskernes adfærd via individuel læring og 
tilpasninger i sammensætningen af output. 
 
Alle papirerne inkluderet i Del II: Modellering og Evaluering af Fiskeres Adfærd betragter 
faktorer, der påvirker fiskeres adfærd. Kendskab til disse er vigtige for at give en korrekt 
beskrivelse af fiskernes adfærd. Inkludering af alle faktorer i specifikke analyser er dog 
umuligt, hvorfor det er vigtig at være opmærksom på de mest betydende af faktorer. 
  
Som fremstillet i litteraturgennemgangen i Papir 1 kan en lang række af faktorer påvirke 
fiskernes kortsigtede adfærd, det vil sige valg af redskab og fiskeområde. Adfærd kan 
opfattes som værende bestemt af fiskernes målsætninger underlagt en række forskellige 
restriktioner i form af fysiske ressourcer, tid, mental kapacitet og information, samt 
institutionelle forhold. Gennemgangen af den omfattende litteratur giver støtte til den 
neoklassiske antagelse om nyttemaksimering via profit maksimering. Derudover viser 
litteraturen betydningen af de fysiske ressourcer og tid, hvilket dog i noget omfang kan 
tilskrives den relativt nemmere adgang til sådanne oplysninger. 
 
I de efterfølgende tre papirer analyseres specifikke forhold af fiskeres adfærd. I Papir 2 
estimeres teknisk efficiens og årsager til inefficiens ved anvendelse af den såkaldte Stokastisk 
Front-metode. Resultaterne viser, at niveauet af teknisk efficiens ikke påvirkes af, om 
fangstværdi eller vægt anvendes som outputmål. Det har heller ikke nogen afgørende 
betydning om input måles ved at inkludere ”fishing power” og tid på havet separat eller som 
et kombineret mål. Disse valg har dog betydning for de beregnede output elasticiteter. 
Derudover er det fundet, at inefficiensen påvirkes af fartøjsstørrelsen, fiskernes 
erhvervsstatus og deres erfaring. 
 
Papir 3 analyserer, hvorledes fiskebestanden kan inkluderes i efficiensanalyse. Den 
biologiske udvikling er vigtig i relation til fiskeriet, idet bestandene er en af de primære 
komponenter i produktionsprocessen. Det er derfor værdifuldt at evaluere, om forskellige 
metoder for inkludering af bestandene giver anledning til forskellige konklusioner. Tre 
mulige metoder undersøges. Den første metode er baseret på fangstdata, mens de to andre 
metoder er baseret på uafhængige bestandsestimater. Det vises, at estimationer på grundlag af 
den førstnævnte metode ikke er sammenlignelige med dem opnået ved anvendelse af de to 
sidste metoder. Denne konklusion er uafhængig af valget af tidshorisont og valg af 
input/output mål.  
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Papir 4 analyserer fiskeres adfærd til at modvirke usikkerhed. Når efficiensanalyser udføres, 
sker dette på ex post data. I relation til fiskeriet er dette dog muligvis for hård en tilgang, idet 
fiskerne opererer i et miljø præget af usikkerhed som følge af variationer i fiskebestande, 
vejrforhold osv. Fiskerne søger derfor i deres ex ante beslutninger at forholde sig til 
usikkerheden. Hvis forholdene er bedre end forventet, kan dette resultere i at nogle inputs 
ikke anvendes. I ex post efficiensanalyse vil dette blive fortolket som inefficiens, selvom det - 
i en ex ante opfattelse - var rationelt at tage disse inputs med. Denne type af inefficiens kan 
betegnes som rationel inefficiens. Ved at videreudvikle metoden fra Bogetoft og Hougaard 
(2003) udføres en evaluering af 308 danske fiskefartøjer. Resultaterne indikerer, at disse 
fartøjer søger at forsikre dem selv mod usikkerhed ved at have størst fleksibilitet i besæt-
ningsaflønningen efterfulgt af omkostninger til henholdsvis brændstof, salg og is/proviant. 
 
Hensyntagen til ændringer i fiskernes adfærd på industriniveau er undersøgt i Del III: 
Industrimodeller for Fiskeres Adfærd og Individuelle Omsættelige Kvoter. Mange bioøkono-
miske modeller er blevet opstillet gennem tiderne til at evaluere sådanne adfærdsændringer, 
men ingen af disse tillader til forfatternes kendskab den adfærdsfleksibilitet, som modellerne 
i denne afhandling. 
 
Udgangspunktet i Papir 5 er det faktum, at ændringer i regulering ofte vil resultere i en 
ændret fiskeradfærd. Det er nødvendigt at tage hensyn til sådanne ændringer, når de 
forventede gevinster beregnes. Ved anvendelse af Data Envelopment Analyse metoden 
opstilles en ramme til beregning af disse gevinster. Gevinsterne er beregnet ved at 
sammenligne industriprofitten under det initiale reguleringssystem med den under et 
reguleringssystem baseret på Individuelle Omsættelige Kvoter (IOK’er). To typer af 
adfærdsfleksibilitet tillades i form af muligheden for at lære den bedste metode og 
muligheden for at ændre sammensætningen af inputs og outputs. Den opstillede ramme 
anvendes efterfølgende på et datasæt for dansk fiskeri. Ikke overraskende vises gevinsterne at 
stige med øget adfærdsfleksibilitet. Under de mest restriktive adfærdsantagelser vil alene en 
reallokering af IOK’erne resultere i en stigning i bruttooverskuddet på 50 %, mens denne 
stiger til 87 % i den mest fleksible situation. 
 
Det sidste Papir 6 udbygger rammen opstillet i Papir 5. Et kompleks af begrænsninger 
inkluderes, således at mere realistiske estimationer af de potentielle gevinster ved 
reallokering kan opnås, når rammen anvendes på specifikke fiskerier. Begrænsningerne 
relaterer sig til bestemmelsen af den bedste metode, muligheden for individuel læring og 
ændringer i fangstsammensætningen. Ved at anvende et datasæt, som dækker hele det danske 
kommercielle fiskeri, estimeres de potentielle gevinster, hvis dansk fiskeri havde været 
reguleret med IOK’er i 2002. I den mest fleksible (optimistiske) situation kan en stigning på 
92 % i bruttooverskuddet forventes, men dette niveau reduceres betydeligt, når fartøjernes 
adfærdsfleksibilitet begrænses. Yderligere en række forhold inddrages i form af 
koncentration, specialisering, aktivitet på markedet og prisændringer. Slutteligt analyseres de 
forventelige konsekvenser af eksogene chok og ændringer i reguleringen i form øget 
maskestørrelser. 
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Production Economic Models of Fisheries: 
Vessel and Industry Analysis 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
This introductory section of my PhD thesis presents the background, objectives and structure 
of the thesis. Six papers comprise the thesis. The first four papers use modern production 
economic models to investigate individual fishermen’s behavioural patterns. The last two 
papers combine the individual fishermen models into an industry model, and use this to 
investigate the impact of different management systems.  
 
 
Introduction 
Investigation of human behaviour has been performed since ancient times and is the focus of 
an almost infinite number of studies. Restricting ourselves to social sciences, plausible 
models have been proposed by psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists and economists. 
However, the approaches have different advantages and for instance, Frey (1999, p. 11) 
mentions that “economics seems to be better equipped to explain changes in human 
behaviour, while sociology seems to be better equipped to explain historically existing 
levels”.  
 
Investigation of fishermen’s behavioural patterns has also been an important area within 
fisheries research. The importance hereof for both biologists and economists is - as 
mentioned by Holland and Sutinen (1999, p. 253) - that “failure to anticipate and respond to 
fishers increasing or decreasing and redistributing their effort among fisheries may reduce 
economic benefits and can result in severe declines or collapse of fish stocks”. With this in 
mind, it is necessary to find an acceptable method to investigate fishermen behaviour. 
Carlson (1975, p. 84) calls attention to the fact that “the behavioural model of interest for 
fishermen is most likely an economic model”. The economic methodology can thus be seen as 
a preferable method to investigate fishermen’s behaviour, and will therefore be utilised in this 
PhD thesis.  
 
Economists have since the seminal paper by the Danish economist Jens Warming in 1911, cf. 
Andersen (1983), participated in the behavioural analyses of fishermen. The behavioural 
patterns are of course dependent upon the type of decisions to be taken. For instance, is the 
fisherman choosing where to fish? What to fish? Or is the decision related to possible 
investments in a new vessel? It is not necessarily the same factors that are important to these 
different types of decisions. For example, the interest rate will most likely influence the 
fishermen’s investment choices, but it does not necessarily influence the choice of a location 
to fish in. 
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1. Purposes 
It is a complicated task to describe behaviour due to the large number of factors which can 
potentially influence this behaviour. Vessel size, skipper qualifications, fish prices, 
regulations, weather, stock situations, and many other factors may potentially influence the 
behaviour and may vary between specific fisheries and fishermen.  
 
The first purpose of this PhD thesis has therefore been to focus on some of the important but 
to some extent less investigated factors influencing fishermen’s behaviour. The thesis focuses 
on three aspects, namely 1) estimation of fishermen’s level of technical efficiency and the 
factors influencing this level, 2) how to account for stock levels in efficiency estimations and 
3) how fishermen seek to account for uncertainty. 
 
To make optimal management decisions at the system level, it is important to be able to make 
ex ante evaluations of the plausible costs and gains from changing management. Setting up 
models to analyse the consequences of management changes in fisheries requires a flexible 
modelling framework, which is able to account for behavioural changes, given that fishermen 
seek to maximise profits. Under the current regulations, fishermen choose a behavioural 
pattern that maximises their profit. However, changes in regulations are likely to result in a 
behavioural shift to maximise profit in the new regime.  
 
The second purpose of this PhD thesis has therefore been to set up a flexible framework 
which can easily account for different behavioural changes that can be expected following a 
change in management. The focus has been put on individual learning and the possibility to 
change catch composition. 
 
 
2. Structure 
The first part consists of four papers. In Paper 1, an extensive literature review is performed 
to illustrate the array of factors influencing fishermen’s short/medium run behaviour. The 
following three papers investigate different aspects of fishermen’s behaviour. An analysis of 
technical efficiency is undertaken in the Paper 2 with focus on how to measure inputs and 
outputs, and it is further investigated which factors influence the level of technical efficiency. 
In Paper 3, an empirical study is performed focusing on the consequences of using different 
approaches to include fish stocks in productivity analysis of fishermen. Paper 4 investigates 
the possibility to interpret ex post inefficiency as an ex ante rational decision by the 
fishermen that counteracts the uncertainties that naturally embrace this type of production. 
 
The second part consists of two papers. In Paper 5, individual fishermen’s production 
possibilities are included in industry linear programming problems, which can then be used to 
analyse the consequences of management changes. Furthermore the framework is able to 
account for plausible behavioural changes by the fishermen. Paper 6 extends the framework 
derived in Paper 5 to make this more compliant with real life fishing activities. In addition to 
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the theoretical issues covered in both papers, empirical estimations are performed. They give 
indications of the likely gains to be expected if Danish fisheries were to be regulated by 
individual transferable quotas, instead of the current management regime. 
 
 
3. Approaches 
Behaviour at the vessel level is analysed in Part II. Besides the review conducted in Paper 1, 
the other three papers consider selected issues using the primal approach contrary to the dual 
approach. The primal approach estimates the technical relationship between the inputs and 
outputs, while the dual approach estimates the economic relationship between inputs and 
outputs in the form of revenue, cost or profit functions. In the dual approach, it is assumed 
that input and output prices are determined exogenously and that input and output use is 
determined in order to maximise profit, maximise revenue or minimise costs. For further 
insight, readers are referred to Chambers (1988). 
 
Based on the primal approach, two methods are applied. Both methods estimate production 
frontiers illustrating best-practice behaviour, as opposed to traditional production estimations 
reflecting “average” behaviour. The applied methods are Stochastic Production Frontier and 
Data Envelopment Analysis. These methods are described within the respective papers, but 
readers seeking more general introductions may consult books like Kumbahkar and Lovell 
(2000) on Stochastic Production Frontier, Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) on Data 
Envelopment Analysis, and Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) on both approaches. 
 
The industry level models in Part III also use the primal approach. The industry models set up 
in this section are optimisation models. Here behavioural changes are allowed in an attempt 
to maximise profits given some explicit restrictions about production structures and catch 
possibilities. This type of model is thus able to answer “what’s best” questions, cf. Conrad 
(1999). The most obvious alternative to optimisation models is simulation models, where 
“what if” questions are addressed. In simulation models, behaviour is specified by the 
parameters in the equations, and restrictions and objectives are included in these equations. 
Further insight into these models can for instance be found in Pascoe (2000). 
 
To sum up, an overview of the different levels of analyses and methods utilised in the 
included papers, excluding the general review in Paper 1, is given in the table below. 
 
 Vessel level Industry level 
Stochastic Production Frontier Paper 2  
Data Envelopment Analysis Papers 3 and 4 Papers 5 and 6 
 
The PhD thesis can thus be divided into two general parts, namely Modelling and Evaluating 
Fishermen’s Behaviour and Industry Models of Fishermen’s Behaviour and Individual 
Transferable Quotas, respectively. 
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4. Abstracts of the included papers 
In the following section, an abstract of each paper comprising this PhD thesis is provided.  
 
Paper 1: 
Determinants of fishermen’s behaviour  
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
In economic theory it is generally assumed that agents seek to maximise utility being derived 
from one measure (for instance profits) or several measures (for instance profits and 
adventure). The behaviour is however influenced by restrictions, which limit the solutions 
that are possible to obtain. This approach is also used in fisheries economics, where the 
fishermen’s behaviour is influenced by many different factors such as weather, tradition and 
regulation. Considering that it is almost impossible to identify and model all the possible 
factors, it is important to include at least the most influential ones in a specific analysis to 
obtain the best possible description of fishermen’s behaviour. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the objectives and restrictions that influence 
fishermen’s short run behaviour based on a review of the extensive literature within fisheries 
economics. Initially, a framework for the review of fishermen’s behaviour is derived from the 
economic theory about human behaviour. Based on this, fishermen’s behaviour is 
investigated with respect to possible objectives and restrictions, classified into physical 
resources, time, mental capacity and information, and institutions.  
 
In general, the literature supports the neoclassic assumption that fishermen are maximising 
their utility through profit maximisation. Furthermore, the focus has primarily been on 
restrictions related to physical resources and time due to their relatively straightforward 
measurement. However, some papers have also investigated other restrictions in different 
contexts.  
 
Status 
The paper is forthcoming as a working paper published by the Food and Resource Economics 
Institute. 
 
 
Paper 2: 
Using different inputs and outputs to estimate technical efficiency in fisheries: An 
application to Danish seiners in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
The number of articles analysing technical efficiency in fisheries has risen considerably in the 
last couple of years, and many different measures of inputs and outputs have been. At 
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present, however, no consensus has been established about which measures to use in such an 
analysis. In order to give some insight into which measures to choose, this paper estimates 
technical efficiency using three different output measures and two different input measures. 
The estimations are performed assuming that the functional form of the estimated production 
frontier can be represented by the flexible translog function. Furthermore, inefficiency 
models are estimated in order to explain why some vessels do not behave as best practice. 
The dataset used covers the Danish seiner fleet fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak in the 
period 1987 to 1999. 
 
The results show that it is not highly important whether output is measured in catch weight or 
catch revenue with respect to level of technical efficiency and estimation of the inefficiency 
model, at least for the dataset used. However, using revenue-weighted catch weight as the 
output measure generally gives other results. Looking at output elasticities, the results are not 
as decisive. The choice of input measure also has little influence on technical efficiency, but 
the level of output scale elasticity is affected. Results from the estimated inefficiency models 
indicate that inefficiency decreases with increases in size, that full-time fishermen are more 
efficient than other types of fishermen, and that experience with the primary fishing area 
reduces inefficiency. 
 
Status 
An earlier draft of this paper has been published as working paper no. 10/2002 at the Food 
and Resource Economics Institute. It has also been presented at the 14th annual conference of 
the European Association of Fisheries Economists in Faro, Portugal, 25-27 March 2002. 
 
 
Paper 3: 
Inclusion of stocks in multi-species fisheries: The case of Danish seiners 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
Efficiency analysis in fisheries has become an area of increased research. However, setting 
up models to perform such analyses is complicated and several important modelling issues, 
including choice of inputs and outputs, level of aggregation and inclusion of stock indices, 
have only briefly been addressed in the literature. Using data on Danish seiners and Data 
Envelopment Analysis to estimate efficiency, the latter issue is addressed in this paper. 
Production in fisheries is obviously dependent on the fish stocks. Comparing vessels 
efficiency therefore needs to account for stock developments. Three methods to include fish 
stock are analysed. It is shown that estimations based on Catch Per Unit Effort stock measure 
gives other results than the estimations based on independent stock measures, and that this is 
independent of the choice of time horizon and choice of input/output measures. 
 
Status 
The paper is published in Marine Resource Economics 2005, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 163-184. 
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Paper 4: 
Rational Inefficiency in Fisheries 
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Efficiency evaluations of Decision Making Units (DMUs) are usually done ex post and not ex 
ante. This may be a too harsh approach, especially if the DMUs are operating under 
significant uncertainty. Fishermen are often considered to operate in such an environment. 
The output arising from using given inputs is seldom known with certainty, because external 
factors such as availability of fish, equipment performance and weather may have a 
significant influence. Thus, when fishermen decide the inputs to bring on a trip, they try to be 
in the best possible position to handle the expected uncertainty. This may result in bringing 
excess inputs that are not used or strictly needed. This situation will usually be interpreted as 
inefficiency in ex post analyses despite of the fact that it may have been rational to bring 
them in the first place. One can denote such inefficiency as rational inefficiency. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the allocation of inefficiency on the different input factors and 
we use this to infer which factors are most useful to insure against the ex ante risk. More 
specifically, we use the method from Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) to find the allocation of 
slack that is consistent with rational behaviour. Based on data from 308 Danish vessels, we 
show that fishermen tend to allow for the highest flexibility in crew payments, followed by 
fuel costs. Sales costs and ice/provision costs seem to be the least flexible. Based upon 
specific utility functional forms, we find support for these conclusions.  
 
Status 
The paper is work in progress. A previous version has been presented at the 16th annual 
conference of the European Association of Fisheries Economists in Rome, Italy, 5-7 April 
2004. 
 
 
Paper 5: 
Quota Trading and Profitability: Theoretical Models and Applications to Danish 
Fisheries 
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we provide a framework to analyze the potential 
gains from quota trading. We compare the industry profit and structure before and after a free 
trade reallocation of production quotas. The effects of tradable production quotas depend on 
several technological and behavioural characteristics, including the ability to learn best 
practice (catch-up) and the ability to change the input and output composition (mix). To 
illustrate the usefulness of our approach, we analyze a dataset from the Danish fishery. We 
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study the potential gains to the industry from tradable quota under each of four sets of 
technological and behavioural characteristics. 
 
Status 
The paper is accepted for publication in European Journal of Agricultural Economics. It has 
also been selected and presented at the 15th annual conference of the European Association of 
Fisheries Economists in Brest, France 14-16 May 2003 and the 8th European Workshop on 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Oviedo, Spain, 24-27 September 2003. 
 
 
Paper 6: 
Potential gains from using Individual Transferable Quotas to regulate Danish fisheries  
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Previous articles have shown that there are significant gains to be expected from 
implementing an Individual Transferable Quota system within fisheries. Andersen and 
Bogetoft (2003) developed a new approach to calculate expected tradability gains in such 
systems. Using Data Envelopment Analysis, linear programming problems were formulated 
to capture reallocation gains under two behavioural restrictions. This considers the ability to 
learn best-practice and to change output composition. In this paper, we extend the proposed 
method by focusing on a complex of restrictions, which can be included in order to obtain 
more realistic estimations, when applied to specific fisheries. 
 
In order to illustrate the applicability, a dataset covering the entire Danish commercial fishery 
is utilised. Based on this, we estimate the tradability gains in the most flexible situation to be 
an increase in gross profits of around 90%. However, we also show that the potential gains 
are significantly reduced, if the flexibility in vessel behaviour is restricted. A series of policy 
implications is analysed including concentration, specialisation, market activity, price 
changes, etc. Attention has often been drawn to these effects when the implementation of 
Individual Transferable Quotas in fisheries is discussed. Finally, we analyse the 
consequences of exogenous chocks and changes in management practice in form of mesh size 
increases. 
 
Status 
The paper has been presented at different workshops including ‘Efficiency Evaluations and 
Allocations in Time and Space’ in Copenhagen, Denmark, 10th June, 2004. Furthermore has 
parts of this paper been published in the journal Fisk & Hav 2005, vol. 59, pp. 12-21 (in 
Danish). 
 
 
 
 
 10
References 
Andersen, P. (1983). On rent of fishing grounds: a translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 
article, with an introduction. History of Political Economy 15(3): 391-396. 
Carlson, E.W. (1975). The measurement of relative fishing power using cross section 
production functions. In Measurement of Fishing Effort. Edited by J.A. Pope. Rapports 
et procès-verbaux des réunions, The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 
vol. 168, Charlottenlund, Denmark. 
Chambers, R.G. (1988). Applied Production Analysis: A Dual Approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Coelli, T., D.S.P. Rao and G.E. Battese (1999). An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis. Third Printing, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Conrad, J.M. (1999). Resource Economics. Cambridge University Press. 
Cooper, W.W., L.M. Seiford and K. Tone (2000). Data Envelopment Analysis: A 
Comprehensive Text with Models, Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software. 
Second Printing, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Frey, B.S. (1999). Economics as a Science of Human Behaviour: Towards a New Social 
Paradigm. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, extended Second Edition. 
Holland, D.S. and J.G. Sutinen (1999). An empirical model of fleet dynamics in New 
England trawl fisheries. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 56: 253-
264. 
Kumbahkar, S.C. and C.A.K. Lovell (2000). Stochastic Production Analysis. First edition, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pascoe, S. (Editor) (2000). Bioeconomic modelling of the fisheries of the English Channel. 
Final Report FAIR CT96-1993. Research Report no. 53. CEMARE, Portsmouth, United 
Kingdom. 
 11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II 
 
Modelling and Evaluating  
Fishermen’s Behaviour  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
 13
Determinants of fishermen’s behaviour 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
In economic theory it is generally assumed that agents seek to maximise utility being derived 
from one measure (for instance profits) or several measures (for instance profits and 
adventure). The behaviour is however influenced by restrictions, which limit the solutions 
that are possible to obtain. This approach is also used in fisheries economics, where 
fishermen’s behaviour is influenced by many different factors such as weather, tradition and 
regulation. Considering that it is almost impossible to identify and model all the possible 
factors, it is important to include at least the most influential ones in a specific analysis to 
obtain the best possible description of fishermen’s behaviour. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the objectives and restrictions that influence 
fishermen’s short run behaviour based on a review of the extensive literature within fisheries 
economics. Initially, a framework for the review of fishermen’s behaviour is derived from the 
economic theory about human behaviour. Based on this, fishermen’s behaviour is 
investigated with respect to possible objectives and restrictions, classified into physical 
resources, time, mental capacity and information, and institutions.  
 
In general, the literature supports the neoclassic assumption that fishermen are maximising 
their utility through profit maximisation. Furthermore, the focus has primarily been on 
restrictions related to physical resources and time due to their relatively straightforward 
measurement. However, some papers have also investigated other restrictions in different 
contexts.  
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Fishermen, behaviour, short run, objectives, restrictions  
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Introduction 
Many different types of analyses within social science have been performed historically for 
fisheries. However, no matter the type of analysis, detailed knowledge about the fishermen’s 
behaviour is required in order to obtain realistic research results. For instance, in setting up 
bioeconomic models that combine both economic and biological considerations in fisheries, 
one of the primary parts is related to the behaviour of fishermen. Despite the purpose of the 
bioeconomic model, the assumptions about fishermen’s behaviour are critical for the results, 
and thus conclusions, reached as noted in Wilen (1979). Wrong assumptions about the 
behaviour may/will implement results that are very different to the true results. This can have 
considerable consequences as phrased by Bockstael and Opaluch (1983, p. 126): “without 
detailed and accurate prediction of firms’ response to policies, regulation can have 
unexpected and adverse results”. 
 
An encyclopaedia definition of human behaviour describes it as the collection of activities 
influenced by culture, attitude, emotions, values, ethics, authority, rapport, hypnosis, 
persuasion and coercion. A significant number of factors can thus have an effect on 
behaviour, but considering all these in specific analyses is often not possible due to 
measurement problems and estimation practicalities. However, in order to obtain a reasonable 
level of realism, it is important to include the most essential ones and be aware of how the 
excluded factors can influence the derived results. 
 
From an economic point of view, fishermen’s behaviour can principally be described as one 
seeking to compose the use of production inputs, including fish stocks, in such a way that 
profits are maximised. It is however important to initially be aware that the behavioural 
model may depend on the type of fishermen being analysed. A distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial fishermen hence seems obvious. 
 
Commercial fishermen fish to make a living, and run their activities as firm-like as possible 
with recognition of the special features characterising fisheries. The most plausible 
behavioural model of a commercial fisherman is therefore an economic model, as noted by 
Carlson (1975). However, describing the behaviour of fishermen (and human behaviour in 
general) by using an economic model is not a straightforward task, because no single 
accepted micro-economic theory of the decision making by fishermen exists, cf. Kirkley and 
Strand (1988).  
 
Non-commercial fishermen, which can also in some sense be considered as recreational 
fishermen, may on the other hand have a behavioural model which is different from the one 
characterising commercial fishermen. Economic forces do supposedly not drive them in the 
same degree as in the case for commercial fishermen. Instead fishing is performed as a 
hobby, where the benefits are of a more immeasurable character, such as the joy of fishing 
and good fellowship. These factors are most likely also present in commercial fisheries as 
well, but they are not considered the driving force for their behaviour.  
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It is also necessary to consider the time perspective when analysing fishermen’s behaviour, 
despite the fact that it complicates things. As mentioned by Bockstael and Opaluch (1983), a 
deduction can be made between three different time perspectives in fisheries. These are the 
short run where target species are chosen, the intermediate run where gear type and location 
in form of fishing area are chosen, and finally there is the long run, where investments and 
sector entry/exit are determined. The short and intermediate runs coincide to some extent, 
considering that if one of these is chosen, the other one is partly dependent on this. 
 
The short and intermediate run horizons are primarily applicable when analysing 
consequences of using management instruments such as quota restrictions, closed areas, 
closed seasons, limited entry and technical restrictions. In this type of analysis, it is highly 
relevant to investigate the plausible changes in catches and locations, which the fishermen 
can be expected to take, if these instruments are implemented. The long run analysis on the 
other hand primarily relates to the capacity discussion about the optimal size of the fishing 
fleet and thus investments. In order to limit the following analysis, the focus will only be on 
the behaviour related to the short and intermediate run decisions1, and will for simplicity be 
referred to as short run.  
 
With all of the above in mind, the purpose of this paper is to review some of the most 
important contributions to the description of commercial fishermen’s behaviour in the short 
run. The behaviour of non-commercial fishermen will not be considered, but many of the 
points made will be applicable for them as well.  
 
The focus in this paper will be on an economic approach to behavioural modelling, which is 
as mentioned plausible when only commercial fishermen are considered. However, in order 
to obtain a more formalistic framework for describing fishermen’s behaviour, the review will 
start with a brief examination of the general theory of human behaviour in section 1. The 
purpose is to set up the primary components that are necessary to address in the following 
sections. Sections 2 and 3 will then review some of the tremendous amount of literature 
within fisheries that describes fishermen’s short run behaviour. The focus in section 2 is on 
the objectives that fishermen are expected to have and how these can be measured, while 
section 3 reviews the restrictions that fishermen encounter, when conducting their fishing 
activity. To close the paper, some final comments are made. 
 
 
1. A general framework of human behaviour 
Giving a brief and at the same time thorough description of human behaviour is not an easy 
task considering the vast amount of literature and theories that are available. The following 
                                                 
1 Theoretical considerations about investments within fisheries can be found in Clark (1985) and Clark, Clarke 
and Munro (1979) and some empirical applications are made in Bjørndal and Conrad (1987), Penson, Tettey and 
Griffin (1988) and Jensen (2000). 
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section will therefore not go deeply into the different topics, but instead summarise the main 
outlines of human behaviour as seen from an economic perspective in order to obtain a 
logical structure for the forthcoming sections. 
 
In his book from 1999, Bruno S. Frey described human behaviour in an economic sphere 
from the viewpoint of the “New Institutionalist Schools” of thought2. The "New 
Institutionalist Schools" are a collection of schools seeking to explain political, historical, 
economic and social institutions in terms of neoclassical economic theory. It seeks to expand 
the neoclassic rationality assumptions of maximisation and no scarcity of information with a 
broader view, where social rules become important to predict human behaviour. However, 
the New Institutionalist School does not exclude the neoclassic rationality approach. 
 
Following Frey (1999), the Neoinstitutionalist School describes human behaviour as being 
“determined by their wishes (preferences) and the constraints they face” (Frey 1999, p. 3). 
This general approach will be used in the following to describe human behaviour. 
 
In order to perform any analysis, it is thus essential to clarify which objectives humans are 
seeking to accomplish in order to rank his or her preferences3, and thus decide the behaviour 
that leads to the best fulfilment of these objectives. The objectives can thus be considered as 
the driving force behind all actions conducted by humans. Generally, it is in economic theory 
assumed that humans seek to maximise their utility. This leads to the question of how to 
measure utility, and many different possibilities have been put forward in the economic 
literature.  
 
The discussion of how to measure utility will be kept for the next section, but it should be 
noted that when analysing a group of humans, it is traditionally assumed that utility is 
measured in the same way. The reason for this assumption is a wish to keep the analysis from 
becoming too complicated and cumbersome. 
 
When deciding on a specific behaviour in order to obtain their objective, humans are usually 
restricted by many different factors such as “income, time, imperfect memory and calculating 
capacities, and other limited resources, and also by the available opportunities in the 
economy and elsewhere” Becker (1993, p. 386). Based on this citation, four groups of 
restrictions can be derived. 
  
The first group covers what Becker (1993) calls “income” and “other limited resources”. The 
former can more generally be referred to as the available physical resources that can directly 
be influenced by the human behaviour. The latter can be perceived as including resources that 
                                                 
2 Important contributors are Gary S. Becker, Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, Oliver Williamson and James 
Buchanan. 
3 Human preferences can be defined as the ranking or ordering over all possible behavioural patterns, no matter 
whether they are possible or not. 
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cannot (or only indirectly) be influenced by the human. Regarding the former, these 
restrictions can be modified. However, this is only to a certain extent, because it is for 
instance not possible to have a behaviour which imposes a cost in excess of the available 
money, including borrowing. The former cannot be modified by the human behaviour, but is 
still a physical restriction limiting his or her behavioural possibilities. Examples could 
include hours of sun, the number of fish in the oceans etc. 
 
The second group relates to “time”. Becker (1993) mentions time to be an important 
restriction considering that there are only 24 hours in each day and that this restriction cannot 
be changed, as is the case with the physical resources for instance. This of course increases 
the focus on the best possible utilisation of the time available. 
 
“Imperfect memory and calculating capacities” constitute the third group and can be referred 
to as the mental capacity of the human mind. Within the methodology of economics, these 
restrictions have primarily been discussed in relation to two rationality concepts. These are 
unbounded (unlimited) rationality and bounded (limited) rationality, as mentioned by 
Knudsen (1991). However, other types of rationality such as procedural rationality, intended 
rationality, subjective rationality and selective rationality have also been suggested, but these 
will not be described here. 
 
If human behaviour is assumed to be unbounded rational, it implies that the individual seeks 
to pursue self-interest under perfect information, i.e. has unlimited information about past, 
present and future events, and unlimited calculation power. These assumptions make the 
human capable of finding a maximising solution to the decision problem, given the 
restrictions faced. The neoclassic school of thought is the most well known economic 
methodology founded on the assumption of unbounded rationality. In this methodology it is 
assumed that agents being consumers are seeking to maximise their level of utility, while 
agents being producers are trying to maximise their profits (Quirk 1987). This school of 
thought, and thus the assumption of unbounded rationality, has gained many supporters, 
because it makes the mathematical formulations of a society more straightforward. 
 
Even though the new institutionalism is founded on the neoclassic theory, it disagrees with 
the assumption of unbounded rationality. Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1998, p. 207) 
formulate the most severe problem to be “the unrealistic demands of the mind”. Instead, an 
assumption of bounded rationality becomes relevant, because it assumes that humans are not 
equipped with full information and infinite calculation power when making their decisions. 
Thus, individuals are not capable of finding all possible solutions to their problems, and do 
therefore not necessarily obtain a maximising solution. A stopping rule is thus needed in 
order halt the search. One stopping rule could be to consider humans as optimising under 
constrained information, where the search for a better solution is stopped by taking “the costs 
of time, information and computation into account” (Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1998, p. 
208). Another stopping rule could be that humans have predefined a satisfying solution, and 
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then halt the search, when this is obtained. None of these solutions necessarily imply 
realisation of the maximising solution found under unbounded rationality. 
 
Friedman (1953) defended the unrealistic assumption of unbounded rationality by putting 
forward the famous as-if defence. This defence postulates that even though agents may be 
bounded rationally, only those who act as-if they were maximising will survive in the long 
term, thus a form of natural selection, where only the agents finding the maximising solution 
survives. 
 
The final fourth group “the opportunities available in the economy and elsewhere“ can be 
viewed as the restrictions imposed by the institutions embedded in society and the actions 
taken by other humans. Regarding the institutions, this refers to all the formal and informal 
rules and procedures embedded in the society, where the humans behave. The institutions are 
essential, because they describe the possibilities, but also the restrictions that humans are 
facing when determining their behaviour. According to Frey (1999), a distinction can be 
made between three different types of institutions: 1) decision making systems, 2) norms, 
traditions and other behavioural rules and 3) organisations. All these can have a significant 
influence on the behaviour conducted by agents in different situations. 
 
Decision making systems refer to the basis upon which decisions are taken in the society 
analysed, and include topics such as the laws and regulatory framework, how prices are 
determined and the distribution of authority. Regarding the norms, traditions and other 
behavioural rules, these are primarily determined historically through religion, upbringing, 
education, attitudes and motives4. Finally, organisations refer to all the different groups 
present in society. Among these are the state, interest groups and family associations, thus 
covering actions taken by other humans. 
 
In order to describe human behaviour it is hence necessary to specify the objectives, i.e. 
preferences and restrictions (physical resources, time, mental resources and institutions). 
These are all essential, because they define the environment in which the human behaviour 
and thus choices are being made. To clearly exemplify the set up, an illustrative situation in 
the two-input case is shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
                                                 
4 See McFadden (1999) for a further discussion of attitudes and motives. 
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Figure 1.1 Utility maximisation 
 
 
The human seeks to maximise his utility given by U, with U1>U2>U3. However, a restriction 
given by the dotted line restricts the use of input 1 and input 2. In order to maximise utility 
within the restriction, a point within the grey shaded area must therefore be chosen. It will 
therefore be optimal to use quantities of input 1 and input 2 as at point A, because this gives 
rise to the highest possible utility U2. Point B could give a higher utility U1, but is not 
possible due to the included restriction. Point C is on the other hand possible, but will only 
give a utility of U3, which is lower than in point A. 
 
With the above framework in mind for describing human behaviour, the following sections 
will review how utility is measured, and which restrictions can be found in the literature that 
analyses fishermen’s short run behaviour. 
 
 
2. The objectives of fishermen 
As mentioned in the previous section, economic theory generally assumes the overall 
individual objective to be one of utility maximisation. A commercial fisherman can be put 
into this framework as being a producer seeking to pursue a behaviour that leads to the 
maximisation of his utility level. Given the array of uncertainties found in fisheries, it is 
however commonly assumed that fishermen seek to maximise the expected utility, when 
making their ex ante decisions about gear and location choice5.  
 
As also mentioned, utility is not a concept which can be directly measured. It is therefore 
necessary to find relevant and measurable variables that are considered applicable to 
indirectly measure the level of utility, i.e. their objective. Despite recognising that utility 
maximisation is the overriding objective, the literature has traditionally referred to the 
quantitative measure of utility as being the objective. For example, if it is assumed that 
                                                 
5 The different uncertainties observed in fisheries will be discussed in the next section. 
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maximisation of utility is accomplished through profit maximisation, the objective is referred 
to as profit maximisation. This approach will also be used in the following. 
 
This section will firstly focus on different objectives fishermen can be assumed to have in 
relation to fisheries. Secondly, a review of empirical studies will be used to identify which 
objectives fishermen can be assumed to have. 
 
An array of different objectives leading to utility maximisation has been put forward in the 
literature of economics. The undisputedly most used for firms is profit maximisation, with 
profit defined as revenues minus costs. The explanation for choosing this could follow along 
the lines described in Opaluch and Bockstael (1984). Utility is derived from the level of 
wealth, which is affected by the level of profit. If the profit is positive (negative), the level of 
wealth increases (decreases) and utility rises (falls). Hence, when fishermen choose a location 
to fish in, they are assumed to select the one with the highest profit, if unbounded rationality 
is assumed. Likewise, if bounded rationality is assumed, they choose a location with a 
satisfying level of profit. 
 
Many examples can be found in the literature, where fishermen are assumed to be profit 
maximisers. Dating back to the first articles of fisheries economics by Jens Warming in 1911 
(Andersen 1983), this assumption has by far been the most utilised objective in the analysis 
of fishermen’s behaviour. A few examples include Squires (1987,1988) analysing the New 
England otter trawl fishery and Dupont (1990,1991) studying the British Columbia salmon 
fishery.  
  
Other monetary objectives have also been proposed as a practical method for indirectly 
obtaining utility maximisation. Baumol (1959) proposed to use revenue maximisation, i.e. 
fishermen choose to fish in the area where the highest catch value is obtained. Possible 
explanations for this objective were also put forward in Baumol (1959). One was that firms 
with low sales lost their visibility on the market, i.e. a marketing set back. Another 
explanation was personal self-interest from the executives due to a correlation between sales 
and personal payment. With respect to fisheries, only the latter explanation seems relevant 
depending on how the remuneration is calculated.  
 
Carlson (1973) proposes that revenue maximisation is a likely behavioural pattern when 
vessels have chosen an area to fish in. In this situation, fuel cost for instance is approximately 
known, and maximisation of revenue becomes the only way to obtain the highest profits. 
Kirkley and Strand (1988) analyse the trawl fishery on Georges Bank, New England, and 
assumes a single fixed input, thus making the revenue maximisation assumption reasonable. 
In such a fishery, revenue maximisation will coincide with profit maximisation. Several other 
articles, in which revenue maximisation is assumed, can be found in Squires and Kirkley 
(1995). 
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Cost minimisation has also been considered as a possible objective for fishermen. In 
situations with very fluctuating or uncontrollable revenues, it can be relevant to minimise the 
cost level. Fisheries are traditionally characterised by a high degree of stochasticity in catches 
due to factors such stock and price fluctuations, weather and luck, cf. Gates (1984), which 
can justify using cost minimisation as the objective. This measure is also relevant in a 
situation where the output level is specified, in for instance a management system based on 
total allowable catches. 
  
Compared to profit and revenue maximisation, cost minimisation has not been utilised as 
frequently in the fisheries literature as a utility maximising objective. Some examples are 
however available. For instance, Lipton and Strand (1992) assume that fishermen are cost 
minimisers with a predetermined output level in the Atlantic surf clam industry, and analyse 
the consequences of changes in stock size and regulations on the industry structure. Bjørndal 
and Gordon (2001) analyse the Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery and estimate the 
economic costs of harvesting herring for three different fleet segments. Gordon, Asche and 
Bjørndal (2002) estimate optimal quota size, potential rent and optimal fleet size in the output 
restricted Norwegian cod fishery using the behavioural assumption of cost minimisation. 
 
However, revenue maximisation and cost minimisation are basically identical to profit 
maximisation, if revenues or costs are assumed fixed in the short run. 
 
Examples of non-monetary objectives applicable as ways of obtaining utility maximisation 
are not straightforward. Anderson (1980) discusses the term Worker Satisfaction Bonus 
(WSB), and the importance of including this measure in the utility function. WSB covers an 
array of elements including “adventure, risk taking, challenges with the elements, fellowship, 
and ties to traditional behavior which satisfaction is presumably not available to the same 
degree in other types of work available to them” (Anderson 1980, p. 859). Being one’s own 
boss, competition with other fishermen, reputation and opportunity for self-development 
could be other examples of non-monetary measures, cf. Feeny, Hanna and McEvoy (1996). 
None of these measures are however directly measurable, or therefore applicable, when 
trying to model fishermen’s choices in the short run. One possible non-monetary measure 
could be travel time, which is measurable. Due to family reasons, fishermen could prefer 
fishing grounds close to the homeport, thus seeking to minimise the travel time in order to 
maximise utility. However, no models have to the knowledge of the author applied this 
approach in relation to fisheries. 
 
Instead of having only one objective constituting the objective of utility maximisation, one 
can also include several objectives in the analysis. This is known as multi-objective analysis. 
This type of analysis necessarily demands determination of the weights attached to each 
measure. For a given level of utility, a trade-off between the different objectives is thus 
obtained. Inclusion of several objectives only seems relevant if these to some extent are 
opposed to each other. Thus, it is not possible to have behaviour where more than one 
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objective is maximised at the same time. Further insights into the theory of multi-objective 
analysis can be found in Steuer (1986). 
 
To investigate the most common objectives that fishermen pursue in order to maximise their 
utility, a distinction can be made between two categories: 1) studies using estimation 
techniques based on available data of for instance effort and catches and 2) surveys explicitly 
asking fishermen about their objectives by using questionnaires. 
 
Several methods have been used to study and determine the objectives of fishermen. Hilborn 
and Ledbetter (1979) use descriptive statistics to analyse the location choice of the British 
Columbia purse seine fleet fishing for salmon. They conclude that this fleet tends to move 
between areas in order to maximise the economic gain (profit). They reject that the fishermen 
have maximisation of catch revenue as their objective. The economic gain is corrected using 
the relative desirability. In the given framework, this desirability can be considered a 
restriction in the fisherman’s optimisation problem. 
 
Both Dupont (1993) and Eales and Wilen (1986) use econometric methods in their analysis. 
Dupont (1993) analyses the location choice for the British Columbia salmon fishery on an 
individual level. Two approaches are used to measure expected utility. In the first, utility 
depends on profit and its variability, and in the second it depends on profit and wealth, 
defined as the sum of pre-known wealth and expected profitability of a fishing location. The 
conclusion is that profit is important for fishermen’s location choice, but also that wealth is 
even more important. Eales and Wilen (1986) examine the pink shrimp fishery, and cannot 
reject that fishermen are profit maximisers, when making their location choice. 
 
Turning attention to the method of questionnaire surveys, only a few have to the knowledge 
of the author been performed to reveal fishermen’s approaches to maximising utility. These 
are Hanna (1989), Frost et al. (1993), Hillis et al. (1995) and Robinson and Pascoe (1997)6. 
The first considers fishery in the United States, while the latter three focus on fishermen 
located in British ports. It has not been possible to obtain a copy of Hanna (1989), and the 
conclusions from the three other analyses will be briefly summarised in the following. 
 
Frost et al. (1993) interviewed 126 skippers on UK vessels landing their catches primarily in 
ports around the North Sea. The possible objectives put forward by the fishermen included 
maximisation of profit, revenue, labour share, quota uptake and other (i.e. good living, 
survival and highest possible catch).  
 
                                                 
6 Hanna and Smith (1993) used questionnaires to investigate 68 Oregon trawler captains’ attitudes towards their 
work (e.g. rewards and risks), resource use (e.g. resource status and effect of fishing) and fishery management 
(e.g. discards and wrong regulation). However, no direct investigation of objectives and restrictions were 
performed in this analysis. 
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Based on their answers, the skippers could initially be divided into skippers seeking to 
maximise their utility and skippers seeking to obtain a certain amount of utility, i.e. obtaining 
a satisfying level. The conclusion from the analysis by Frost et al. (1993)7 was that the 
primary part (66 per cent) of the skippers were seeking to pursue a maximising behaviour, 
while 40 per cent focused on profits. Combined, approximately 28 per cent were seeking a 
behaviour leading to profit maximisation. Interestingly, also a high proportion (22 per cent) 
of the interviewed had maximisation of revenue as their behavioural goal. However, as 
mentioned previously, this may be due fishermen considering costs as fixed, and is thus 
indirectly in line with profit maximisation. 
 
In total, 33 skippers fishing in the Irish Sea were questioned by Hillis et al. (1995). The 
results were similar to the ones obtained in Frost et al. (1993). Sixty-four per cent of the 
skippers were trying to maximise their objective, while 39 per cent focused on profits. 
Overall, 27 per cent tried to obtain profit maximisation. Obtaining maximisation of revenue 
was the most common answer for the skippers’ objective fishing in the Irish Sea. 
 
Robinson and Pascoe (1997) criticised the two analyses performed by Frost et al. (1993) and 
Hillis et al. (1995), for the lacking precision in the questions asked. However, in their survey 
covering the UK fishery in the English Channel, they did not directly ask a question 
regarding the fishermen’s objectives. Instead, they asked an array of different motivational 
question to a total of 64 vessels, and based on these answers they found enough evidence to a 
conclusion that the vessels behaved in a manner that led to profit maximisation. 
 
Even though the empirical work done to reveal fishermen’s objectives is not very extensive, 
there seems to be reasonable support for the conclusion that the most important objective is 
maximisation of profits, which is equal to the assumption made in the neoclassical theory of 
the firm. 
 
 
3. Restrictions influencing fishermen’s behaviour 
Besides determining the objective of fishermen, the other important part is to evaluate under 
which restrictions/constraints this objective is pursued in the short run, when deciding the 
choice of gear type and the location to fish in. Using the formalistic framework reviewed in 
section 1, an overall distinction can be made between restrictions related to physical 
resources, time, mental capacity and institutions. This section will discuss these in detail, 
with reference to analyses from fisheries whenever possible. 
 
Some of the restrictions can be viewed as individual for each vessel, while others influence 
all vessels. Furthermore, some restrictions may influence the vessels differently. Take for 
instance traditions. Some skippers may have long historic family traditions of fishing in a 
                                                 
7 The questionnaire used in Frost et al. (1993) can be found in Valatin (1991). 
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specific area, while other skippers are more flexible in this respect. It is necessary to bear in 
mind when discussing the restrictions that fishermen are limited by. 
 
 
3.1 Physical resources 
As mentioned previously, the physical resources that restrict a fisherman can be divided into 
those that can be changed and those cannot be changed.  
 
The changeable physical resources primarily refer to the view of the fishing vessel, which can 
be described in many different ways. When considering the physical resources of a vessel in 
the short run, it is advantageous to make a deduction between fixed and variable inputs.  
 
The fixed inputs are given in the short run and can thus not be changed8. As obvious 
examples of fixed inputs, the most prominent are the length, tonnage and engine power size. 
These inputs are important restrictions in the plausible behaviour. For instance, small-sized 
vessels with low engine power are physically restricted in participating in high-seas fisheries, 
while large vessels on the contrary often are restricted from conducting coastal fishing. Other 
important physical inputs fixed in the short run are for instance building materials, age of 
vessel and electronic equipment such as echo sounders, satellite navigation and radar. 
 
The variable inputs can on the other hand be changed in the short run, although this can be 
costly for some. Examples of such variable inputs are gear equipment, amount of fuel, crew 
size and its composition. The gear equipment such as mesh size of nets is important with 
respect to the species caught. Likewise, the crew size is important in order to obtain and 
process the catch. However, the composition of the crew may also be important. For instance, 
a good combination between older and younger crew members could be valuable in order to 
have experience and strength onboard. The amount of fuel restricts the radius of actions and 
the possibilities for conducting searches for fish, when arriving at the decided fishing 
location. 
 
In particular, the fixed physical resources are highly utilised in analysing fishermen’s 
behaviour, because these are relatively easy to measure and therefore obtain. Many articles 
have therefore used these in specific analyses. Vessel tonnage was for instance included in 
Kirkley and Strand (1988), Dupont (1991), Squires and Kirkley (1991), Campbell and 
Nicholl (1994), Alam, Omar and Squires (1996), Jensen (2000) and Bjørndal and Gordon 
(2001), while Diop and Kazmierczak (1996) and Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe (2003) 
used engine power; Ward and Sutinen (1994) used vessel length and tonnage; Pradhan and 
Leung (2004) used length and vessel age; Pascoe and Robinson (1998) used deck area, 
                                                 
8 In the long run time horizon, these fixed physical characteristics of the vessels can be changed through 
investments, and the fishermen can thus change their effect as behavioural restrictions. 
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engine power and gear size; and Campbell (1991) used advanced technology, gross tonnage, 
year of construction, engine power and fuel tank capacity. 
 
By far the most prominent physical input which restricts the fishermen, but which they 
cannot influence directly, is the stock situation of the species caught. Because stock is such 
an important component, it is included in several analyses. For instance, yearly dummies are 
used in Squires (1987) and Campbell and Nicholl (1994) to account for stock variation, while 
monthly dummies are included in Campbell (1991). In some articles some kind of stock 
index is used instead of dummies. Dupont (1991) used a stock index calculated using catch 
and escapement data, Ward and Sutinen (1994) also used a fishery independent index 
delivered by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe 
(2003) used stock information from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES), while Pradhan and Leung (2004) used an index based on catch per unit of effort.  
 
 
3.2 Time 
The daily limitation of 24 hours is for fishermen a naturally given restriction (as it is for other 
people). For a fisherman, the time at sea can be divided between several activities, cf. Hilborn 
and Walters (1992) and Hannesson (1993). These are travel time (steaming time), search 
time, fishing time and handling time. The relative distribution between the four activities may 
differ from vessel to vessel, depending on the location and type of fishery. For instance, if a 
vessel fishes at a location far away from the homeport, it has a higher proportion of travel 
time compared to a vessel fishing close to its homeport, ceteris paribus. 
 
It is seldom that detailed information about the distribution of the different activity measures 
is available, and the most utilised measure is therefore number of days at sea, cf. Carlson 
(1973). From an economic point of view, it is important to include all the time at sea in an 
analysis of fishermen’s behaviour, because all activities at sea give rise to revenues and costs. 
However, for some gear types, the suitable time measure must include more than the number 
of days at sea. Take for instance vessels using nets and pots. These vessels go out, set the nets 
or pots, go back home, and then return the following day to collect their catch. In this 
situation, the number of days at sea will give an inadequate description of the time 
consumption. 
 
Fishermen can of course seek to utilise the time at sea in the best possible way. This can for 
instance be done by having a well rested crew ready to work hard, setting the gear in the most 
favourable time of the day, using steaming time to prepare or de-rig the gear and so forth.  
 
Giving the importance of time, it has therefore been included as a restriction in most of the 
analyses of fishermen’s behaviour. For instance, Kirkley and Strand (1988) used days absent 
from port, Dupont (1991) used number of fishing days, Campbell and Nicholl (1994) used the 
number of sets, Diop and Kazmierczak (1996) the number of days spent fishing, Pascoe and 
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Robinson (1998) used hours fished per day, and Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe (2003) used 
days at sea. 
 
 
3.3 Mental capacity and information 
Evaluating the mental capacity and calculating the capability of fishermen and agents in 
general is very difficult. To the knowledge of the author, no analysis has been made about 
this with regards to fishermen. However, in most articles, fishermen are assumed to have a 
maximising behaviour. A noteworthy exception is Anderson (2002), where fishermen are 
assumed to have profit goal behaviour instead of a profit maximising behaviour. 
 
Assuming that fishermen have perfect information about all past, present and future events 
and their consequences is unrealistic. The number of uncertainties in fisheries are numerous, 
which restricts such behaviour, and as mentioned in the previous section, these uncertainties 
result in fishermen maximising their expected utility. Clark, Munro and Charles (1985) 
distinguish between economic and biological uncertainties, while Gates (1984) gives 
examples hereof. These examples include uncertainties about stock size and catch rates, 
prices, weather and quality of inputs, but other examples could also be mentioned including 
regulatory changes. 
 
Economists acknowledge these facts, and several articles include this in analysing 
fishermen’s behaviour. Andersen (1982) and Dupont (1993) focused on uncertainties with 
respect to output prices, Andersen and Sutinen (1984), Ward and Sutinen (1994), Mistiaen 
and Strand (2000) and Baldursson and Magnússon (1997) analysed uncertainties with respect 
to fish stocks, Eggert and Tveterås (2004) focused on uncertainties with respect to catches in 
general, while Smith (2002) and Wilen et al. (2002) included weather variables. 
 
It has also been investigated how fishermen seek to collect additional information about fish 
stocks in order to know where the fish can be found and thus allow them to make better 
decisions. These include Wilson (1990), Smith and Provencher (2003), Marcoul and 
Wenninger (2004) and Curtis and McConnell (2004). Allen and McGlade (1986) take the 
quality of the obtained information into consideration. Curtis and Hicks (2000) include the 
number of vessels in a given area, assuming that this indicates the quality of the area, where 
the trade-off is that too many vessels and congestion makes the area less attractive. 
 
 
3.4 Institutions 
An array of institutions influences the behaviour of fishermen. These could be viewed as the 
foundation upon which fishermen’s behaviour is governed, and thus include all the formal 
and informal rules/relations that are present in society. In order to describe these institutions, 
a distinction was previously made between 1) decision making systems, 2) norms, traditions 
and other behavioural rules and 3) organisations. A range of topics relate to these institutions. 
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However, despite their importance topics, such as how prices are determined in the economy 
and which political regime is installed, are not addressed in the relevant literature, and will 
therefore not be covered in the following.  
 
An important restriction in fishermen’s behaviour is the regulatory system, which the fishery 
is subject to. When analysing the regulatory system, a distinction can be made between the 
general regulation principles and the specific regulation instruments used. The general 
principles lay the foundation for the type of property-right regime the fishermen are operating 
in. Feeny, Hanna and McEvoy (1996) refer to the four basic ideal types being open access, 
private property, communal property and state property. In specific fisheries, variants of these 
can be found in the form of for instance restricted open access, etc. 
 
The general regulatory principles are often supported by an array of more specific 
regulations, which are installed to counteract particular unwanted effects and thus obtain a 
more suitable utilisation of the fish resource. Examples of specific regulation measures can 
for instance be restrictions on mesh size and landing size, closed areas, quotas and limitations 
on the number of days at sea.  
 
Reviewing the literature about the influence of regulation on fishermen’s behaviour in the 
short run, reveals that this has especially focused on the topic of fishermen substituting 
between regulated and non-regulated inputs. Examples hereof are found in Campbell (1991), 
Dupont (1990,1991), Lipton and Strand (1992), Clay and Revell (1998), Pascoe and 
Robinson (1998), Del Valle, Astorkiza and Astorkiza (2000). Lipton and Strand (1992) 
investigate consequences on the industry structure when the regulation on number of hours a 
vessel is allowed to fish surf clams per season is changed.  
 
Norms, traditions and other behavioural rules include a multifarious set of elements, which 
are mainly formed over long time periods. Previously, religion, upbringing, education, 
attitudes and motives were mentioned as being relevant parts. However, despite their 
importance for fishermen’s behaviour, the primary focus in empirical analyses has been on 
education and risk attitudes. 
 
As with other branches, education and skills are important for fishermen’s behaviour, cf. 
Squires and Kirkley (1999). Despite the general problems of identifying and describing 
education and skills, some attempts have been made. In Campbell (1991) each skipper is 
graded by independent fishery officers, while Alam, Omar and Squires (1996) use a dummy 
to indicate whether the skipper is trained or not. Del Valle, Astorkiza and Astorkiza (2000) 
use the ratio between the number of small landings and total landings as a measure of skipper 
skills. Hutton et al. (2004) include the lagged catch value of a given area as a measure of 
experience. 
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Investigation of fishermen’s attitudes toward risk has been the topic in several articles. Three 
types of risk attitudes can be identified cf. Friedman and Savage (1948). These are risk-
aversion, risk-neutrality and risk-perversion/loving/seeking. In short, risk-neutrality implies 
that one is indifferent to risk and will neither pay to avoid it nor to take it, thus risk does not 
affect the decisions. Risk-aversion is where less risk is preferred to more risk, while risk-
perversion implies the opposite. Whether fishermen’s preferences towards risk have an 
influence on their behaviour was investigated in Mistiaen and Strand (2000). Fishermen’s 
risk preferences have generally been investigated by including variables indicating the 
variability in the utility measure. Holland and Sutinen (1999,2000) found indications of risk-
loving behaviour, as did Dupont (1993). Larson, Sutton and Terry (1999), Pradhan and Leung 
(2004) and Eggert and Tveterås (2004) on the other hand observed risk-averse behaviour. 
Furthermore, Strand (2004) concluded that risk preferences can vary spatially between 
fishermen.  
 
Traditions are generated through time, where experience and information are carried on from 
family or the local community. Traditions can be positive, because it gives fishermen a set of 
rules to conduct their activities within. It may however also be negative, if these for instance 
restrict fishermen from diverting to other untraditional activities. The importance of traditions 
with respect to fisheries has been discussed in several articles, cf. Bockstael and Opaluch 
(1983) and Chakravorty and Nemoto (2001). However, only a few seek to include this in a 
description of fishermen’s behaviour. Holland and Sutinen (1999,2000) include habit 
variables to reflect whether the current behaviour collides with previous behaviour in the last 
ten days. Another interesting aspect is the ethnicity of the fishermen. Alam, Omar and 
Squires (1996) find this to have an influence on fishermen’s behaviour. Pradham and Leung 
(2004) find significant inertia between the current quarter’s trip type and the previous 
quarter’s trip type, and relate this to belief, tradition, habit and skill. 
 
The interrelationship between different organisations and the fishermen is difficult to 
describe and quantify in empirical analysis. The most obvious and quantifiable topics have 
been discussed above, i.e. management by the state and family traditions. However, other 
organisations may also influence fishermen’s behaviour. An obvious example is 
environmental organisations seeking to preserve the sea habitats. Other organisations such as 
oil producers, windmill producers and so forth may also have a perceptible influence on 
fishermen’s behaviour. Unfortunately, the number of articles discussing the relationships is 
limited. However, parallels can be drawn to the theory of marine reserves/protected areas, 
because this involves the closure of specific areas for fishing activities9.  
 
 
                                                 
9 See for instance Hannesson (1998) for further insight into the topic of marine reserves. 
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Final comments 
Investigation into fishermen’s behaviour and the factors that drive this behaviour is an 
important area to perform research within. Improving this knowledge will lead to improved 
research results, because previously unexplained effects become explainable. This will then 
hopefully spill-over into better management of the fishery giving rise to improved 
profitability for fishermen and society in general.  
 
In this paper, a significant number of papers have been reviewed in order to identify the 
primary factors influencing fishermen’s behaviour with respect to choice of gear type and 
fishing location, i.e. short run choices. A more general framework for approaching 
fishermen’s behaviour has been presented. Based on the New Institutionalist School of 
thought this has led to a distinction between objectives and restrictions, where the latter can 
furthermore be subdivided into restrictions related to physical resources, time, mental 
capacity and information, and finally institutions.  
 
Reviewing the significant amount of literature specifically studying fishermen’s behaviour, 
we find evidence in the literature for assumptions made in the neoclassical theory of the firm. 
Fishermen primarily seek to maximise their utility through profit maximisation. However, 
this maximisation is performed under a series of restrictions. In the literature, the focus has 
primarily been on the physical resources and time. This is probably due to the fact that data 
for these are relatively easy to measure and thus obtain. The other restrictions are more 
cumbersome to identify and collect for individual vessels, but it has been possible in some 
situations, as also noted. 
 
For specific analyses, it is difficult to include every element that influences the fishermen’s 
choices. First of all, measurement problems may simply exclude restrictions, because these 
are impossible to quantify in a satisfying way. The analysis may also be significantly 
cumbersome to perform, if all considerations about the restrictions need to be taken into 
account. Furthermore, some of the restrictions may be of such little importance that the 
benefits from inclusion do not bear comparison with the difficulties of inclusion. 
 
Identifying all the factors influencing fishermen’s behaviour is however still important, 
regardless of whether they are included in the specific analysis or not. Having identified 
these, it becomes easier to explain some unexpected results found in the specific analysis, 
which cannot be evaluated based on the included factors. 
 
Although much research has been performed with respect to fishermen’s behaviour, there is 
still need for more research. Often analysis is concentrated on a simplistic fishery, which 
makes it difficult to extend the results to more diversified fisheries. Research also needs to 
focus more on other factors that are given less attention, although acknowledging that this 
may be rather difficult. 
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Using different inputs and outputs to estimate technical efficiency 
in fisheries: An application to Danish seiners in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
The number of articles analysing technical efficiency in fisheries has risen considerably in the 
last couple of years, and many different measures of inputs and outputs have been applied. At 
present, however, no consensus has been established about which measures to use in such an 
analysis. In order to give some insight into which measures to choose, this paper estimates 
technical efficiency using three different output measures and two different input measures. 
The estimations are performed assuming that the functional form of the estimated production 
frontier can be represented by the flexible translog function. Furthermore, inefficiency 
models are estimated in order to explain why some vessels do not behave as best practice. 
The dataset used covers the Danish seiner fleet fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak in the 
period 1987 to 1999. 
 
The results show that it is not highly important whether output is measured in catch weight or 
catch revenue with respect to level of technical efficiency and estimation of the inefficiency 
model, at least for the dataset used. However, using revenue-weighted catch weight as the 
output measure generally gives other results. Looking at output elasticities, the results are not 
as decisive. The choice of input measure also has little influence on technical efficiency, but 
the level of output scale elasticity is affected. Results from the estimated inefficiency models 
indicate that inefficiency decreases with increases in size, that full-time fishermen are more 
efficient than other types of fishermen, and that experience with the primary fishing area 
reduces inefficiency. 
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Introduction 
An array of different input and output measures are available for analysing technical 
efficiency in fisheries. The former is often in form of tonnage, engine power, length, 
insurance value and/or fishing time, while the latter is in form of catch weight and catch 
revenue. Despite of the many efficiency analyses that have been performed using these 
measures, there does not seem to be a general consensus about which type of output measure 
to use and the specific way to include the input measures. 
 
The outputs produced by fishing vessels can as mentioned be quantified in different ways. 
Alvarez (2001) distinguished between three in form of weight, revenue or different 
combinations thereof. Various arguments can be put forward as to which approach should be 
chosen, however it is unclear whether this choice has any consequences on the output 
elasticities and the level of technical efficiency. One purpose of this paper is therefore to 
investigate the effects of using different output measures, when investigating technical 
efficiency. 
 
Turning attention to the measurement of the inputs used in a fishery, it is often convenient to 
make a distinction between variable and fixed inputs. An input such as fishing time can be 
regarded as a variable input, because it can be changed in the short run, i.e. it is a flow. On 
the other hand, fixed inputs such as tonnage and engine power can be viewed as capacity or 
stock measures, because they cannot be changed in the short run. Combining the variable and 
fixed measures into one measure gives an input which can be referred to as a ‘service flow’, 
cf. Campbell and Hand (1998). A service flow can thus be defined as the product between the 
variable and fixed inputs, and i.e. gives the intensity by which the fixed inputs are used in a 
specific period.  
 
There does not seem to be a clear approach in the literature as to whether the fixed and 
variable inputs should be included separately in the production function or as a service flow. 
For instance, Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1995), Sharma and Leung (1999), Eggert (2001), 
Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde (2001) all included the fixed and variable inputs separately in 
the production frontier function, while Campbell and Hand (1998) and Squires et al. (1998) 
used the service flow approach1. Another purpose of this paper is therefore to analyse 
whether the approach used has any influence on the estimated levels of technical efficiency. 
 
The two purposes mentioned above will be pursued by examining the estimates of technical 
efficiency and output elasticities derived from the estimated production frontiers. 
Furthermore, some reasons for any observed technical inefficiency can be extracted from the 
estimated inefficiency models, and by comparing these, further insight will be gained with 
respect to the input and output choice. 
                                                 
1 Smit (1996) also used a service flow approach to analyse productivity developments in fishing effort of a 
Dutch Cutter fleet. 
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In order to address these questions a dataset has been compiled, which covers all the Danish 
seiners fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak in the period from 1987 to 1999. In total there 
were 118 Danish seiners registered in the Danish vessel register in 1999, and the main part of 
these have fished in the two areas included. The Dane Jens Væver invented in 1848 the 
fishing method, which these vessels use, and it was designed to catch flatfish, especially 
plaice. However, this fishery has experienced hard times in recent years, primarily due to 
declines in stocks and heavy regulation. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 briefly explains the theory of stochastic 
production frontiers, while Section 2 describes the dataset used. Section 3 describes the 
stochastic production model to be estimated and Section 4 presents the estimated production 
frontiers and some specification tests are performed. The impact on the level of technical 
efficiency from choosing different input and output measures are analysed in Section 5, while 
the output elasticities are calculated in Section 6 and compared for the different output 
measures. Section 7 presents estimates of the inefficiency models, and besides explaining the 
observed inefficiencies, these are also discussed with respect to the choice of input and output 
measures. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. The theory of technical efficiency 
The historical starting point of the theory of efficiency is considered to be the paper from 
1957 by M.J. Farrell in which he distinguished between technical and allocative efficiency, 
using the terms in Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999). Looking at technical efficiency from an 
output perspective, a firm is considered to be technically efficient if it produces the maximum 
possible output, given the level of inputs. Allocative efficiency can be separated into input 
and output allocative efficiency. The former refers to choosing the optimal input mix for 
given input prices and production technology, while the latter refers to choosing the optimal 
output mix for given output prices. If all these are fulfilled, then the given firm maximises 
profits (Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde 2001). 
 
Due to data limitations only technical efficiency will be analysed. A prerequisite for finding 
the level of technical efficiency is to find the observed best-practice. Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) proposed independently of each 
other how to estimate the following stochastic production frontier (with time included): 
 
 Yj,t = f(Xj,t;β) + vj,t – uj,t (1)
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where Yj,t denotes the output2 produced by firm j at time t, Xj,t is a (1 x k) vector of inputs 
used by firm j at time t and β is a ((k+1) x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
The random errors (noise) for firm j at time t are denoted by vj,t, and it accounts for non-
controllable factors, e.g. weather and luck, cf. Gates (1984). The random errors are assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed and to follow a normal distribution with mean 
zero and variance 2vσ .  
 
Technical inefficiency for firm j at time t is represented by the term uj,t, which is assumed to 
be non-negative, independently and identically distributed with a variance given by 2uσ . If uj,t 
equals zero, then firm j is fully efficient at time t, and therefore produces on the production 
frontier. However, if uj,t is larger than zero, then firm j is inefficient at time t. 
 
Different types of distributions can be assumed for the inefficiency term uj,t, i.e. half-normal 
(Jondrow et al. 1982), truncated normal (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977), exponential 
(Meeusen and van der Broeck 1977) or gamma distribution (Greene 1990). However, if the 
purpose of the analysis also is to find possible reasons for any observed inefficiencies, the 
formulation of an inefficiency model becomes relevant. Battese and Coelli (1995) propose 
the inefficiency to modelled as: 
 
 uj,t = δzj,t + wj,t (2)
 
where δ is a vector (m x 1) containing unknown parameters of the inefficiency model 
(including the intercept) and z is a vector of inputs (1 x m) and w is a random error like v. 
 
When an appropriate functional form for f has been chosen, the parameters in the stochastic 
frontier model can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, which is considered 
the best method, cf. Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999). The estimated f-function thus determines 
the frontier production, i.e. best practice/maximum output. Using this estimated function, the 
output of each firm can be compared to the output in the observed best-practice, and a 
measure of technical efficiency can be calculated.  
 
Technical efficiency is thus a relative measure of firm j’s observed output as a proportion of 
the frontier production, and can be calculated as follows, cf. Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999): 
 
 TEj,t = E(Yj,t⏐uj,t) ⁄ E(Yj,t⏐uj,t=0) (3)
 
                                                 
2 It is thus assumed that the production of a firm is either a single output or can somehow be aggregated into 
one. Methods accounting for several outputs have been developed, cf. Coelli and Perelman (1999, 2000), but 
they will not be utilised in this paper. 
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Considering that the stochastic production function is estimated using a parametric method, it 
is possible to impose a number of different restrictions on the parameters to test the structural 
form of the production function.  
 
The first test is whether there are any inefficiency effects in the model. If not, the model 
might as well be estimated using ordinary least squares instead of maximum likelihood. The 
test is γ = δ0 =…= δ(m-1) = 0, where γ is given as )/( 2v2u2u σ+σσ=γ . If the hypothesis is 
accepted, there are no deviations from the production frontier due to inefficiencies, but only 
due to stochastic errors. 
 
If the above test is rejected, there are inefficiency effects in the model. Whether it is 
significantly better to include an inefficiency model, instead of assuming that the inefficiency 
effects are following a normal distribution, can be tested using the following hypothesis δ1 
=…= δ(m-1) = 0. If accepted, we can assume that the inefficiencies follow a normal 
distribution with a mean value of δ0, i.e. the intercept, instead of including the proposed 
inefficiency model. 
 
It is also possible to test which functional form is the most appropriate for the stochastic 
frontier production function, for instance whether it is a translog (Christensen, Jorgenson and 
Lau 1973), generalised Leontief (Diewert 1971), Cobb-Douglas (Cobb and Douglas 1928) or 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (Arrow et al. 1961) function. If there are no arguments for 
choosing a specific functional form, Lau (1986) recommends using either generalised 
Leontief or translog production functions, because these do not restrict the parameters using a 
priori assumptions about the output- and substitution elasticities for instance. 
 
Generalised likelihood ratio statistics can be used to either accept or reject the above tests. 
The value of this is given as λ = -2×[ln{L(H0)}÷ln{L(H1)}], and is χ2-distributed3. Likewise, 
the generalised likelihood ratio statistics can be used to test whether to include variables or 
groups of variables in the inefficiency model.  
 
This brief theoretical review of the Stochastic Production Frontier approach can be further 
broadened by reading for instance Kumbahkar and Lovell (2000). A review of the computer 
programs available to perform estimations of the Stochastic Production Frontier can be found 
in Herrero and Pascoe (2002). 
 
 
2. Description of the dataset used 
A dataset has been derived from the official data on catches and vessel information collected 
by the Danish Directorate of Fisheries. The dataset includes monthly catches and number of 
                                                 
3 The first test regarding whether there are any inefficiency effects in the model is a one-sided LR-test, and 
follows the distribution given by Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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days at sea together with vessel characteristics for each of the included Danish seiners fishing 
in the North Sea or Skagerrak in the period from 1987 to 1999. In total, there are 19,573 
observations for 261 different vessels over the thirteen years. Table 2.1 shows how many 
observations and Danish seiners there are in the dataset for selected years. The average 
number of observations per vessel per year is also displayed, and a tendency of a decreasing 
number of observations is observed after a peak in 1991. This decrease can be explained by a 
general decrease in the number of Danish seiners, combined with decreasing fishing 
possibilities in the included areas. 
 
Table 2.1 Number of observations and vessels per year 
 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Number of observations 1,376 2,193 2,057 1,688 1,283 923 805
Number of vessels 146 231 213 191 148 108 98
Average number of obs. per vessel 9.42 9.49 9.66 8.84 8.67 8.55 8.21
 
 
In order to ensure robust and reliable results only vessels participating in the fishery for at 
least 25 months during the 13 years are included in the dataset. Table 2.2 displays how many 
times the included vessels were present in the dataset for different intervals, e.g. 32 vessels 
were in the dataset between 25 and 36 times (months). In addition, the total and average 
number of observations for these intervals is also included in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Number of times vessels are represented in the dataset 
 ---------------------------------------Interval -----------------------------------------
 
25-
36
37-
48
49-
60
61-
72
73-
84
85-
96
97-
108
109-
120
121-
132
133-
144
145-
156
Number of observations 957 1,745 2,066 2,035 1,551 2,680 1,738 2,087 2,905 1,662 147
Number of vessels 32 41 37 30 20 30 17 18 23 12 1
Average number of observations 30 43 56 68 78 89 102 116 126 139 147
 
 
Three measures of output will be used in the analysis performed in the following sections. 
The first is total aggregated catch weight, where the catch of the different species s (s=1,…S) 
is simply aggregated into one single measure without considering their relative importance, 
i.e. 
 ∑
=
=
S
1s
weight
s,t,j
weight
t,j YY  (4)
 
where Yj,t,s measures the catch weight of species s for vessel j in period t. 
 
The second output measure is total aggregated inflated catch revenue4 denoted as Yinf. revenue. 
It is inflated to 1999 values for each species before aggregation using a yearly index Ik 
(k=1987,…,1999)5, i.e. the output measure is calculated as: 
                                                 
4 Catch revenue is in the rest of this paper defined as the total or gross catch value, i.e. no costs are deducted.  
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 ∑
=
=
S
1s
s,k
value
s,t,j
revenue.inf
t,j IYY  (5)
 
where Yj,t,s now measures the catch revenue of species s for vessel j in period t.  
 
The final output measure is weighted catch weight, where the monthly catch weight of each 
species is weighted using monthly revenue-shares in order to take the importance of each 
species, (measured in monetary) terms into account, i.e.: 
 
 
( )∑∑=
=
⋅=
S
1s
weight
s,t,jS
1s
s,k
revenue
s,t,j
s,k
revenue
s,t,jweightweighted
t,j Y
IY
IY
Y  
(6)
 
Descriptive statistics for the three outputs used separately to estimate the level of technical 
efficiency in the Danish seiner fleet fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak can be found in 
Table 2.3. A similar development can be observed for these three measures; an increase in the 
output revenue until 1989, succeeded by a continued decrease until 1999, with a slight 
increase in 1997. An increase in the standard deviation is observed in the years 1995 to 1999, 
which implies that the observations for these years are more differentiated compared to the 
observations in the other years. 
 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics for output measures 
  1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
- Total 16,126 30,177 19,333 17,928 17,625 19,374 12,052Catch weight 
(tonnes) - Average per vessel 110 131 91 94 119 179 123
 - Standard deviation 43 64 38 57 90 348 56
- Total 8,759 16,617 10,111 8,456 8,832 11,890 6,621Weighted catch 
weight (tonnes) - Average per vessel 60 72 47 44 60 110 68
 - Standard deviation 26 49 24 21 59 311 31
- Total 217,976 398,886 290,907 253,255 254,116 227,279 178,380
- Average per vessel 1,493 1,727 1,366 1,326 1,717 2,104 1,820
Inflated catch 
revenue 
(1,000 DKK) - Standard deviation 601 759 593 883 1,286 1,401 927
Notes: The high standard deviation in 1997 (and 1996/1998, not shown here) is due to the presence of several 
Danish seiners with high catch weights. These have not been considered as outliers. 
 
 
Various input factors can be expected to influence the output level. A distinction can be made 
between fishing effort and fish stock (Andersen 1999). The former includes factors the 
fisherman can control, while the latter is not directly controllable. The fishing effort measure 
can further be divided into fishing power and fishing time, i.e. fixed and variable inputs in the 
short run. Fishing power includes input factors that cannot be changed in the short run, for 
instance tonnage, length, engine power, insurance value and crew size6. Descriptive statistics 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 The index was derived from Danish fishermen’s total catch revenue of each species landed in Danish ports. 
6 Crew size can in principle be changed in the short run, although the included measure for crew size is only 
declared on a yearly basis to the Directorate of Fisheries. 
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for these factors can be found in Table 2.4, where inflated insurance values are also 
included7. 
 
Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics for fishing power measures 
  1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Tonnage  - Total 5,183 8,266 7,796 7,024 5,524 4,181 4,007
(GT/GRT) - Average per vessel 35.50 35.78 36.60 36.77 37.32 38.71 40.89
 - Standard deviation 9.68 12.85 13.11 13.88 23.33 29.43 30.32
Length  - Total 2,507 3,967 3,694 3,315 2,543 1,856 1,714
(metres) - Average per vessel 17.17 17.17 17.34 17.35 17.18 17.19 17.49
 - Standard deviation 1.86 2.01 1.96 2.06 2.61 2.87 2.78
Engine power  - Total 20,429 33,983 32,148 28,951 23,135 17,356 16,338
(kW) - Average per vessel 139.92 147.11 150.93 151.58 156.32 160.71 166.72
 - Standard deviation 39.00 49.41 49.73 51.05 59.24 66.81 67.37
Insurance value  - Total (mill. DKK) 2,054 3,529 3,771 3,290 2,657 2,095 1,865
(1,000 DKK) - Average per vessel 1,493 1,609 1,833 1,949 2,071 2,270 2,317
 - Standard deviation 705 935 922 1,037 1,379 1,687 1,540
Inflated insurance value - Total (mill. DKK) 2,772 4,347 4,421 3,732 2,894 2,187 1,865
(1,000 DKK) - Average per vessel 2,015 1,982 2,149 2,211 2,255 2,369 2,317
 - Standard deviation 952 1,151 1,080 1,176 1,502 1,761 1,540
Crew size - Total 451 707 655 587 450 330 303
 - Average per vessel 3.09 3.06 3.08 3.07 3.04 3.06 3.09
 - Standard deviation 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.63 0.67 0.67
 
A graphical representation of the development in total and average fishing power measures 
can be seen in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. A similar decreasing development in total values is 
observed, and is due to the reduction in number of vessels in the dataset. However, the 
insurance value increased in 1991, and this can be attributed to general price increases in the 
Danish economy, since the inflated insurance value follows the same trend as the other 
measures.  
 
Figure 2.1 Development in total fishing power measures (1987=100) 
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7 The standard consumer price index was used to inflate the insurance value with 1999=100. 
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Figure 2.2 Development in average fishing power measures (1987=100)  
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As opposed to the development in total fishing power measures, there has been an almost 
continual increase in the average fishing power measures from 1987 until 1999. The increase 
is most significant for the insurance value, although this increase can again be attributed to 
the general price increases in the Danish economy, as described above. 
 
The measure of fishing time used in the analysis is the number of days at sea. This measure 
thus includes the time used for other purposes than fishing, e.g. travelling time and 
processing primarily in form of cleaning the fish caught. It could be argued that the time 
where the fishing gear is in use would be a more appropriate measure to use. However, 
considering that the analysis seeks to evaluate the technical efficiency related to all activities 
related to obtaining a catch, the number of days at sea is used as the fishing time measure8. 
From an economic point of view, this is also the best measure to use, because all activities 
have economics repercussions.  
 
From the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2.5, a significant reduction in the total number 
of days at sea can be observed, although it seems to have been relatively stable from 1997 to 
1999. This development is closely linked with the development in the number of Danish 
seiners in the dataset, considering that the average number of days at sea per vessel per month 
is almost constant during the thirteen years. 
 
                                                 
8 Comparing with an analysis where gear time is used as a measure of fishing time, could be an interesting topic 
for further analysis. However, data is currently not available. 
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Table 2.5 Number of days at sea 
 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Total 19,698 33,493 31,057 25,249 18,983 12,906 12,224 
Average per vessel per month 14.32 15.27 15.10 14.96 14.80 13.98 15.19 
Standard deviation per month 6.50 6.70 6.58 6.44 6.50 6.30 6.41 
 
 
The correlation coefficients between the output and fishing effort measures can be viewed in 
Table 2.6. A high correlation between weight and weighted weight is observed, while the 
inflated revenue of the catch is not highly correlated with the other two output measures. 
Tonnage, engine power, length and insurance value are also highly correlated, while crew 
size is not as highly correlated with the other fishing power measures. It can be observed 
from Table 2.6 that tonnage and insurance value are the fishing power measures having the 
highest correlations with the three output measures. Fishing time measured as the number of 
days at sea is most correlated with the inflated catch revenue. 
 
Table 2.6 Correlation between output and fishing effort measures 
 
Catch 
weight 
Weigh-
ted 
catch 
weight 
Inflated 
catch 
revenue Tonnage
Engine 
power Length
Insu-
rance 
value 
Inflated 
insu-
rance 
value 
Crew 
size 
Days at 
sea 
Catch weight 1.00          
Weighted catch weight 0.94 1.00         
Inflated catch revenue 0.51 0.30 1.00        
Tonnage 0.37 0.27 0.41 1.00       
Engine power 0.22 0.11 0.36 0.68 1.00      
Length 0.26 0.16 0.40 0.80 0.69 1.00     
Insurance value 0.33 0.19 0.47 0.85 0.74 0.73 1.00    
Inflated insurance value 0.32 0.18 0.46 0.84 0.74 0.74 0.99 1.00   
Crew size 0.19 0.10 0.34 0.52 0.48 0.59 0.59 0.60 1.00  
Days at sea 0.35 0.20 0.66 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.22 1.00 
 
 
Stock size is also supposed to be an important determinant of the catch level obtained from 
fishing, i.e. the more fish in the sea, the more will be caught for a given level of fishing effort, 
ceteris paribus. As mentioned by Alvarez (2001), the stock cannot be considered a traditional 
input in a production function, because the individual fisherman cannot directly control it. 
However, when performing analysis of over time, it would be a mistake to exclude it from the 
production frontier, if the relationship above is significant. 
 
Different methods have been used to include a fish stock measure in the production function. 
Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1995, 1998) used an index based measure on relative catch rates 
obtained from a supposedly bias free method, while Coglan, Pascoe and Harris (1998) and 
Pascoe and Robinson (1998) used dummy variables to account for stock effects. Pascoe, 
Andersen and de Wilde (2001) applied stock estimates obtained from the annual stock 
estimates made by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
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In this paper, the fish stock measure will be based on the annual stock estimates made by 
ICES, which assesses estimates for an array of fish stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak, 
including cod, plaice, sole, sprat, herring, mackerel, etc. Four of the most important species 
for the Danish seiners (measured in inflated revenue) are cod, plaice, haddock and European 
hake. Table 2.7 shows that these four species comprise more than 80% of the catches taken 
by the Danish seiners. A stock measure based on these four species will therefore cover the 
major part of the catches caught by the Danish seiners fishing in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak. 
 
Table 2.7  Inflated catch revenue composition for an average Danish seiner fishing in 
the North Sea and Skagerrak (%) 
 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Plaice* 46 52 49 46 35 45 47 
Cod* 41 34 27 33 46 38 35 
Lemon sole 2 3 6 6 4 3 5 
Haddock* 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 
Common dab 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
European hake* 1 2 4 3 2 1 1 
Witch flounder 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 
Catfish 2 1 3 1 1 0 1 
Anglerfish 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 
Turbot 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 99 99 96 97 96 97 98 
Total of biomass species 92 91 82 84 85 87 86 
Notes: * indicates species with biologically assessed biomass. 
 
 
Technically, the stock measure for each Danish seiner was calculated on a monthly basis 
using the relative inflated revenue shares and indexed stock estimates for the different areas9. 
It was necessary to index the stock estimates in order to account for differences in their 
magnitude. For example, if a Danish seiner catches 60% cod and 40% plaice in January 1995, 
and the stock index for cod is 68 and 56 for plaice, then the stock measure for this vessel will 
be 63 (calculated as 0.60⋅68+0.40⋅56=63). 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the development in the included stock indices. The stock indices of the four 
species decreased overall from 1987 to 1999, most significantly for cod and plaice, which are 
the two most important species for the Danish seiners. There are some fluctuations for each 
of the different species, especially for haddock, which after a decrease from 1987 to 1991, 
increased until 1997, but then decreased to a lower level in 1999 compared to 1987. 
 
                                                 
9 A deduction is made between southern (4C), central (4B) and northern (4A) North Sea and Skagerrak (3AN). 
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Figure 2.3 Development in stock indices (1987=100)  
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3. Specification of the stochastic production frontier model 
When specifying the stochastic production frontier to be estimated, an assumption about the 
functional form of the production function is necessary. There are no initial reasons for 
choosing one functional form instead of another, and hence a translog function is chosen for 
the purpose of this paper. The translog function has several advantages, e.g. it is a flexible 
function and imposes only few prior restrictions on the parameters, cf. Lau (1986) and Morey 
(1986)10. The estimated function is thus given as: 
 
ln Yj,t = β0 + βFP ln FPj,t + βFT ln FTj,t + βS ln Sj,t + βT Tj,t + (7)
 βFPFP (ln FPj,t)2 + βFTFT (ln FTj,t)2 + βSS (ln Sj,t)2 + βTT (Tj,t)2 + 
 βFPFT (ln FPj,t ⋅ ln FTj,t) +βFPS (ln FPj,t ⋅ ln Sj,t) + βFPT (ln FPj,t ⋅ Tj,t) + 
 βFTS (ln FTj,t ⋅ ln Sj,t) + βFTT (ln FTj,t ⋅ Tj,t) + βST (ln Sj,t ⋅ Tj,t) + 
 vj,t - uj,t 
 
where FP is the fishing power measured in tonnage11, FT is fishing time measured as the 
number of days at sea, S is the stock index calculated as explained in Section 2 and T is the 
monthly index of time. j refers to the j’th vessel (j=1,...,261) and t refers for the t’th month 
(t=1,…,156) from January 1987 to December 1999. 
 
The time index Tj,t can be included in the production frontier in several ways. However, it has 
been chosen to use the approach proposed by Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) and applied in 
                                                 
10 A thorough investigation of the translog production function is found in Boisvert (1982). 
11 Tonnage is chosen as the measure of fishing power due to the high correlation with the output measures and 
the other fishing power measures in general, cf. the conclusions derived from the dataset description.  
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relation to fisheries by Campbell and Hand (1998). The time index measures movements in 
the frontier and could at least partly be considered to measure technological progress12. 
 
The time index is included in the same way as the other variables in the production function, 
i.e. with squared- and cross-terms. It can be discussed how to interpret the cross product 
between the stock and time indices, although in order to follow the intentions of the translog 
functional form as a second order approximation to some unknown production function, it 
has been decided to include the terms. Another argument is that the two terms, T and T2, may 
also include some of the variation in the stock index, as long as the stock index is included in 
the production function. 
 
One of the objectives in this paper is to analyse the consequences of including fishing effort 
as a separate or composite measure in the production function. The second function to be 
estimated is therefore: 
 
ln Yj,t =β0 + βFE ln FEj,t + βS ln Sj,t + βT Tj,t + (8)
 βFEFE (ln FEj,t)2 + βSS (ln Sj,t)2 + βTT (Tj,t)2 + 
 βFES (ln FEj,t ⋅ ln Sj,t) + βFET (ln FEj,t ⋅Tj,t) + βST (ln Sj,t ⋅ Tj,t) + 
 vj,t - uj,t 
 
where FE denotes the fishing effort given as FP times FT. The variables are defined as in 
equation (7). 
 
In equation (7) and (8), Y is measured as the monthly output given as either inflated catch 
revenue13, weighted catch weight or catch weight, i.e. Yinf. revenue, Yweighted weight and Yweight, cf. 
the previous section. 
 
A total of six production functions will thus be estimated. The acronyms used for each of 
these models in the following sections are displayed in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Acronyms used for the estimated models 
Input measure / Output measure Inflated revenue (IV) Weighted weight (WW) Weight (W) 
Fishing power and fishing time included  
as separate variables Model IV.a Model WW.a Model W.a 
Product of fishing power and fishing time Model IV.b Model WW.b Model W.b 
 
 
                                                 
12 Technological progress could be included in other ways, see for instance Heathfield and Wibe (1987). Some 
estimations have been made with technological progress included via the intercept term as δ0 = δ0emt and via the 
fishing power and fishing time measures as FPtTECH = ent⋅FPt and FTtTECH = ent⋅FTt, respectively. However, the 
estimated efficiency levels were highly correlated and not significantly different from each other.  
13 Sharma and Leung (1999) mentioned some limitations of using catch revenue as the output measure. For 
instance, there is the unclear deduction between technical and allocative efficiency.  
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As mentioned in Section 1, the inefficiency term can be modelled by assuming some kind of 
distribution of this term or including an inefficiency model. Here the latter is chosen in order 
to explain some of the possible reasons for any observed inefficiencies. A number of factors 
are available to explain the observed inefficiencies. The utilised inefficiency model therefore 
consists of both quantitative and dummy variables. It is for all the estimations specified as: 
 
uj,t =δ0 + δ1 ln INSj,t + δ2 ln VINj,t + δ3 DsNj,t + δ4 DsTj,t + δ5 PFj,t + δ6 HSj,t + (9)
δ7 UFj,t + δ8 PFA4Bj,t + δ9 PFA4Cj,t + δ10 PFA3ANj,t + δ11 EXPAj,t + 
δ12 EXPGj,t + δ13 FEBj,t + δ14 MARj,t + δ15 APRj,t + δ16 MAYj,t + δ17 JUNj,t + 
δ18 JULj,t + δ19 AUGj,t + δ20 SEPj,t + δ21 OCTj,t + δ22 NOVj,t + δ23 DECj,t + 
wj,t 
 
The first variable is inflated insurance value (INS), which is included in order to test whether 
the vessel size has any influence on the level of efficiency. Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde 
(2001) concluded that the size has an influence on the technical efficiency level of the Dutch 
beam trawlers, while Vestergaard et al. (2003) have the same conclusion for Danish industrial 
vessels. Both analyses found that larger vessels have a higher efficiency than smaller vessels. 
 
The construction year of the Danish seiner (VIN) is included to test whether older Danish 
seiners are more inefficient than newer ones. However, this may not be the case considering 
that maintenance and investments may eliminate or at least reduce any differences. Campbell 
and Hand (1998) included dummy variables to model the effects of construction year on the 
level of technical efficiency, although their conclusion on the effect related to the 
construction year is unclear. The average age of the included Danish seiners increased from 
31 years in 1987 to 37 years in 1999 with a standard deviation of around 12. The newest 
Danish seiner was from 1994, while the oldest was from 1913. 
 
In the Danish vessel register, each Danish seiner is classified as either an ordinary Danish 
seiner, a Danish seiner with the ability to also use nets (DsN), or a Danish seiner with the 
ability to also act as a stern trawler (DsT). Dummy variables are included in the inefficiency 
model to analyse whether the two multi-gear vessels have any efficiency advantages 
compared to an ordinary Danish seiner. The expectation would be that this is the case, 
considering it will be easier for a multi-gear Danish seiner to adjust to any changes in the 
catch possibilities. 
 
The skippers on the vessels can also have a different commercial status. A distinction is made 
between three types, i.e. commercial (full-time) fishermen, part-time fishermen (PF) or hired 
skipper (HS), where a firm primarily hires the latter. There is also a fourth type, which covers 
unknowns (UF), although the main part of these is most likely part time fishermen. Dummy 
variables are used to analyse whether the commercial status of the fisherman has any 
influence on the level of technical efficiency. It is expected that full-time fishermen have the 
greatest incentive to be efficient, considering that part-time fishermen do not have fishing as 
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their primary occupation Further, hired skippers are not solely getting the benefits from being 
efficient due to the payment schemes used in fisheries. 
 
A primary fishing area is derived for each observation, using the method proposed by 
Campbell and Hand (1998). The primary fishing area is thus assigned to be the area, where 
the largest relative part of the catch revenue is caught. Four distinct areas are defined, i.e. 
northern, central (PFA4B) and southern (PFA4C) part of the North Sea and Skagerrak 
(PFA3AN). The variables thus account for different area conditions, such as seabed and 
height of waves. 
 
Two variables are included in order to reflect each Danish seiner’s (fisherman’s) experience 
of fishing in the included areas (EXPA) and with their primary gear (EXPG). The former 
measures, on a yearly level, the share of days at sea in the North Sea and Skagerrak compared 
with the total days at sea. The latter is on a monthly basis, and measures the share of days at 
sea, where the primary gear (i.e. Danish seine) is used instead of other gear types such as 
trawl, net, line, etc. 
 
Finally, eleven monthly dummy variables are included in order to reflect any seasonality in 
the technical inefficiency (FEB,…,DEC). It can be discussed whether these dummies should 
have been included in the production function instead, in order to account for monthly 
differences in the production technology. Coelli, Perelman and Romano (1999) investigate 
the issue of including environmental factors. Based on empirical estimations they find that 
the obtained rankings are similar for the methods, but that the levels differ to some extent. 
Furthermore, they recommend including the environmental factors in the inefficiency model, 
as done here with the monthly dummies, because the estimated frontier then reflect the outer 
boundaries of the production possibility set. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to include any dummy variables reflecting regulatory 
changes in the inefficiency model. Although such changes have taken place during the 
analysed period, it is not possible to identify the most important ones at the required level of 
detail. 
 
To avoid the dummy trap when estimating the inefficiency model, one dummy variable is 
excluded in every set of dummy variables, cf. Hardy (1993). The reference situation is thus 
an ordinary Danish seiner with a commercial full-time fisherman as skipper, fishing in the 
northern part of the North Sea in January. 
 
 
4. Estimations of the frontier production function 
As mentioned in the previous section, six frontier production functions are estimated in total, 
cf. Table 3.1. This is done by using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli 1996). The results from these 
estimations and some specification tests are presented in this section. 
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Table 4.1 shows the results from estimating the production frontier for Model IV.a, Model 
WW.a and Model W.a, while Table 4.2 shows the results obtained for Model IV.b, Model 
WW.b and Model W.b. 
 
Most of the variables included in the production frontier turn out to be significant in both 
models, but unfortunately the estimated coefficients are in general difficult to interpret, cf. 
Campbell and Hand (1998) and Eggert (2001). Instead it is recommended to calculate 
elasticities, which will therefore be done in Section 6. 
 
Table 4.1 Estimation of the frontier production function in Models IV.a, WW.a and W.a 
  ------ Model IV.a ------ ----- Model WW.a ----- ----- Model W.a ----- 
Para-
meter 
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation 
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation 
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation
 β0 11.41 0.57*** 16.17 0.75*** 14.51 0.56***
Ln (tonnage) βFP -0.59 0.17*** -2.80 0.22*** -2.38 0.17***
Ln (days at sea) βFT 1.28 0.10*** 0.48 0.13*** 0.99 0.10***
Ln (stock) βS -0.69 0.15*** -3.77 0.21*** -2.04 0.14***
Time βT -0.02 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00***
Ln (tonnage)2 βFPFP 0.09 0.01*** 0.14 0.02*** 0.16 0.01***
Ln (days at sea)2 βFTFT -0.01 0.01** -0.02 0.01*** -0.01 0.01 
Ln (stock)2 βSS 0.13 0.01*** 0.43 0.02*** 0.17 0.01***
Time2 βTT 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Ln (tonnage) × Ln (days at sea) βFPFT 0.04 0.02** 0.04 0.02* 0.05 0.02***
Ln (tonnage) × Ln (stock) βFPS 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.04*** 0.32 0.03***
Ln (tonnage) × time βFPT 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Ln (days at sea) × Ln (stock) βFTS -0.11 0.02*** 0.07 0.02*** -0.05 0.02** 
Ln (days at sea) × time βFTT 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Ln (stock) × time βST 0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
Sigma-squared σ2 0.52 0.02*** 1.29 0.09*** 0.55 0.02***
Gamma γ 0.77 0.01*** 0.78 0.01*** 0.76 0.01***
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Estimation of the frontier production function in Models IV.b,WW.b and W.b 
  ------ Model IV.b ------ ---- Model WW.b ---- ------ Model W.b ------
Para-
meter
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation 
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation 
Coeffi-
cient
Standard 
deviation
 β0 5.24 0.45*** 8.04 0.57*** 6.32 0.46***
Ln (tonnage×days at sea) βFE 1.77 0.08*** 0.54 0.10*** 1.06 0.08***
Ln (stock) βS -0.28 0.13** -2.84 0.17*** -1.28 0.13***
Time βT -0.02 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00***
Ln (tonnage×days at sea)2 βFEFE -0.05 0.00*** -0.04 0.00*** -0.04 0.00***
Ln (stock)2 βSS 0.12 0.01*** 0.41 0.02*** 0.16 0.01***
Time2 βTT 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Ln (tonnage×days at sea) ×  
Ln (stock) βFES -0.11 0.01*** 0.15 0.02*** 0.04 0.02** 
Ln (tonnage×days at sea) × time βFET 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
Ln (stock) × time βST 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Sigma-squared σ2 5.24 0.45*** 8.04 0.57*** 6.32 0.46***
Gamma γ 1.77 0.08*** 0.54 0.10*** 1.06 0.08***
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Instead, the estimated frontier production functions will be tested in order to check whether 
these are well specified and whether it is appropriate to include an inefficiency model at all. 
This will be done by using the different tests mentioned in Section 1. The test results are 
given in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Testing the specification of the frontier production function 
No inefficiency1) Ln[L(H0)] Ln[L(H1)] LR Critical χ2
Number of
restrictions Decision
Model IV.a  -17,334 -14,432 5,804 37.066* 25 Reject
Model IV.b  -19,056 -15,437 7,237 37.066* 25 Reject
Model WW.a -21,517 -20,021 2,991 37.066* 25 Reject
Model WW.b -22,772 -20,660 4,223 37.066* 25 Reject
Model W.a -17,637 -14,732 5,809 37.066* 25 Reject
Model W.b -19,349 -15,729 7,239 37.066* 25 Reject
 
Cobb-Douglas 
production function2) Ln[L(H0)] Ln[L(H1)] LR Critical χ2
Number of
restrictions Decision
Model IV.a -14,864 -14,432 864 16.92 9 Reject
Model IV.b -15,833 -15,437 791 12.59 6 Reject
Model WW.a -20,863 -20,021 1,684 16.92 9 Reject
Model WW.b -21,380 -20,660 1,440 12.59 6 Reject
Model W.a  -15,369 -14,732 1,273 16.92 9 Reject
Model W.b -16,188 -15,729 918 12.59 6 Reject
       
No time effects3) Ln[L(H0)] Ln[L(H1)] LR Critical χ2
Number of
restrictions Decision
Model IV.a -14,962 -14,432 1,061 11.07 5 Reject
Model IV.b -15,977 -15,437 1,080 9.49 4 Reject
Model WW.a -20,883 -20,021 1,723 11.07 5 Reject
Model WW.b -21,513 -20,660 1,705 9.49 4 Reject
Model W.a -15,255 -14,732 1,045 11.07 5 Reject
Model W.b  -16,253 -15,729 1,048 9.49 4 Reject
Notes: * Critical values obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
 1)  The null hypothesis is: H0:γ = δ0 =… = δ23 = 0. 
 2)  The null hypotheses are: H0:βFPFP=βFTFT=βSS=βTT=βFPFT=βFPS=βFTS=βFTT=βST=0 or 
   H0:βFEFE=βSS=βTT=βFES=βFET=βST=0, depending on the model. 
 3) The null hypothesis is: H0:βT=βTT=βFPT=βFTT=βST=0 or H0:βT=βTT=βFET=βST=0, depending on the 
model. 
 
 
The first test focuses on whether there are any inefficiency effects in the model. It follows 
from Table 4.3 that the hypothesis of no inefficiency effects is rejected at the 5% level in all 
the models, and Maximum Likelihood shall therefore be used to estimate this model in order 
to get efficient estimates14. Whether the functional form of the production function can be 
reduced to a Cobb-Douglas form is also tested, and this test is also rejected at a high level of 
significance for all the models. Finally, the hypothesis of not including time effects in the 
model is also rejected.  
                                                 
14 An estimator is considered efficient if the unbiased estimator has a smaller variance than any other unbiased 
estimators for a given sample, cf. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991). 
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Having thus tested and found that the model is well specified, the next step is to consider 
consequences of choosing different output and input measures.  
 
 
5. Impact on the level of technical efficiency 
The technical efficiency measure estimated in the Stochastic Production Frontier models used 
here is output-oriented, i.e. it measures the output of a firm relative to the output produced by 
firms which are fully efficient, given that the employed inputs remain unchanged. 
 
The average efficiency scores are presented in Table 5.1 for each of the models analysed. The 
average efficiency, in the model with inflated revenue used as output measure is estimated to 
be 62-63% depending on the input measure used. A Danish seiner fishing in the North Sea 
and Skagerrak therefore on average over the thirteen years only caught 62-63% of the value 
caught by a fully efficient Danish seiner. The estimated efficiency levels with output 
measured as either weighted weight or weight can be interpreted likewise. 
 
Table 5.1 Average efficiency scores from 1987 to 1999 
 Model IV.a Model IV.b Model WW.a Model WW.b Model W.a Model W.b 
Average efficiency 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Standard deviation 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22 
Maximum efficiency 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.95 
Minimum efficiency 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 
 
The relative distribution of the efficiency scores, cf. Table 5.2, shows that the models 
estimated with weighted weight have a tendency to have a relatively lower number of 
efficiency scores in the interval 0.9-1.0 compared to the other models. Instead, these models 
have a higher percentage of scores in the intervals from 0.6-0.7 and 0.7-0.8. 
 
Table 5.2 Relative distributions of efficiency scores 
  Model IV.a Model IV.b Model WW.a Model WW.b Model W.a Model W.b 
0.0-0.1 0.68 0.95 0.52 0.93 0.58 0.84 
0.1-0.2 2.84 3.56 2.00 2.91 2.74 3.41 
0.2-0.3 5.84 6.22 3.46 4.71 5.26 5.82 
0.3-0.4 7.83 7.82 5.25 6.08 7.40 7.04 
0.4-0.5 9.65 8.81 7.08 8.06 9.04 8.44 
0.5-0.6 11.84 10.44 10.92 10.97 11.13 9.76 
0.6-0.7 15.75 13.66 17.20 16.50 15.24 12.63 
0.7-0.8 22.77 21.82 28.62 27.07 22.20 21.18 
0.8-0.9 21.43 25.25 24.64 22.47 25.05 29.22 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
sc
or
e 
0.9-1.0 1.38 1.48 0.32 0.28 1.34 1.66 
 
 
The development in the average efficiency scores from 1987 to 1999 is presented in Figure 
5.1. There has been a tendency for scores to increase from 1987 to 1999, but there are, 
however, significant drops in 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999. This means that the overall 
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increase has only been minor. The development in the average yearly efficiency for each of 
the models followed almost the same pattern, and this is confirmed by looking at the 
correlation between the average yearly efficiency scores, cf. Table 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.1 Development in yearly efficiency scores 
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Looking at the average monthly efficiency levels, an obvious trend can be observed, cf. 
Figure 5.2. Starting with an average efficiency of 42% in January, it increases until reaching a 
maximum of approximately 80% in August. From August, the average monthly efficiency 
starts to decline, ending up in December with an efficiency of 40%. Again, a similar 
development can be observed for each of the models estimated, and it corresponds with the 
estimated parameters for the monthly dummy variables in the inefficiency models, cf. Section 
7. This development is most likely influenced by the magnitude of cod and plaice in the 
catches of the Danish seiners, which are high during the summer months. 
 
Figure 5.2 Development in monthly efficiency scores 
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Despite that the previous figures seem to indicate that the choice of output and input 
measures are unimportant, the picture changes when looking at the correlation coefficients, 
cf. Table 5.3 to Table 5.5. 
 
The focus is first on the correlations between the different output measures. These are 
observed to be higher for the models with output measured as revenue and weight, while 
these are lower when comparing with the weighted weight output measure. The efficiency 
levels estimated using revenue and weight seem to be more alike than when compared to the 
weighted weight efficiency. 
 
Table 5.3 Correlations between the estimated efficiencies 
  Model IV.a Model IV.b Model WW.a Model WW.b Model W.a Model W.b 
Model IV.a 1.00      
Model IV.b 0.94 1.00     
Model WW.a 0.82 0.81 1.00    
Model WW.b 0.79 0.86 0.96 1.00   
Model W.a 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.84 1.00  
Model W.b 0.90 0.97 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 
 
 
The correlation between the average yearly efficiencies estimated using tonnage and days at 
sea separately, compared to the service flow measure, is in all models estimated to be high, 
disregarding which output measure is used, cf. Table 5.3. 
 
The general conclusion is thus that the choice of input measure does not seem to result in 
significantly different estimations of technical efficiency. However, the technical efficiencies 
seem to be influenced by the choice of output measure, despite that approximately the same 
levels are estimated. The variation primarily seems to be for revenue and weight on one side 
and weighted weight on the other side.  
 
If analysis is performed on more aggregated levels of technical efficiency, higher correlations 
between the different measures are observed, cf. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, but the ones related 
to revenue and weight still correlate higher compared to weighted weight. 
 
Table 5.4 Correlations between the average yearly efficiencies 
 Model IV.a Model IV.b Model WW.a Model WW.b Model W.a Model W.b 
Model IV.a 1.00      
Model IV.b 0.99 1.00     
Model WW.a 0.92 0.91 1.00    
Model WW.b 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.00   
Model W.a 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.92 1.00  
Model W.b 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.99 1.00 
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Table 5.5 Correlations between the average monthly efficiencies 
 Model IV.a Model IV.b Model WW.a Model WW.b Model W.a Model W.b 
Model IV.a 1.00      
Model IV.b 1.00 1.00     
Model WW.a 0.97 0.96 1.00    
Model WW.b 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00   
Model W.a 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00  
Model W.b 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 
 
 
6. Impact on the output elasticities 
Based on the previous section, it seems necessary to further investigate the output measures 
used. This will be done by calculating the output elasticities, which thus furthermore 
facilitates a more thorough discussion of the coefficients found for the frontier production 
functions. 
 
The output elasticities are found by taking the derivative of each input with respect to the 
output. If for instance the input measure is tonnage, the output elasticity is, when inputs are 
included separately, found as follows15: 
 
 
TlnSlnFTlnFPln2
FPln
Yln
FPTFPSFPFTFPFPFP ⋅β+⋅β+⋅β+⋅β⋅+β=∂
∂  (10)
 
The average output elasticities evaluated in mean values over the thirteen years from 1987 to 
1999 for the six models are presented in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Average yearly output elasticities 
 Model IV.a Model WW.a Model W.a Model IV.b Model WW.b Model W.b 
Tonnage 0.27 0.26 0.29    
Days at sea 0.94 0.90 0.96    
Tonnage×days at sea    0.72 0.68 0.74 
Stock 0.37 1.26 0.40 0.40 1.28 0.44 
Time 0.0012 0.0045 0.0010 0.0014 0.0046 0.0012 
Scale elasticity* 1.21 1.16 1.25 0.72 0.68 0.74 
Notes: * The scale elasticity is only calculated for the factors which the fishermen can influence. 
 
 
In the models with tonnage and days at sea included as separate variables in the production 
frontier, the output elasticities are estimated to be relatively close to each other. On average, a 
10% increase in tonnage will give rise to an increase in catch, measured in either revenue or 
weight, of approximately 2.7%. Similarly, a decrease in the number of days at sea of 10% 
                                                 
15 The output derivative with respect to time is for the average values calculated as follows: 
SlnFTlnFPlnT2
T
Yln
STFTTFPTTTT ⋅β+⋅β+⋅β+⋅β⋅+β=∂
∂  
Since the time measure is not transformed by taking the logarithm, i.e. the derivative gives the relative effect on 
output of an absolute change in time. 
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will result in a 9.3% decrease in catch on average. When including tonnage and days at sea as 
a composite measure, a decrease of 10% in the composite measure will result in an average 
decrease of 7.1% in the catch level. 
 
Calculating the scale elasticity for the factors which the fisherman can influence, gives a 
figure above one in the approach where these factors are included separately. This implies 
increasing returns to scale, and this may be an explanation for the increase in size of the 
average Danish seiner in the dataset, cf. Table 2.4. However, using the service flow approach 
gives scale elasticity below one, indicating decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Turning attention to the output measures, it is observed that the weighted weight 
systematically gives lower output elasticities for tonnage, days at sea and service flow 
measures. The opposite is observed for the stock related output elasticities. In this case, the 
output elasticity is estimated to be three times higher, when using the weighted weight output 
measure, regardless of how input is measured. 
 
The output elasticity calculated with respect to the index of time shows the same pattern as 
observed with the stock. Similar figures for the catch revenue and catch weight are found, 
while using the weighted catch weight again results in much higher output elasticities. 
 
Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.3 shows the development in output elasticities for the different output 
and input measures used, when evaluated as mean values for each year16. For tonnage, the 
development over the years is almost identical for weight and weighted weight, while value 
gives a more smooth development, cf. Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 Development in output elasticities with respect to tonnage 
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16 The development for the output elasticity related to the stock is not included for Model IV.b, Model WW.b 
and Model W.b, because these are similar to those observed in Model IV.a, Model WW.a and Model W.a. 
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The number of days at sea also shows a similar development with a tendency to converge in 
the latter years. This can be seen in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2 Development in output elasticities with respect to days at sea 
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Figure 6.3 shows the development in output elasticities, when using the service flow 
approach. The elasticities for the different models have a tendency to converge, and is most 
profound for the models using inflated revenue and weight. 
 
Figure 6.3 Development in output elasticities with respect tonnage times days at sea 
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For the output elasticity of the stock, the development is scattered, cf. Figure 6.4. Using 
revenue and weight, the development is contrary to each other. Using the service flow 
approach gives a different development for each output measure. Regarding the stock, the 
output elasticity measured with respect to weight decreases from 1987 to 1999, but increases 
when revenue is used. However, using the weighted catch weight gives different results, 
considering that it is at a very high level in 1987, but then converges significantly towards the 
others. 
 
Figure 6.4 Development in output elasticities with respect stock 
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Investigation of the output elasticities thus reveals a scattered pattern, where the different 
output measures seem to give various estimates. Based on the average over the thirteen years, 
the weight and revenue output measures seem to give approximately equal results. However, 
this conclusion is to some extent undermined when looking at the yearly output elasticities. It 
is noticeable though that the stock and time elasticities with the weighted weight output 
measure are significantly different to the other two output measures. A conclusion could 
therefore be that the output elasticities are generally more alike when the output measures are 
revenue and weight, while weighted weight in some cases can give other elasticities.  
 
 
7. Estimations of the inefficiency model 
When estimating the frontier production functions, inefficiency models are also estimated. 
These models can be used to evaluate which factors influence fishermen’s level of technical 
efficiency and thus indirectly influence their behaviour. The results for the six estimated 
models are presented in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.1 Estimations of the technical inefficiency model in Models IV.a,WW.a and W.a 
  ----- Model IV.a ------ ----- Model WW.a --- ----- Model W.a ------ 
 Para-meter
Coef-
ficient
Standard 
deviation
Coef-
ficient
Standard 
deviation
Coef-
ficient
Standard 
deviation
 δ0 17.15 13.14 15.65 31.38 22.62 14.14 
Inflated insurance value δ1 -0.74 0.03*** -0.37 0.06*** -0.64 0.03*** 
Construction year δ2 -0.68 1.77 -1.11 4.21 -1.55 1.90 
Danish seines/netter δ3 -0.38 0.07*** -0.81 0.15*** -0.24 0.06*** 
Danish seiner/stern trawler δ4 -0.13 0.08* -0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 
Part time fisherman δ5 0.28 0.09*** 0.99 0.17*** 0.25 0.10** 
Hired skipper δ6 0.51 0.14*** 0.67 0.26** 0.43 0.15*** 
Unknown commercial status δ7 0.22 0.02*** 0.34 0.04*** 0.23 0.02*** 
Primary fishing area 4B δ8 0.24 0.09*** -0.91 0.11*** 0.06 0.08 
Primary fishing area 4C δ9 0.22 0.29 0.06 0.52 0.27 0.32 
Primary fishing area 3AN δ10 -0.06 0.09 -0.60 0.12*** -0.19 0.08** 
Time in NS and Skagerrak δ11 -0.68 0.06*** -0.97 0.11*** -0.74 0.06*** 
Time with primary gear δ12 0.15 0.04*** 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.04 
February δ13 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.04 
March δ14 -0.28 0.04*** -0.47 0.08*** -0.32 0.04*** 
April δ15 -0.77 0.05*** -1.09 0.12*** -0.83 0.05*** 
May δ16 -1.45 0.07*** -1.87 0.19*** -1.46 0.07*** 
June δ17 -1.76 0.09*** -2.86 0.31*** -1.90 0.10*** 
July δ18 -1.55 0.08*** -3.98 0.47*** -2.05 0.11*** 
August δ19 -1.74 0.09*** -4.38 0.54*** -2.14 0.11*** 
September δ20 -1.32 0.07*** -2.59 0.26*** -1.48 0.07*** 
October δ21 -0.65 0.05*** -1.28 0.12*** -0.81 0.05*** 
November δ22 -0.13 0.04*** -0.10 0.07 -0.19 0.04*** 
December δ23 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.08*** 0.04 0.05 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7.2 Estimations of the technical inefficiency model in Models IV.b,WW.b and W.b 
  ------ Model IV.b ------ ---- Model WW.b ---- ------ Model W.b ------ 
 Para-meter 
Coef-
ficient
Standard 
deviation  
Coef-
ficient
Standard 
deviation  
Coef-
ficient 
Standard 
deviation  
 δ0 103.09 15.62*** 138.81 27.80*** 117.01 16.43*** 
Inflated insurance value δ1 -0.26 0.03*** 0.32 0.05*** -0.13 0.03*** 
Construction year δ2 -12.88 2.09*** -18.60 3.73*** -14.91 2.20*** 
Danish seines/netter δ3 -1.07 0.11*** -1.43 0.19*** -0.84 0.09*** 
Danish seiner/stern trawler δ4 -0.33 0.11*** -0.23 0.13* -0.10 0.10 
Part time fisherman δ5 0.26 0.12** 0.85 0.16*** 0.25 0.13* 
Hired skipper δ6 0.46 0.18*** 0.10 0.22 0.10 0.19 
Unknown commercial status δ7 0.22 0.03*** 0.27 0.04*** 0.23 0.03*** 
Primary fishing area 4B δ8 0.22 0.10** -0.79 0.11*** 0.03 0.09 
Primary fishing area 4C δ9 0.18 0.42 -0.06 0.46 0.18 0.39 
Primary fishing area 3AN δ10 -0.21 0.10** -0.66 0.12*** -0.35 0.09*** 
Time in NS and Skagerrak δ11 -0.95 0.07*** -1.12 0.10*** -0.99 0.07*** 
Time with primary gear δ12 0.12 0.04*** 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.04 
February δ13 -0.10 0.05** -0.15 0.07 -0.12 0.05*** 
March δ14 -0.42 0.05*** -0.56 0.07*** -0.46 0.05*** 
April δ15 -1.11 0.06*** -1.35 0.11*** -1.17 0.06*** 
May δ16 -2.16 0.11*** -2.27 0.18*** -2.14 0.11*** 
June δ17 -2.55 0.14*** -3.17 0.29*** -2.74 0.15*** 
July δ18 -1.92 0.10*** -3.58 0.33*** -2.53 0.14*** 
August δ19 -2.48 0.13*** -4.54 0.48*** -3.05 0.17*** 
September δ20 -1.74 0.08*** -2.61 0.19*** -1.92 0.09*** 
October δ21 -0.80 0.06*** -1.25 0.10*** -0.96 0.06*** 
November δ22 -0.13 0.05*** -0.10 0.07 -0.20 0.05*** 
December δ23 0.12 0.05** 0.30 0.08*** 0.14 0.05*** 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Before interpreting the estimated coefficients, it is generally observed that the models using 
revenue and weight as output measure estimate coefficients are more alike compared to the 
weighted weight coefficients. However, the estimated coefficients generally seem to have the 
same signs. The derived conclusions in the following will therefore be covering all models. 
 
All the estimated inefficiency models have inflated insurance value to be significant, and are 
negative with only one exception (Model WW.a). This implies that the higher the inflated 
insurance value, the higher the level of technical efficiency, i.e. the larger a Danish seiner is, 
the more efficient it will be. 
 
There is no general agreement on whether the construction year of the Danish seiner has any 
influence on the level of technical efficiency. Only in the models using the service flow 
approach does the construction year turn out to be significant. In this case, it is observed that 
new Danish seiners are more efficient than older ones. 
 
A Danish seiner with the capability of using nets is estimated to be significantly more 
efficient in all the models compared to the ordinary Danish seiners. The Danish seiners with 
stern capabilities are also, when the coefficient is significant, estimated to have a higher level 
of technical efficiency compared to ordinary Danish seiners. This corresponds to the former 
argumentation that vessels capable of using several gear types are more flexible in their 
fisheries and thus more efficient. 
 
The commercial status also influences the level of efficiency for the Danish seiners. The 
estimated coefficients show that Danish seiners with skippers as commercial fishermen are 
more efficient than those Danish seiners where the skippers have another commercial status. 
Vessels that are skippered by hired skippers have the lowest level of technical efficiency. 
This result is interesting, especially if it is seen in a principal-agent framework, where the 
owner of the vessel cannot observe the effort of the skipper, cf. Tirole (1988). 
 
In some of the estimated inefficiency models, the primary fishing area turns out to be 
significant, while in others it does not. However, in five of the six models, the dummy 
variable for Skagerrak as the primary fishing area is significant, and all the estimated 
coefficients point to the conclusion that Danish seiners primarily fishing in Skagerrak are 
more efficient than Danish seiners fishing in the northern part of the North Sea. This could be 
related to the distance to the specific fishing location in the different fishing areas, although 
this has not been possible to verify. 
 
As an indicator of experience related to the fishing area and the fishing gear, two variables 
have been included. Using the number of days at sea in the North Sea and Skagerrak relative 
to the total number of days at sea helps to reflect the former. This turned out to be significant 
in all models by having a negative coefficient. This implies a positive relationship between 
the total time a Danish seiner spent in the North Sea and Skagerrak with the level of 
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efficiency of the vessel. However, the variable reflecting the number of days at sea using the 
primary gear, relative to the total number of days at sea in the included areas, is only 
significant when output is measured as inflated revenue. In this case, the coefficients are 
positive, implying that the efficiency level decreases when the primary gear is used more. 
This result seems contradictive to what would be expected. However, it is noteworthy to 
observe that the variable is only significant when output is measured as inflated catch 
revenue. 
 
The included monthly dummy variables are supposed to reflect changes in the technical 
efficiency due to monthly variations. Almost all these variables were significant in the six 
estimated models. The level of efficiency rose to a higher level during the summer months, 
i.e. June to August, while the winter months, December to February, have almost the same 
low levels of technical efficiency. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of how output is measured and how inputs are included have been analysed 
using the stochastic production frontier approach for a dataset comprised of Danish seiners 
fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak in the period from 1987 to 1999. Six models were 
estimated using a translog functional form as an approximation for the true functional form of 
the production function. In the estimations, inefficiency models were also included in order to 
find some explanations for the observed inefficiency.  
 
Three measures of output were used, i.e. catch weight, inflated catch revenue and revenue 
weighted catch weight. These were separately estimated against a production function where 
the factors controllable by the fisherman, i.e. measures of fishing power and fishing time, 
were included separately or as a service flow calculated as tonnage multiplied by number of 
days at sea. The production function also included an index of stock and a time measure.  
 
The first comparisons were related to the estimated levels of technical efficiency, and how 
these differed between the estimated models. One conclusion from these comparisons was 
that the choice of method to include inputs did not influence the estimated levels of technical 
efficiency significantly. The choice of output measure did on the other hand seem to be 
important. The estimated levels of technical efficiency were generally at the same levels, and 
so was the development over the thirteen years. However, the distribution of the efficiency 
levels and the correlation coefficients revealed that using revenue and weight as output 
measures produced more comparable results than the ones obtained using weighted weight. 
 
The next step was therefore to perform some further comparisons between the different 
output measures. This was done by calculating the output elasticities, which at the same time 
facilitated the interpretation of the estimated parameters in the translog frontier production 
function. The conclusions derived from this analysis were ambiguous. The thirteen year 
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averages were approximately equal when measuring output with revenue and weight, while 
the weighted weight measure gave different elasticities, especially with respect to stock and 
time. Looking at the development over the thirteen years we saw that the elasticities differ 
depending on the different measures used. This is especially the case for the elasticities with 
respect to time and stock. The general conclusion was however that the output elasticities 
seem to be more alike when the output measures are revenue and weight, while weighted 
weight in some cases gives other elasticities.  
 
Turning attention to the inefficiency models, it was observed that for the significant 
coefficients, the models using revenue and weight as output measure gave more similar 
estimates. As expected the coefficients differed with respect to the input measure used. 
 
To finally conclude on the choice of output and input measure, it can for the analysed fishery 
be concluded that: 1) the choice between including input separately or as a service flow does 
not seem to influence the level of technical efficiency, although (as expected) the level of 
scale size and coefficients in the inefficiency models are affected; 2) the choice between 
output measures as revenue, weight or weighted weight are more difficult, but the analysis 
generally shows that using revenue and weight gave approximately equal levels of technical 
efficiency and coefficients in the inefficiency models, while the pattern is more diversified 
with respect to the output elasticities. Thus, the utilised input inclusion approach must be 
decided considering the actual analysed fishery, while further investigations are required to 
choice between revenue or weight instead of weighted weight as the output measure. 
 
A range of observations can also be derived from the estimated inefficiency models with 
respect to the factors influencing fishermen’s level of technical efficiency. It can for instance 
be observed that a larger Danish seiner is more efficient than a small one. Full-time fishermen 
are more efficient than part-time fishermen, while hired skippers are most inefficient. The 
fishing area chosen also seems to have an influence on the level of technical efficiency. For 
instance, vessels fishing in Skagerrak tend to have higher efficiency compared to those 
fishing in the North Sea. The more frequently a fisherman fish in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak during a given year also seem to affect their efficiency level positively. However, 
the time allocated to their primary gear seems to negatively influence the level of efficiency. 
Finally, the summer months are the most efficient months to fish in, while December, 
January and February are the least efficient.  
 
Several topics for further investigation and discussion can be suggested following this 
analysis. For instance, the inclusion of a time trend in the translog functional form is not 
straightforward. Different methods can be used and it would be interesting to investigate the 
importance of this more closely. The inclusion of a stock measure in the production frontier 
model in order to account for stock developments is also troublesome. Danish fisheries are 
generally a multi-species fisheries and one must therefore consider several different stocks, 
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the relative importance which depends on the vessels analysed, and the target species. The 
relevance of misreporting may also be analysed, cf. Pascoe, Herrero and Mardle (2001). 
 
 
References 
Aigner, D., C.A.K. Lovell and P. Schmidt (1977). Formulation and estimation of stochastic 
frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics 6: 21-37. 
Alvarez, A. (2001). Some issues in the estimation of technical efficiency in a fishery. 
Efficiency Series Paper 2/2001, University of Oviedo, Spain. 
Andersen, J.L. (1999). A Review of the Basic Biological and Economic Approaches to 
Fishing Effort. Working Paper no. 12/1999, Food and Resource Economics Institute, 
Denmark. 
Arrow, K, H.B. Chenery, B.S. Minhas and R. Solow (1961). Capital-labor substitution and 
economic efficiency. Review of Economic Statistics 43: 225-250. 
Boisvert, R.N. (1982). The Translog Production Function: Its properties, its several 
interpretations and estimation problems. Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, United States of America, A.E. Res. 82-28. 
September. 
Campbell, H.F. and A.J. Hand (1998). Joint ventures and technology transfer: the Solomon 
Islands pole-and-line fishery. Journal of Development Economics 57: 421-442. 
Christensen, L.R., D.W. Jorgenson and L.J. Lau (1973). Conjugate Duality and the 
Transcendental Logarithmic Production Function. Econometrica 39: 255-256. 
Cobb C.W. and P.H. Douglas (1928). A Theory of Production. American Economic Review 
18 (supplement): 139-165. 
Coelli, T.J. (1996). A Guide to FRONTIER Version 4.1: A Computer Program for Stochastic 
Frontier Production and Cost Function Estimation. Working Paper 96/07, Centre for 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, University of New England, Australia. 
Coelli, T.J. and S. Perelman (1999). A comparison of parametric and non-parametric distance 
functions: With application to European Railways. European Journal of Operational 
Research 117: 326-339. 
Coelli, T.J. and S. Perelman (2000). Technical efficiency of European railways: a distance 
function approach. Applied Economics 32: 1967-1976. 
Coelli, T.J., S. Perelman and E. Romano (1999). Accounting for Environmental Influences in 
Stochastic Frontier Models: With Application to International Airlines. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis 11(3): 251-273. 
Coelli, T., D.S.P. Rao and G.E. Battese (1999). An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis. Third Printing, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Coglan, L., S. Pascoe and R.I.D. Harris (1998). Measuring efficiency in demersal trawlers 
using a frontier production function approach. In Proceedings of the 10th annual 
conference of the European Association of Fisheries Economists, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 1-4 April 1998. Editor P. Salz, Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
(LEI), The Netherlands: 236-257. 
 64
Diewert, W.E. (1971). An Application of The Shephard Duality Theorem: A Generalized 
Leontief Production Function. Journal of Political Economy 79: 481-507. 
Eggert, H. (2001). Technical efficiency in the Swedish trawl fishery for Norway Lobster. In 
Essays on Fisheries Economics, Doctoral Thesis, Gothenburg University, Sweden.  
Farrell, M.J. (1957). The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A, CXX, Part 3: 253-290.  
Gates, J.M. (1984). Principal Types of Uncertainty in Fishing Operations. Marine Resource 
Economics 1(1): 31-49. 
Greene, W.H. (1990). A gamma-distributed stochastic frontier model. Journal of 
Econometrics 46: 141-163. 
Hardy, M.A. (1993). Regression with dummy variables. Sage University Series on Qualitative 
Applications in the Social Science 07-093. Newbery Park, CA: Sage. 
Heathfield, D.F. and S. Wibe (1987). An introduction to cost and production functions. 
Macmillan Education Ltd., Hong Kong. 
Herrero, I. and S. Pascoe (2002). Estimation of technical efficiency: a review of some of the 
stochastic frontier and DEA software. Computers in Higher Education Economics 
Review 15(1). 
Jondrow, J., C.A.K. Lovell, I.S. Materov and P. Schmidt (1982). On the estimation of 
technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model. Journal of 
Econometrics 19: 223-238. 
Kirkley, J.E., D. Squires and I.E. Strand (1995). Assessing Technical Efficiency in 
Commercial Fisheries: The Mid-Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 77: 686-697. 
Kirkley, J.E., D. Squires and I.E. Strand (1998). Characterizing managerial skill and technical 
efficiency in a fishery. Journal of Productivity Analysis 9: 145-160. 
Kodde, D.A. and A.C. Palm (1986). Wald criteria for jointly testing equality and inequality 
restrictions. Econometrica 54(5): 1243-1248. 
Lau, L.J. (1986). Functional Forms in Econometric Model Building. In Handbook of 
Econometrics, Volume III edited by Z. Griliches et al., Elsevier Science Publishers BV. 
Meeusen, W. and J. van der Broeck (1977). Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
Production Functions with composed errors. International Economic Review 18: 435-
444. 
Morey, E.R. (1986). A Generalized Harvest Function for Fishing: Allocating Effort among 
Common Property Cod Stocks (A Generalized Harvest Function). Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 13: 30-49. 
Pascoe, S. and C. Robinson (1998). Input control, input substitution and profit maximisation 
in the English Channel beam trawl fishery. Journal of Agricultural Economics 49(1): 
16-33. 
Pascoe, S., J.L. Andersen and J.W. de Wilde (2001). The impact of management regulation 
on the technical efficiency of vessels in the Dutch beam trawl fishery. European Review 
of Agricultural Economics 28(2): 187-206. 
 65
Pascoe, S., I. Herrero and S. Mardle (2001). Identifying mis-reporting in fisheries output data 
using DEA. Paper presented at the 7th European Productivity and Efficiency Workshop, 
Oviedo, Spain, 25-27 September. 
Pindyck, R.S. and D.L Rubinfeld (1991). Econometric Models & Economic Forecasts. 
Singapore, McGraw-Hill International Editions, Economics Series, Third Edition. 
Sharma, K.R. and P. Leung (1999). Technical efficiency of the longline fishery in Hawaii: an 
application of a stochastic production frontier. Marine Resource Economics 13: 259-
274. 
Smit, W. (1996). An Economic Approach to Measuring Fishing Effort: Application to a 
Dutch Cutter Fleet. Marine Resource Economics 11: 305-311. 
Squires, D., R.Q. Grafton, M.F. Alam and I.H. Omar (1998). Where the land meets the sea: 
integrated sustainable fisheries development and artisanal fishing. Discussion Paper 98-
26. University of California, San Diego, United States of America. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. The MIT Press. 
Vestergaard, H., D. Squires, F. Jensen and J.L. Andersen (2003). Technical Efficiency of the 
Danish Trawl Fleet: Are the Industrial Vessels Better Than Others? Nationaløkonomisk 
Tidsskrift (Danish Journal of Economics) 141(2): 225-242. 
 66
 67
The Inclusion of Stocks in Multi-species Fisheries:  
The Case of Danish Seiners 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen 
 
Abstract 
Efficiency analysis in fisheries has become an area of increased research. However, setting 
up models to perform such analyses is complicated and several important modelling issues, 
including choice of inputs and outputs, level of aggregation and inclusion of stock indices, 
have only briefly been addressed in the literature. The latter issue is addressed in this paper, 
using data on Danish seiners and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate efficiency. 
Production in fisheries is obviously dependent on the fish stocks and comparing vessel 
efficiency, therefore, needs to account for stock developments. Three methods to include fish 
stocks are analyzed. It is shown that estimations based on the Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) 
stock measure differ from the estimations based on independent stock measures, and is 
independent of the choice of time horizon and choice of input/output measures. 
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Introduction 
Traditionally, estimated production functions only include controllable (discretionary) input 
factors; i.e., factors that the producers can influence directly through their behaviour (Alvarez 
2001). For some sectors in the economy, however, it is necessary to include non-controllable 
factors as well. In particular, this is the case where there are considerable variations in the 
conditions experienced by the producers across time, space, and production unit. The fishing 
industry is one such sector.  
 
The early seminal articles within fisheries economics already recognize the importance of 
considering fish stocks (Gordon (1954), Schaefer (1957), and Clark (1973a, 1973b)). 
Fishermen’s catches are highly dependent on the availability of fish in the respective fishing 
areas. If the stocks are low, a given effort will result in a lower catch in contrast to a situation 
with high fish stocks. Excluding fish stocks from production and efficiency analysis will, 
therefore, provide misleading results.  
 
Different methods to include fish stocks in production functions have been suggested. 
However, there is no consensus about which method to use. This is due to several reasons. 
One is the type of fishery analyzed; e.g., single- or multi-species fishery. Another is 
describing the state of the fish stock; e.g., is independent stock measures available or not?  
 
It is important to investigate whether different methods of stock inclusion give different 
results, because the analysis can have a significant influence on management 
recommendations. For example, if a “wrong” instead of a “right” method for stock inclusion 
is used, the choice of regulation may be inappropriate and give rise to social losses. Webster, 
Kennedy and Johnson (1998, p. 3) recommend with reference to Valdmanis (1992) and 
Nunamaker (1985) to “run a number of different models from each dataset and evaluate the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in model specification.” 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze methods which include fish stock measures when 
estimating technical efficiency. The three methods investigated are: 1) inclusion of a stock 
index for each primary species based on Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE), 2) inclusion of one 
stock index obtained from independent stock assessments for each of the primary species, and 
3) inclusion of one composite stock index for each observation based on the independent 
stock measures and the relative importance of the primary species.  
 
The analysis is based on data for Danish seiners between 18 and 24 meters for the years 1995 
to 1999. The results of using different measures will be tested for consistency, and whether 
the conclusions depend on the time horizon being short or long run will be analyzed. The 
three consistency tests presented in Bauer et al. (1998) are adopted. These tests investigate 
the following questions: 1) Are similar means and standard deviations observed? 2) Do the 
vessels obtain the same ranking? and 3) Are the same vessels classified as “best” and 
“worst”? 
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The paper is organized as follows: The first section discusses different methods for including 
stocks in fisheries production analysis. The following section briefly introduces the utilized 
estimation method. Based upon the two previous sections, three methods for stock inclusion 
are identified and each method is presented in the third section, which also includes a general 
formulation of the programming problem to be estimated. The data used in the analysis are 
described in the fourth section, and the results are presented in the fifth section. The paper 
closes with a conclusion and a discussion of topics for future research. 
 
 
1. Inclusion of Fish Stocks in Production Analysis 
When a fishery is characterized as operating under changing or unequal resource conditions, 
it is necessary to consider this when performing production analysis (Morrison 2000). In such 
situations, the lack of including stock measures in the analysis will assign any resource 
effects to inefficiency and give a wrong impression of the level of technical efficiency. The 
consequence can, for instance, be that management decisions are made on an incorrect basis, 
leading to the regulation of a specific fishery that is not optimal. 
 
Reasons for considering variations in resource conditions can be due to changes over time, 
between fishing areas, and/or between vessels. Changing resource conditions over time 
and/or fishing areas may be relevant in both single-species and multi-species fisheries. In 
these situations, inclusion of fish stock measures are important to ensure that vessels fishing 
in periods or areas with low fish stocks are not disfavoured when compared to vessels fishing 
in another period or area with higher fish stocks.  
 
It is generally not necessary to consider changing resource conditions between vessels if the 
analysis is performed on cross-sectional data for a single-species fishery, because the 
resource conditions are equal for all vessels. An example is Bjørndal (1989), who estimates 
production functions for the North Sea herring fishery. However, if the analyzed fishery is 
characterized by multi-species with vessels targeting different species, it is important to 
account for different resource conditions between the vessels1. In this situation, the species 
caught may have a different relative importance for each vessel. If the technical efficiency 
scores between the included vessels are to be compared, it is necessary to account for this by 
including some measure of fish stock in the estimations. This applies whether cross-sectional 
or panel data for a multi-species fishery are used. 
 
During the last decades, several methods have been used to include fish stock measures in 
production analysis. The optimal situation would be to have an independent stock measure 
for each vessel for every period and area. However, such measures are almost impossible to 
                                                 
1 If vessels target only one species in a multi-species fishery with bycatch of other less important species, the 
analysis can be treated as a single-species fishery, depending on the specific fishery. However, if comparison 
across time or areas is required, it is still necessary to include a stock index for the target species. 
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obtain at reasonable costs. Other methods have been used in the literature, and these will 
briefly be presented and discussed. An important aspect in choosing a method is the 
accessibility of possible independent stock measures2. If such estimates are available in form 
of biological assessments of fish stocks, these can often be applied.  
 
Consider first a fishery without the availability of independent fish stock measures. Technical 
efficiency analysis of such fisheries is possible despite this lack of information. Several 
methods have been suggested in the literature to account for this. 
 
One method is to use dummy variables as a method to consider stock fluctuations. For 
instance, Pascoe and Robinson (1998) and Coglan, Pascoe, and Mardle (1998) analyzed the 
multi-species fishery in the English Channel using dummy variables for years, months, and 
métiers (area) to account for any stock effects. Campbell and Hand (1998) also use this 
approach to analyze the Solomon Islands pole-and-line fishery. A dataset covering two years 
is used to analyze the New England otter trawl fleet by Squires (1987), and stock changes are 
accounted for by including one dummy variable in the analysis. Kompas and Nhu (2002) do 
not apply available independent stock measures, and argue that weather dummies can account 
for important stock variations in the Australian northern prawn fishery. However, the 
inclusion of dummies to account for stock effects is not without problems, because it can 
result in a significant loss of degrees of freedom3. This depends on the number of fishing 
areas, time periods, and fishing vessels. 
 
There are also examples of analyses where CPUE is used as a measure of fish availability. 
Comitini and Huang (1967) use “catch per skate” as a measure of stock density in the North 
Pacific halibut fishery. Eggert (2001) analyses the Swedish trawl fishery for Norway lobster 
and uses the overall average landings value as a proxy of stock availability. Analyzing 
demersal trawlers in the English Channel, Pascoe and Coglan (2002) use average catch value 
per hour fished. However, the use of CPUE as a measure of stock abundance is not 
straightforward. It depends on other inputs used in the production, as mentioned by Sharma 
and Leung (1998). The measure can also reflect a change in vessel composition of the 
specific place and point in time. 
 
Richards and Schnute (1986) test whether there is any correlation between CPUE and 
availability of fish. They find that this measure is not preferable when based on data from 
commercial fishery statistics, at least not when analyzing the inshore rockfish fishery in the 
Strait of Georgia in British Columbia. Based on data from the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Harley, Myers and Dunn (2001) compare CPUE with 
                                                 
2 Stock measures can be considered independent if they are calculated without being directly related to the 
analysed fishery. 
3 The loss of freedom is especially important when SPF is used. DEA can be performed with dummy variables 
by dividing data into groups using categorical DMUs, cf. Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000). This approach, 
however, demands an ability to compare every area and period in order to make a hierarchy. 
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independent stock abundance data. They find that there does not seem to be proportionality 
between stock and CPUE for three groups of fish, i.e. cod, flatfish, and gadiformes. Hilborn 
and Walters (1992) discuss why different aspects of fishermen’s behaviour will cause CPUE 
not to be proportional to abundance. As mentioned by Pascoe and Herrero (2004), a problem 
of using the CPUE approach is that an implicit assumption is made about constant returns to 
scale between fish stock and effort. 
 
If independent stock measures are available, the fish stock can be considered as natural 
capital in line with man-made capital in classic production theory. Several types of stock 
estimates have been applied in the literature, and some collect these for the specific analysis. 
Others seek to estimate these and some use stock information obtained from organizations 
delivering biological assessments. ICES and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC) are examples of such organizations.  
 
Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1995, 1998) analyze the single-species sea scallop fishery in the 
Mid-Atlantic. As a measure of abundance, supposedly bias-free samples are obtained using 
the last tow of approximately 50 vessels. This method is based on individually collected data. 
Pascoe and Herrero (2004) estimate abundance indicators for the Spanish octopus fishery in 
the South Atlantic region and use them to modify the dependent variable.  
 
Several articles use independent stock estimates published by biological institutions. 
Hannesson (1983) uses ICES biomass assessments to estimate production functions in the 
Norwegian Lofoten fishery. Eide et al. (1998) use the same approach when analyzing the 
Norwegian bottom trawlers fishing for northeast Arctic cod, using total yearly biomass. An 
independent measure of tuna stock abundance is also used by Cabrera-Muro (2002) in an 
analysis of the Mexican tuna fishery from 1992 to 1995. Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000) 
look at the British Colombia halibut fishery. They obtain yearly data on the weight of the 
total available halibut stock from an independent biological survey.  
 
Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde (2001) estimate technical efficiency for Dutch beam trawlers. 
They include a composite Fisher quantity index based on biomass for sole and plaice and the 
related overall prices for these species. Data on biomass was obtained from the Netherlands 
Institute for Fisheries Research. The prices were used as weights, when aggregating the two 
stocks into one.  
 
Several methods have been applied in order to account for stock effects in production 
analysis. The choice of method is dependent upon the type of fishery to be analyzed, the type 
of analysis to be performed, and the availability of independent stock measures.  
 
Only one of the reviewed articles applies Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate 
technical efficiency (Pascoe and Coglan 2002), while the rest primarily uses the Stochastic 
Production Frontier approach. However, Pascoe and Coglan (2002) did not have independent 
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stock measures, and instead used year, month, and métier as categorical variables to estimate 
technical efficiency separately for each category. Hence, this excludes the possibility of 
comparison between vessels in different years, months, and métiers. 
 
 
2. The Theory of Data Envelopment Analysis 
Measuring the level of efficiency for different Decision Making Units (DMUs) has received 
increasing attention among scientists, managers, and regulators4. The questions asked 
include: Why do some DMUs have higher efficiency levels than others? How can DMUs 
with low levels of efficiency improve? And how does regulation influence the observed 
efficiency levels? 
 
Efficiency is not one single concept. From an economist’s point of view, the primary 
objective is to obtain economic efficiency, which refers to a situation where the DMUs are 
maximizing their profits. However, economic efficiency can be decomposed into allocative 
and technical efficiency, respectively. Allocative efficiency measures whether the input mix 
used by the DMUs minimizes cost, given the input prices.  
 
The interpretation of the technical efficiency measure depends on the orientation used. In an 
output orientation, the objective is to maximize the output level given the observed input 
level. Here, technical efficiency is a measure of the relative change (increase) in output that 
can be obtained keeping the inputs unchanged. The input orientation, on the contrary, aims to 
minimize the use of inputs for a given output level. Hence, technical efficiency measures the 
possible decrease in input use while keeping the output level constant. In the following, the 
Farrell (1957) efficiency measure of maximal radial expansion (contraction) in outputs 
(inputs) that are feasible for the DMU is used5. Technical efficiency can furthermore be 
subdivided into other efficiency measures, cf. Webster, Kennedy and Johnson (1998).  
 
Estimation of technical efficiency hinges on the estimation of production frontiers that 
compare observed production with maximal production. Traditionally, production functions 
have been estimated as average production functions. However, the classic notation of a 
production function is as a frontier giving the maximal possible output for a given input 
(Quirk 1987). The awareness of this discrepancy has increased, and today there are several 
methods for estimating production frontiers. These methods are gathered under the term 
distance functions, which measure the distance between actual production and the best-
practice production. The two most prominent methods are the parametric Stochastic 
Production Frontier (SPF) method and the non-parametric DEA method. 
                                                 
4 The term Decision Making Unit is used instead of firm, because DEA is also well suited to analyse other types 
of units, such as government services and non-profit organisations, cf. Steering Committee for the Review of 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision (1997). 
5 Other non-radial measures of technical efficiency are also available as discussed by Färe and Lovell (1978) 
and Russell (1985). 
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Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. SPF is advantageous when data are 
highly influenced by idiosyncratic randomness. In the SPF method, it is also possible, 
through statistical tests, to evaluate the results obtained. However, SPF assumes specific 
functional forms for the production function6, and furthermore the handling of several outputs 
is not straightforward7. DEA avoids the two disadvantages of SPF. However, DEA does not 
deal with stochasticity8 and all deviations from the production frontier are considered to be 
due to pure inefficiencies and not noise. Several articles compare the results obtained by 
using SPF and DEA, respectively. Among these are Lee and Holland (2000) and Coglan, 
Pascoe and Mardle (1998), but their comparisons do not produce any solid conclusion about 
which method to use. 
 
In this paper, DEA has been chosen as the method to perform the estimations of technical 
efficiency. It can be argued that when analyzing a fishery, it is necessary to consider 
stochasticity. However, Coglan, Pascoe and Mardle (1998) point out that if monthly or longer 
time period data are used, the trip-related stochasticity is reduced and the necessity for 
dealing with stochasticity is not as important. Because the forthcoming analysis is based on 
individual monthly data, DEA without stochasticity is considered a valid method. 
 
The following review of the DEA theory is intended to give the reader the basic knowledge 
needed to understand the method9. The review will be input-oriented due to the fact that the 
vessels being analyzed are restricted by catch limitations in form of quotas. Combined with 
the biological circumstances, it seems irrelevant to use an output-oriented approach, where 
the fishermen are assumed to maximize their output given the current input use.  
 
DEA is a technique using mathematical programming methods10 to find the frontier that 
envelops the data observed and thus reflect the best-practice. The relative efficiency of each 
observation is then measured relative to this frontier, as observations on the frontier are 
considered fully efficient. The technique has been used to analyze the structures of many 
different industries. Besides fisheries, examples include hospitals (Dervaux, Kerstens and 
Leleu 2000), schools (Arnold et al. 1996), banks (Sherman and Gold 1985), and farms 
(Battese 1991)11. 
 
DEA can be conducted with a short-run or long-run time horizon. In the long run, all inputs 
that the DMU can directly influence are considered variable or discretionary, and thus 
                                                 
6 Webster, Kennedy, and Johnson (1998) consider this to be an advantage because it enables one to perform 
solid tests of the results. 
7 Coelli and Perelman (1996, 1999, 2000) use parametric distance functions to analyse a multi-output situation 
for European railways. 
8 DEA has been modified to consider stochasticity. See Grosskopf (1996) for a survey of the different methods. 
9 Readers with special interest in DEA are encouraged to read Charnes et al. (1994) and Cooper, Seiford and 
Tone (2000). Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) also discuss SPF and productivity measurement. 
10 The parametric SPF method uses econometric theory to estimate the frontier. 
11 An extensive reference list can be found on www.deazone.com. 
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changeable at a minimum cost. In the short run, some inputs may be fixed or non-
discretionary, and a distinction between variable and fixed inputs is necessary. However, 
under both time horizons, some important inputs can be directly uncontrollable for the DMU. 
An example is fish stocks. Although these inputs cannot be changed by the DMUs, they are 
still important when estimating the level of technical efficiency and inclusion is, therefore, 
relevant (Golany and Roll 1993). 
 
The input-oriented DEA with only discretionary inputs seeks to identify the radial reduction 
in all inputs that will make the DMU technically efficient. However, with non-discretionary 
inputs in the production structure, these cannot be altered, and the efficiency measure only 
indicates the necessary radial reductions in the discretionary inputs, leaving the non-
discretionary inputs unchanged. Following Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker 
and Morey (1986)12, the problem for DMU o of the J DMUs can, assuming variable returns to 
scale, formally be written as: 
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oi 0xx   i = 1,…,I (4)
  λoj ≥ 0, ∑
=
=λ
J
1j
oj 1  j = 1,…,J, (5)
 
where j is the number of DMUs or observations (j = 1,…,J), k is the number of outputs y (k = 
1,…,K), l is the number of discretionary inputs xD (l = 1,…,L), and i is the number of non-
discretionary inputs xND (i = 1,…,I). The radial reduction in the discretionary inputs 
necessary to make DMU j fully efficient is measured by the scalar θ, which is constrained to 
be equal or below one in an input-oriented approach13. It can be seen that no reductions are 
imposed in the non-discretionary input observed for DMU j. λ is a vector of j intensity 
variables identifying the extent observation j is used to construct the piecewise linear frontier 
approximation that envelops the data. Constant returns to scale is assumed if no restriction is 
imposed on the sum of λ. 
 
                                                 
12 Golany and Roll (1993) modify the DEA problem with respect to two aspects. One is to allow for the 
simultaneous presence of non-discretionary inputs and outputs. Another is the presence of only partially 
discretionary input and outputs. 
13 This measure is exactly equal to the inverse of the input distance function, which is constrained to be equal to 
or above one. See Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) for further insights. 
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Restrictions (2) to (4) secure that the DMU is within the production possibility set for the 
industry, while reducing the discretionary inputs xD. The production possibility set for the 
industry is based on the assumption that it is impossible to produce more than any of the 
observed outputs, or linear combinations of these (ensured by restriction (2)), using less than 
any of the observed inputs or linear combinations of these (ensured by restrictions (3) and 
(4)). 
 
 
3. Three Methods for Stock Inclusion 
An array of approaches for including fish stocks into production analysis was reviewed in the 
first section. To my knowledge, no comparative studies analyzing the consequences of 
choosing a specific approach to biomass inclusion has been performed. It is thus difficult to 
prefer one approach to another. As mentioned in the introduction, the primary purpose of this 
paper is to perform such a comparison. It is also the intention to provide insight into the 
practical importance of these methods in order to recommend the use of a common method. 
 
In this section, the stock inclusion methods to be analyzed will be identified and discussed. 
Furthermore, the programming problem related to each of these methods will be formulated 
using the DEA theory presented in the previous section. Three methods have been chosen. In 
one method, the stock index is derived from the catch data, while the two other methods are 
based on independent fish stock measures, and the methods are as follows: 
 
1. CPUE stock indices 
2. Separate stock indices 
3. A composite stock measure 
 
Method 1, CPUE stock indices, includes one stock index for each of the primary species. The 
stock index for each species is calculated on a monthly basis by dividing the catch/landings 
with the number of days at sea conducted by the relevant vessel, and is the same for all 
vessels participating in a given month. It follows along the lines of Comitini and Huang 
(1967), Eggert (2001), Pascoe and Coglan (2002).  
 
The formula for calculating the fish stock measure in Method 1, sˆ , is: 
 
 0x
y
sˆ
J
1j
D
jm
jkm
km ≥=∑
=
  j = 1,…,J, (6)
 
where the notation is as used previously, but with m indicating the time period (m=1,…,M), 
i.e. month. Observe that the discretionary input in this formula is the number of days at sea.  
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Method 2, separate stock indices, simply includes one stock index, s , for each of the primary 
species, as also done by Eide et al. (1998) and Hannesson (1983). In Method 2, the stock 
indices are on a yearly basis, because the available biological fish stock measures are only 
calculated yearly. 
 
Method 3, a composite stock measure, considers the relative importance when including fish 
stocks in the technical efficiency analysis in line with Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde (2001). 
None of the two previous methods consider the relative importance of each primary species. 
For instance, even though all vessels catch the primary species, these may make up different 
relative amounts of the catch for different reasons. Method 3 accounts for this by calculating 
a monthly individual composite stock index, s~ , by using the following formula: 
 
 ∑ ∑=
=
≥⋅=
K
1k
K
1k
jkm
jkm
kjm 0
y
y
ss~
 j = 1,…,J, (7)
 
where s  is the independent stock index for each of the primary species used in Method 2. 
 
With the presented stock indices in mind, it is possible to point to some advantages and 
disadvantages of each method. Method 1 does not require the availability of independent fish 
stock measures, which may be the case in many fisheries. However, as discussed previously, 
some analyses have shown that the correlation between stock and CPUE is problematic. 
Method 2 is, on the other hand, based on independent measures, but does not consider the 
relative importance of the primary species for each vessel. Method 3 remedies this by 
calculating a stock index using the independent stock indices and the available catch data. 
However, a stock index based on the output measures could give rise to some theoretical 
considerations about consistency, as was also the case for Method 1. 
 
With the above methods in mind, the following programming problem must be solved in 
order to calculate the level of technical efficiency for vessel o in month m: 
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 Minθ,λ θom    (8)
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  ∑
=
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  ∑
=
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J
1j
jm 1, λjm ≥ 0  j = 1,…,J. (13)
 
Observe that the dimensions of the non-discretionary stock index differ between the methods, 
cf. kmsˆ , ks and jms~ . Also observe that in Methods 1 and 3, the stock index is on a monthly 
basis, while Method 2 uses a yearly index, and that the number of stocks differ from the 
number of outputs in Methods 1 and 2, i.e. only stocks for species in K’⊆K are included.  
 
In the programming problem, it has been assumed that variable returns to scale apply, cf. 
restriction 13. In this paper, both short-run and long-run analysis are performed. Grosskopf 
and Valdmanis (1987) argue that contrary to long-run analysis, short-run analysis does not 
presuppose constant returns to scale. Instead, they suggest the use of variable returns to scale 
in the short run. Because the objectives of this paper are not to evaluate the consequences of 
different scale assumptions, variable returns to scale is assumed for both time horizons. 
 
 
4. Description of the Data 
Having defined the methods to be analyzed and the programming problem to be solved, the 
utilized dataset will be described. The dataset was extracted from the databases hosted by the 
Danish Directorate of Fisheries. The dataset covers the Danish seiners between 18 and 24 
meters fishing in the period from 1995 to 1999 in the North Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat, and/or 
Baltic Sea. However, only those vessels that were registered in the Danish Vessel Register by 
the end of 1999 were included. 
 
By the end of 1999, 43 Danish seiners were active compared to 36 in 1995. These Danish 
seiners had a varied behavioural fishing pattern with respect to the choice of location, 
considering that they fished in all four of the primary Danish fishing waters mentioned above. 
The number of observations available for each separate area is shown in Table 1. Considering 
that there are too few observations available in Kattegat and the Baltic Sea, these areas are 
excluded in the analysis. 
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Table 1 Number of observations available for the Danish seiners 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
The North Sea 243 246 268 276 267 1,300 
Skagerrak 126 125 133 134 118 636 
Kattegat 16 16 6 10 7 55 
The Baltic Sea 35 42 59 65 88 289 
 
 
The fishing effort of vessels can be decomposed into two separate measures in the form of 
fishing power and fishing time (Segura 1973). The former measures the amount of capital 
and labour used, while the latter measures the amount of time it is active. Andersen (1999) 
discusses this topic in more detail. 
 
Several physical measures are available for the Danish seiners. Based on the coefficient of 
variation, which is a relative measure calculated as the standard deviation divided by the 
average value, length and engine power have the lowest relative dispersion, and these are 
used in the following analysis. Their characteristics are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for fishing power measures, average 1995-1999 
 Average value Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Length (meters) 19.19 0.91 18.00 22.00 
Engine power (horsepower) 196.91 69.17 121.36 444.24 
 
 
High correlation coefficients are observed between the two measures of fishing power. 
However, as mentioned by Nunamaker (1985), this should not form the basis for omitting 
variables in the analysis. This is opposed to parametric analysis, where the inclusion of highly 
correlated variables could significantly change the efficiency estimates. 
 
Besides fishing power measures of the Danish seiners, it is also important to get an 
impression of their fishing time. This can be measured as the time in which the gear is active 
or as the length of a fishing trip. Here the latter is used, because it includes all the time where 
an economic activity is conducted. Table 3 shows the number of days at sea per month in 
each of the analyzed fishing areas. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for fishing time measure, average 1995-1999 
 Average number of days at sea Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
The North Sea 14.57 6.92 1.00 31.00 
Skagerrak 12.58 7.26 1.00 31.00 
 
 
The Danish seiners use a technology invented by the Dane Jens Væver in 1848. The 
technology generates a relatively ‘clean’ fishery with little by catch and high quality fish. The 
two primary species are cod and plaice, measured in terms of catch weight and revenue. 
Table 4 shows the catch weight composition for the two areas. 
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Table 4 Average catch composition for different fishing areas, weight (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
The North Sea Plaice 30 38 53 42 55 
 Cod 53 46 36 47 31 
 Other species 18 16 11 11 14 
Skagerrak Cod 41 38 42 45 37 
 Plaice 35 33 31 27 36 
 Other species 24 29 27 28 27 
 
 
From Table 4, a trend towards a higher catch proportion of plaice can be observed. This 
development is to a high degree in line with the developments in cod and plaice stock 
indices14. Table 5 shows a decrease in cod stocks compared to an unchanged/minor increase 
in plaice stocks. The availability of fish and the following management initiatives, i.e. gear 
and catch restrictions, may be the primary reason for the reduced importance of cod in the 
catch composition for the Danish seiners. 
 
Table 5 Development in stock indices for different fishing areas, 1995-1999 (1995=100) 
 ----------------- Cod ---------------- --------------------- Plaice --------------------- 
 The North Sea and Skagerrak The North Sea Skagerrak 
1995 100 100 100 
1996 108 90 100 
1997 115 82 107 
1998 104 101 108 
1999 92 101 103 
Source: The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
 
 
Turning attention to catches measured in weight and deflated revenue, Table 6, the most 
important fishing area for the Danish seiners is the North Sea. Here, approximately 65% of 
the catches are caught. Skagerrak is the second most important area with approximately 30%. 
In these two areas, total catches are at their highest in 1997, while average catches peaked in 
1998. 
 
Table 6 Yearly catches for different fishing areas (tonnes and 1,000 DKK) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
The North Sea Total catch weight 3,852 3,422 4,731 4,444 4,277
 Total catch deflated revenue 56,787 50,771 70,934 67,869 64,839
 Average catch weight 133 114 135 135 116
 Average catch revenue 1,958 1,692 2,027 2,057 1,752
Skagerrak Total catch weight 1,681 1,633 2,364 2,167 1,611
 Total catch revenue 24,254 24,116 35,988 31,830 25,912
 Average catch weight 62 74 95 108 64
 Average catch revenue 898 1,096 1,440 1,591 1,036
Total Total catch weight 5,533 5,056 7,095 6,611 5,888
 Total catch revenue 81,041 74,887 106,922 99,699 90,750
 Average catch weight 154 140 177 165 140
 Average catch revenue 2,251 2,080 2,673 2,492 2,161
                                                 
14 The stock assessments made by ICES are besides commercial landings data, primarily based on survey data 
from research vessels and discard samplings. 
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Data are generally considered reliable. However, the output measures (weight) are based on 
landings and not actual catch. This implies that discards are not included, thus 
underestimating the actual production. For the specific fishery, the discards are estimated to 
be around 15% and 13% in the North Sea and Skagerrak, respectively (Krog 2003), but no 
information on specific vessels is obtainable, and the output figures are therefore not 
corrected to take this into account. Technical efficiency can thus be underestimated for some 
vessels.  
 
 
5. Analysis of the Danish Seiners 
 
5.1 Estimated Models 
Several models are estimated in order to pursue the objectives of this paper and to test the 
robustness of the results. This sub-section will briefly describe these models. In total, 48 
models are estimated, 24 models for each of the two fishing areas used by the Danish seiners 
between 18 and 24 meters. With reference to the taxonomy in Figure 1, the three-step 
procedure for understanding the taxonomy of the estimated models will be explained.  
 
Figure 1 Taxonomy of the Estimated Models 
 
 
 
Firstly, a choice has to be made about the way to measure outputs. Two choices are available 
in the dataset: catches in weight or deflated revenue. The use of revenue as an output measure 
is discussed. Traditional production theory uses the physical units to measure outputs. 
However, practical analysis often tends to use monetary units instead. This is despite the fact 
that “the specified frontier is not truly a production function” (Sharma and Leung 1998, p. 
273). There can be different motives for choosing revenue instead of weight. For example, if 
production is characterized by being multi-product, prices can be used to aggregate these 
outputs into one or several groups of output. Price variation is often considered a problem 
when using revenue, and hence the use of deflated catch revenues is recommended. 
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The former section showed that the Danish seiners fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
primarily fish for cod and plaice. Hence, the number of outputs included in the mathematical 
programming problems are cod, plaice and other species.  
 
Secondly, the fishing effort measures have to be defined. These measures are dependent on 
the time horizon, because this determines whether measures are changeable. In the short run, 
all included fishing power measures are non-discretionary, while they are discretionary in the 
long run. The measure of fishing time is, on the other hand, discretionary in both the short 
and long runs. 
 
In practice, two fishing power measures are used, i.e. length and engine power. Length is 
included in all of the estimated models as being either non-discretionary or discretionary, 
depending on the time horizon. Engine power is, on the other hand, only included in some of 
the models and has, if it is included, the same attribute as length, i.e. non-discretionary in the 
short run and discretionary in the long run. The measure of fishing time in form of the 
number of days at sea is included in all of the estimated models and assumed discretionary. 
 
Finally, the method for including fish stocks in the models is chosen. As explained 
previously, the different methods are used to investigate the inclusion of fish stocks in 
efficiency analysis of the Danish seiners. However, irrespective of the method and time 
horizon, the fish stock measure is always considered to be non-discretionary.  
 
Considering the large number of models to be estimated, acronyms have been given to each 
model for convenience. Each acronym is formulated from the basic rule Model te.m, and 
consists of three parts. Model can be replaced with either revenue or weight, depending on 
the choice of output measure. t specifies the time horizon chosen and can be either S for short 
run or L for long run; thus, t∈{S,L}. e denotes whether engine power is included or not. If 
included, e equals 1, otherwise it equals 0; thus, e∈{0,1}. Finally, m represents the stock 
method used. It can have a value of M1, M2, or M3, cf. the methods presented in the second 
section; thus, m∈{M1,M2,M3}. 
 
In Figure 1, an example of an associated acronym is given. Revenue L1.M1 is the acronym 
for a long-run model with revenue as output measure; engine power included and stock 
Method 1 used to account for stock conditions. In Appendix 1, an overview of all variables in 
the estimated models is available, including the acronyms used. 
 
 
5.2 Choice of Method for Fish Stock Inclusion 
With the taxonomy in mind, programming problems have been estimated using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (Brooke et al. 1998), assuming variable returns to scale 
and strong disposability. Given that data are on a monthly basis, a total of 1,300 and 636 
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programming problems were solved for the North Sea and Skagerrak, respectively, in all 48 
models. 
 
Based upon these estimations of technical efficiency using DEA, the three methods for 
including fish stocks will now be compared. To compare the estimations and evaluate the 
level of consistency between these, Bauer et al. (1998) mention several conditions that need 
to be fulfilled. Three of these are related to investigating whether the methods give the same 
results (Pardina, Rossi and Ruzzier 1999), and will, therefore, be used in the following. They 
are: 
 
1. Similar means and standard deviations should be observed. 
2. The DMUs should obtain the same rank. 
3. The same DMUs should be classified as “best” and “worst”. 
 
The fulfilment of these conditions is considered for the analyzed data in relation to the 
objectives of this paper. The comparisons are made between the monthly score for each 
observation; not between the scores of each month, and the methods used for testing these 
relationships will follow along the lines found in Pardina, Rossi and Ruzzier (1999).  
 
The first condition is considered using the means and standard deviations obtained from the 
estimations. The second condition is approached by using three tests, cf. below, and the third 
condition is considered using the upper and lower quartiles, i.e. the 75% quartile and 25% 
quartile. 
 
The tests used to investigate the second condition are the: 1) Spearman rank correlation test, 
2) Friedman test, and 3) Wilcoxon test. The first evaluates the strength of association between 
two variables, or in this case, the estimated models. The second and third tests whether the 
distribution in each of the estimated models can be considered to be similar. The Friedman 
test is used when comparing more than two groups of data, and the Wilcoxon test is used, 
when comparing two groups of data. The three tests are all non-parametric, implying that 
they do not a priori require any knowledge of the distribution of the obtained scores. The 
advantage is that an assumption of normally distributed scores is not necessary, and the tests 
are so-called “distribution free.” Further insight into the theoretical foundation of the three 
tests can be found in Sigel and Castellan (1998) and Conover (1999)15. 
 
The average efficiencies and standard deviations for the estimated models are presented in 
Table 7 for the North Sea and Skagerrak, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
15 All tests were performed by using an add-in for Microsoft Excel called Analyse-it. The programme can be 
downloaded from www.analyse-it.com. 
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Table 7 Average technical efficiencies for Danish seiners 
  ---- Model S0.m ---- ---- Model S1.m ---- ---- Model L0.m ---- ---- Model L1.m ---- 
Average 
Standard 
deviation Average 
Standard 
deviation Average 
Standard 
deviation Average 
Standard 
deviation
Weight te.M1 0.47 0.24 0.53 0.27 0.95 0.04 0.96 0.04 
Revenue te.M1 0.49 0.24 0.56 0.27 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Weight te.M2 0.46 0.24 0.53 0.26 0.95 0.04 0.96 0.04 
Revenue te.M2 0.47 0.25 0.53 0.27 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Weight te.M3 0.41 0.23 0.46 0.25 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.05 
N 
o 
r 
t 
h 
 
S 
e 
a Revenue te.M3 0.41 0.23 0.47 0.26 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Weight te.M1 0.57 0.27 0.61 0.28 0.96 0.04 0.96 0.04 
Revenue te.M1 0.55 0.26 0.59 0.26 0.96 0.04 0.96 0.04 
Weight te.M2 0.53 0.25 0.57 0.26 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Revenue te.M2 0.53 0.24 0.56 0.26 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Weight te.M3 0.47 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
S 
k 
a 
g 
e 
r 
r 
a 
k Revenue te.M3 0.47 0.23 0.50 0.26 0.95 0.04 0.95 0.04 
Notes: Model ∈ {Revenue,Weight}, t ∈ {S,L}, e ∈ {0,1}, m ∈ {M1,M2,M3}. 
 
 
As expected, the level of technical efficiency increases with increasing flexibility in the 
choice of non-discretionary input variables. In the least flexible model, i.e. Model S0.m, 
technical efficiency varies between 0.41 and 0.49 in the North Sea and between 0.47 and 0.57 
in Skagerrak. In the most flexible model, i.e. Model L1.m, technical efficiency is around 0.95 
in both areas. However, the two long-run models do not reflect this difference. This indicates 
that vessel length generally restricts the possibilities for adaptation16.  
 
Comparing the short-run and long-run models, a high similarity is observed in the average 
means between Model te.M1 and Model te.M2, and they generally seem to estimate higher 
values of technical efficiency compared to Model te.M3. The standard deviations, on the 
other hand, are rather similar in the three methods. This does not seem to be influenced by the 
choice of fishing area or output measure. 
 
High and significant correlations are observed between the different inclusions of fish stocks 
within each of the three models, Table 8, again irrespective of which fishing area is analyzed. 
However, there seems to be a tendency for higher correlations between Model te.M2 and 
Model te.M3. Generally, the estimated technical efficiencies in the three models seem to vary 
in similar ways, no matter which fish stock measure is applied. 
 
                                                 
16 The dataset includes an implicit assumption which influences the estimations. Looking at the North Sea, the 
maximum length is 22 meters, while the minimum is 18 meters. This implies that θ cannot be lower than 0.82, 
and this conclusion is not altered when including engine power. In the short run, the number of days at sea 
imposes the restriction, and here θ cannot be lower than 0.03. The larger difference in the average technical 
efficiencies in the short-run models is due to the increased ability to distinguish the DMUs from each other. 
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Table 8 Spearman rank correlations between technical efficiency estimations1) 
 
Weight 
te.M1 
Weight 
te.M2 
Weight 
te.M3 
Revenue 
te.M1 
Revenue 
te.M2 
Revenue 
te.M3 
Model S0.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model S0.M2 0.85 1.00  0.83 1.00  
Model S0.M3 0.90 0.92 1.00 0.87 0.93 1.00 
Model S1.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model S1.M2 0.82 1.00  0.80 1.00  
Model S1.M3 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.83 0.89 1.00 
Model L0.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model L0.M2 0.90 1.00  0.91 1.00  
Model L0.M3 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.96 1.00 
Model L1.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model L1.M2 0.87 1.00  0.79 1.00  
N 
o 
r 
t 
h 
 
S 
e 
a 
Model L1.M3 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.80 0.94 1.00 
Model S0.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model S0.M2 0.71 1.00  0.72 1.00  
Model S0.M3 0.70 0.89 1.00 0.70 0.89 1.00 
Model S1.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model S1.M2 0.71 1.00  0.71 1.00  
Model S1.M3 0.72 0.89 1.00 0.72 0.89 1.00 
Model L0.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model L0.M2 0.77 1.00  0.80 1.00  
Model L0.M3 0.73 0.94 1.00 0.82 0.94 1.00 
Model L1.M1 1.00   1.00   
Model L1.M2 0.77 1.00  0.79 1.00  
S 
k 
a 
g 
e 
r 
r 
a 
k 
Model L1.M3 0.76 0.94 1.00 0.81 0.94 1.00 
Notes: Model ∈ {Revenue,Weight}, t ∈ {S,L}, e ∈ {0,1}, m ∈ {M1,M2,M3}. 
 1) All the correlations were tested to be significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
Tests for statistical significant differences in the distributions between the methods are then 
undertaken. Firstly, the Friedman test is applied. However, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
all models. Therefore, despite the high correlations between the efficiency estimates in the 
three models, these models do not seem to have identical distributions. The highest Spearman 
correlations are observed between Model te.M2 and Model te.M3. In order to test whether the 
distributions observed in Model te.M2 and Model te.M3 are identical, a Wilcoxon test is 
applied. The hypothesis of equal distribution is, however, rejected for these two models. 
 
The last condition for consistency is to identify whether the same DMUs are categorized as 
the “best” and “worst” between the three different methods. Using the upper and lower 
quartiles, this hypothesis can be accepted if the percentage of DMUs that are simultaneously 
present in the quartiles is high. The percentages in the two quartiles are given in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Percentage of DMUs simultaneously present in upper or lower quartile 
  -Model S0.m- -Model S1.m- -Model L0.m- -Model L1.m- 
  Q75 Q25 Q75 Q25 Q75 Q25 Q75 Q25 
Weight te.M1/te.M2/te.M3 55.77 64.92 54.03 61.93 59.57 85.79 51.46 75.54
Weight te.M1/te.M2 59.69 70.21 57.43 71.12 60.54 86.81 59.24 85.16
Weight te.M1/te.M3 65.97 71.12 63.92 67.54 61.41 87.36 54.50 78.77
Weight te.M2/te.M3 77.40 86.05 78.65 80.79 95.09 97.25 79.76 86.19
Revenue te.M1/te.M2/te.M3 57.56 55.67 48.86 52.17 69.57 87.29 44.55 70.16
Revenue te.M1/te.M2 64.77 63.27 53.62 60.80 73.99 89.94 47.62 70.53
Revenue te.M1/te.M3 63.92 60.80 56.65 60.00 70.33 87.85 47.62 71.43
N 
o 
r 
t 
h 
 
S 
e 
a Revenue te.M2/te.M3 79.66 82.86 77.65 77.78 91.93 96.69 85.96 97.56
Weight te.M1/te.M2/te.M3 37.19 45.09 50.61 51.75 35.96 59.72 37.83 57.89
Weight te.M1/te.M2 47.91 57.84 45.21 53.11 39.65 61.76 44.39 59.90
Weight te.M1/te.M3 41.96 55.56 39.47 54.59 39.62 63.81 42.86 62.80
Weight te.M2/te.M3 67.37 64.95 64.77 58.42 83.23 91.06 77.91 89.83
Revenue te.M1/te.M2/te.M3 39.09 45.91 37.92 54.50 58.08 77.61 44.34 59.81
Revenue te.M1/te.M2 49.30 58.42 50.00 57.64 48.60 64.95 49.76 62.25
Revenue te.M1/te.M3 47.22 56.10 42.60 55.34 49.30 65.50 48.54 63.46
S 
k 
a 
g 
e 
r 
r 
a 
k Revenue te.M2/te.M3 62.24 66.67 66.49 60.80 71.89 89.14 80.00 91.28
Notes: Model ∈ {Revenue,Weight}, t ∈ {S,L}, e ∈ {0,1}, m ∈ {M1,M2,M3}. 
 
 
The percentage of DMUs simultaneously present in the upper and lower quartile varies 
considerably; when comparing the different models. The highest percentages are found when 
comparing Model te.M2 and Model te.M3. This is most evident in the long-run models, 
where the percentage in some situations is above 90%. The lowest percentages are generally 
observed when comparing all three models, while comparing Model te.M1 with Model te.M2 
and Model te.M1 with Model te.M3 gives approximately the same percentages. There seems 
to be a general tendency towards lower percentages of DMUs simultaneously present in the 
respective quartiles in Skagerrak compared to the North Sea, but the trends are the same as 
above. 
 
A mixed conclusion can be drawn about consistency based on the above investigation of the 
three conditions. Comparing the three methods with respect to “similar means and standard 
deviations,” they all seem to perform well. However, with respect to “the DMUs should 
obtain the same ranks,” Methods 2 and 3 seem to perform well with respect to high and 
significant correlations between the models, but perform poorly with respect to obtaining 
identical distributions. Finally, Methods 2 and 3 perform well with respect to the condition 
that “the same DMUs should be classified as best and worse.” Method 1 only seems to 
perform well in obtaining “similar means and standard deviations,” when being compared to 
the two other methods. Regarding the two other consistency conditions, Method 1 generally 
performs poorly. 
 
Based on the three conditions for consistency, it can thus be concluded that Methods 2 and 3 
obtain approximately the same technical efficiency levels for the DMUs. Method 1 obtains 
the same average scores as Methods 2 and 3, but are not identical when comparing the 
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individual DMUs. This conclusion is valid irrespective of the choice of time horizon, input 
measures, and output measures. This indicates that the conclusions are robust and not 
dependent on model specification. 
 
Concern of whether the stock indices are binding restrictions in the estimations may arise and 
can result in the influence of these not appearing in the results. This can be investigated by 
performing additional estimations for some of the models. In these estimations, the 
previously non-discretionary inputs were assumed discretionary, while the previously 
discretionary inputs were reduced to the efficient level and assumed non-discretionary. 
Hereby, it becomes possible to estimate an efficiency level with respect to the stock indices, 
i.e. a slack value. The results show that the efficiency levels are high and very often equal to 
one, thus indicating that the stock indices are binding restrictions in the performed 
estimations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Estimation of technical efficiency has increased significantly since M.J. Farrell’s thoughts on 
efficiency in 1957. In order to perform a reliable analysis, many aspects have to be addressed. 
However, in fisheries one of the most important aspects is the inclusion of fish stocks in order 
to account for fish stock developments. 
 
Several methods have been used in the fisheries literature, but with no discussion as to which 
method is preferable. This paper has, therefore, addressed this problem. In total, three 
methods have been considered. Method 1 used CPUE data from the included vessels to 
derive a stock index, which, on a monthly level, was the same for all the analyzed vessels. 
The two other methods were based on independent biological fish stock assessments. Method 
2 simply included, on a yearly basis, a fish stock for each of the primary species without 
distinguishing between vessels. Method 3 considered a composite fish stock measure for each 
individual vessel based on the relative importance of the primary species for a vessel and the 
independent stock measures.  
 
Several techniques have been suggested as ways of performing estimations of technical 
efficiency. In this paper, the DEA was used. This technique uses mathematical programming 
to estimate the frontier of the analyzed dataset. Afterwards, the production of each decision-
making unit is compared with this frontier to find the level of technical efficiency. Danish 
seiners between 18 and 24 meters were used to analyze this issue. Both short- and long-run 
models were included with different output and input measures. This was done in order to test 
the robustness of the obtained results. However, fish stocks were assumed non-discretionary 
in all of the estimations. 
 
In order to compare the estimations, the approach considered in Bauer et al. (1998) was used. 
This approach is based on three consistency conditions, namely the: 1) efficiency levels and 
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standard deviations, 2) obtained rankings and 3) simultaneous identification of the same 
“best” and “worst” vessels. 
 
Based on the chosen approach, it can be concluded that when comparing Methods 2 and 3, 
conditions 1 and 3 were satisfied, while condition 2 was partly satisfied. Thus, these methods 
were considered to obtain approximately similar results. Method 1, on the other hand, only 
performed well with condition 1, when being compared to Methods 2 and 3. These 
conclusions were robust to changes in choice of time horizon and output and input measures. 
It is important to note whether the included fish stock measure is based on independent stock 
assessment data or not. However, when using indices based on independent stock measures, it 
does not seem to matter how these are included. 
 
The comparison of different approaches to include fish stocks in the analysis of technical 
efficiency is considered a necessary first step to determine the best way to do this. A logical 
next step would be to test which stock inclusion method actually gives the correct answers. 
This can be analyzed using three other consistency conditions mentioned by Bauer et al. 
(1998), which as mentioned by Rossi and Ruzzier (1999), focus on whether the answers are 
correct, not whether they are the same. The three conditions are as follows: 1) measures 
should be consistent with other performance measures, 2) the efficiency measure for a DMU 
should be stable over time, and 3) the results should agree with prior expectation. On the 
current basis, it has not been possible to investigate these conditions more thoroughly. 
 
Several other topics could also be investigated in future research. The conclusions in this 
paper have been based on the analysis of Danish seiners, which only have two important 
species. A next step would be to investigate whether the conclusions change for fisheries with 
more than two important species. For example, including a large number of separate fish 
stocks may make the vessels more distinct from each other. This implies a higher technical 
efficiency score, because a larger fraction of the vessels is used to envelope the dataset.  
 
Another further step could be to investigate whether the application of statistical tests 
changes the derived conclusions. The literature on using statistical tests in relation to DEA is 
evolving. Kittelsen (1999, p. 3) points to the fact that more simulations are necessary to 
“draw clear conclusions about the usefulness of the suggested approximate hypothesis tests.” 
However, Banker (1993, 1996) and Simar and Wilson (1995, 2002) have investigated this 
topic. 
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Appendix 1 Estimated models and their acronyms 
Model1) Outputs Discretionary Inputs Non-discretionary Inputs 
Model S0.M1 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  2) CPUE dependent cod stock index 
 3) Catch of other species  3) CPUE dependent plaice stock index 
Model S0.M2 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  2) Independent cod stock index 
 3) Catch of other species  3) Independent plaice stock index 
Model S0.M3 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  
 3) Catch of other species  
2) One stock index based on the relative 
importance of cod and plaice 
Model S1.M1 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  2) Engine power 
 3) Catch of other species  3) CPUE dependent cod stock index 
   4) CPUE dependent plaice stock index 
Model S1.M2 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  2) Engine power 
 3) Catch of other species  3) Independent cod stock index 
   4) Independent plaice stock index 
Model S1.M3 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Length 
 2) Catch of plaice  2) Engine power 
 3) Catch of other species  3) One stock index based on the relative 
importance of cod and plaice 
Model L0.M1 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) CPUE dependent cod stock index 
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 2) CPUE dependent plaice stock index 
 3) Catch of other species   
Model L0.M2 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Independent cod stock index 
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 2) Independent plaice stock index 
 3) Catch of other species   
Model L0.M3 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 
 3) Catch of other species  
1) One stock index based on the relative 
importance of cod and plaice 
Model L1.M1 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) CPUE dependent cod stock index 
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 2) CPUE dependent plaice stock index 
 3) Catch of other species 3) Engine power  
Model L1.M2 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea 1) Independent cod stock index 
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 2) Independent plaice stock index 
 3) Catch of other species 3) Engine power  
Model L1.M3 1) Catch of cod 1) Number of days at sea
 2) Catch of plaice 2) Length 
 3) Catch of other species 3) Engine power 
1) One stock index based on the relative 
importance of cod and plaice 
Notes: 1) If catch weight is used to measure output, the model name is “Weight S0.M1,” etc. When deflated 
catch revenue is used, the model name is “Revenue S0.M1,” and so forth. 
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Rational Inefficiency in Fisheries 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Efficiency evaluations of Decision Making Units (DMUs) are usually done ex post and not ex 
ante. This may be a too harsh approach, especially if the DMUs are operating under 
significant uncertainty. Fishermen are often considered to operate in such an environment. 
The output arising from using given inputs is seldom known with certainty, because external 
factors such as availability of fish, equipment performance and weather may have a 
significant influence. Thus, when fishermen decide the inputs to bring on a trip, they try to be 
in the best possible position to handle the expected uncertainty. This may result in bringing 
excess inputs that are not used or strictly needed. This situation will usually be interpreted as 
inefficiency in ex post analyses despite of the fact that it may have been rational to bring 
them in the first place. One can denote such inefficiency as rational inefficiency. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the allocation of inefficiency on the different input factors and 
we use this to infer which factors are most useful to insure against the ex ante risk. More 
specifically, we use the method from Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) to find the allocation of 
slack that is consistent with rational behaviour. Based on data from 308 Danish vessels, we 
show that fishermen tend to allow for the highest flexibility in crew payments, followed by 
fuel costs. Sales costs and ice/provision costs seem to be the least flexible. Based upon 
specific utility functional forms, we find support for these conclusions.  
 
Keywords 
Rational inefficiency, fishermen, behaviour, allocative efficiency, uncertainty 
 
JEL-classification 
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Introduction 
In traditional production analysis Decision Making Units (DMUs) are evaluated based on the 
ex post observation of input use. If however compared to best practice ex post, outputs are 
too low or inputs too high, and is thus usually interpreted as inefficiency. However, judging 
the performance of a DMU in this way may be too harsh a method, especially if the DMUs 
are operating in environments with significant uncertainty. In such settings, rational DMUs 
have ex ante incentives to allocate too many inputs to the production to insure against the 
uncertainty. This is done in order to have the necessary flexibility to cope with uncertain 
conditions ex post in the best possible way.  
 
Fishermen are an example of DMUs operating in an uncertain environment. Several external 
factors such as availability of fish, equipment performance and weather (Gates 1984) 
influence their production of output (fish). When fishermen ex ante decide to go fishing, they 
want to equip their vessel in a way which secures the best possible flexibility to deal with the 
uncertainties. These inputs may afterwards have been superfluous if conditions are more 
favourable than expected. Thus, in ex post efficiency analyses, these vessels will be found to 
be inefficient, while the vessels that optimistically hoped for favourable conditions and 
therefore equipped their vessel with less inputs are estimated to be efficient.  
 
Of course the more efficient vessels may have a better ability to predict the encountered 
conditions, but if we ignore the uncertainty aspect, we may mix up efficiency with risk 
attitudes and luck.  
 
Based on the above considerations, it becomes interesting to analyse which inputs fishermen 
choose to keep in excess amounts, when they try to cope with uncertainty. Do they for 
instance bring extra crew in order to handle large catches? Or extra fuel to increase their 
range of operation? This will be investigated further in this paper. 
 
The method used to investigate these aspects was introduced in Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003). Instead of considering inefficiency as waste, they regard it as a rational choice of the 
DMU, thus giving rise to the concept of rational inefficiency. Using the notion of allocative 
efficiency, the cost minimising mix of input can be determined. Comparing this level to the 
actual level of input use, the amount of slack and its allocation between different production 
factors can be determined. These slack values can be seen as buffers against uncertainty, and 
indicate which inputs are most often included in excess amounts. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 we provide an introduction to the 
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) approach, and we develop an extension of their approach that 
stresses the uncertainty aspects. In Section 2 we introduce a Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model of the fishery problem and we briefly review how to calculate technical, 
allocative and cost efficiency in this framework. In Section 3 we present the empirical 
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analysis of the excess use of resources and its interpretation as rational inefficiency. The last 
section provides some final remarks.  
 
 
1. Rational inefficiency 
As mentioned in the introduction, Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) discussed the background 
and theoretically derived the framework for calculating rational inefficiency. The conceptual 
idea is that observed inefficiencies in production units (DMUs) are not wasted, but instead 
used to produce outputs that are not included in the analysis. These outputs may secure loyal 
employees, facilitate rent seeking behaviour, and maybe most importantly with respect to 
fisheries, enabling the DMU to cope with uncertainty. There may thus be several reasons for 
not eliminating inefficiencies, and in turn this should be able to give us insights into the 
effects of for instance management changes.  
 
Take initially a general situation, where a DMU uses px +ℜ∈  inputs to produce qy +ℜ∈  
outputs. The input requirement set L in the input space can then be defined as: 
 
 { }yproducecanxx)y(LL p+ℜ∈==  (1)
 
In the following, we assume L to be non-empty, closed, convex and characterised by free disposability 
(i.e. pLxL +ℜ⊆⊆+ ). One way to think of L is as the inputs of labour, fuel etc., needed on a 
vessel to catch the allocated production quota y. 
 
The next step is to define an efficient subset of L, which contains the technically efficient 
production plans. We define this as: 
 
 [ ]{ }L''x'x''x,'x''x:R''xL'x)L(F p ∉⇒≠≤∈∀∈=  (2)
 
Based on the above, we can now define the slack which measures the excess usage of inputs, 
cf. Fried, Schmidt and Yaisawarng (1999)1. Assume that the DMU has used an inefficient 
input combination x∈L\F(L). This means that the DMU could have chosen to use production 
procedures corresponding to an underlying production plan z that weakly dominates x, i.e. z 
∈ L and z≤ x. The excess usage of inputs of the underlying z is used as the anchor and can be 
calculated as the difference between x and z, i.e. the slack is given as: 
 
 pzxs +ℜ∈−=  (3)
 
                                                 
1 A deduction can be made between the radial slack, which by definition is the same proportion for all inputs, 
and the non-radial slack, which is not the same proportion for all inputs. 
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To calculate the excess use of resources this way, we must have more information about the 
underlying production plan z used by the DMU. Without such information, the slack s must 
be included in the slack possibility set S(x) with the observed x defined as: 
 
 { }xz,Lz),zx(ss)x(S ≤∈−==  (4)
 
A graphical illustration of the slack possibility set is found in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 The slack possibility set given actual inputs 
(a) (b) 
 
 
There are at least three possible interpretations of the slack, i.e.: 
 
sW  : real waste due to sub-optimal production procedures 
sR  : a rent in form of on-the-job consumption 
sB  : a buffer against uncertainty, an insurance premium 
 
From an agency perspective, these three interpretations reflect the idea that agents may lack 
abilities, may be lazy or may be risk averse. The former type of slack represents waste in a 
more traditional sense, while the two other slack types are not irrational as such, but instead 
rational decisions by the DMUs. We will in the following briefly review the theoretical 
aspects of viewing slack as on-the-job consumption and then we will turn to an analysis of 
slacks as a buffer against uncertainty. We will not consider the issue of slack as waste, but 
instead refer to Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) for further information on this more 
traditional interpretation.  
 
 
x2 
x1 
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1.1 Rational inefficiency as a buffer for rent 
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) stressed the rent interpretation and investigated firm’s 
decisions between off-the-job profit π, i.e. profits to owners, and on-the-job profit/slack 
pRs +ℜ∈ , i.e. excess use of inputs. They assumed that the DMUs utility depends on both of 
these, and that the underlying utility function has the form: 
 
 U = U(π,sR) (5)
 
which is assumed to be increasing in both arguments. 
 
Assuming preferential independence between π and sR, the level of profit does not affect the 
trade-off between the different slack types, and the utility function can therefore be written 
as: 
 U = U(π,sR) = V(π,g(sR)) (6)
 
with g(◦): ℜ→ℜ+p  being an increasing function aggregating the value of the different types 
of slack.  
 
Assume next that the DMUs are operating in a price based regime with given input prices. 
Having a certain budget, the aim of the individual DMU is then to solve the following 
problem: 
 
)s,(Umax R
x,s,
π
π
 (7)
   
s.t. x·wb −≤π   (7.a)
   
 Lsx ∈− R   (7.b)
   
 0x,0sR ≥≥   (7.c)
 
where x is the vector of actual input consumption, b is the budget allocated and w is the input 
factor price. 
 
The DMU’s decision problem in the price based regime can be graphically illustrated as in 
Figure 2. Decreasing the profit level π=b–w·x, i.e. moving the isoprofit line towards north-
east, the DMUs slack possibilities (as reflected by the shaded area) increase. For any given 
profit level, the choice of x and s reflects the relative weights associated with the different 
slacks. 
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Figure 2 Price based planning 
 
 
In a price based regime, the optimal underlying production plan z is an allocatively efficient 
input combination, thus implying that z=x-s ∈ Xa as shown by Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003)2. The intuition behind this result is illustrated in Figure 3. If the DMU is assumed to 
be rational, it will seek to generate the outputs in the cheapest possible way by using 
aa Xxz ∈= . The remaining budget, b-w·xa, can then be used for either profit or slack. This 
decision problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
 )s,s·wx·wb(Umax RRa
s pR
−−
+ℜ∈
 (8)
 
Having chosen an optimal underlying production plan, the remaining decision for a DMU is 
to select the optimal allocation between profit and slack.  
 
Figure 3 Choice of underlying production in a price based regime 
 
                                                 
2 How to calculate the allocative efficient input combination is presented in the next section. 
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Based on the DMU’s actual input use, one can by assuming a specific functional form for the 
slack preference function g(◦), estimate the trade-off between different slacks. Bogetoft and 
Hougaard (2003) analyse three specific preference functions. These are: 
 
1) a Nash bargaining model: p21 p21 s...ss)s(g
ααα ⋅⋅⋅=  
2) a weighted fairness model: g(s)= min {α1s1, α2s2,…,αpsp} 
3) a fair gains model: g(s)= min {s1-α1, s2-α2,…, sp-αp} 
 
Based on these specific functional forms, the relative importance or relative bargaining power 
of each input factor i=1,…,p can be calculated as follows: 
 
1) ∑=α =p 1j jj
ii
i sw
sw  
2) ∑=α = −p 1j 1jii )s(s
1  
3) 
p
)s1(s
p
1i i
ii
∑−+=α =  
 
The interpretation of these weights is that they indicate which inputs factors or which group 
of employees have most bargaining power and are hereby able to attract the highest 
proportion of on-the-job slack. Large values of α in 1) and 3) and low values in 2) is a sign of 
high bargaining power.  
 
The decision problem for the DMU is thus a two-step procedure, where the allocation 
between off-the-job profits and on-the-job slack is made in the first step, while the allocation 
of on-the-job slack is considered in the second step. In the first step, the allocation can for 
instance be decided by negotiations between owners and employees, while the second step 
slack allocation is decided through bargaining between the different groups of employees or 
other production factors. 
 
 
1.2 Rational inefficiency as a buffer for uncertainty 
For several types of production, it is relevant to interpret the observed slack as a buffer 
against uncertainty instead of some on-the-job resources used by the employees. An obvious 
example is the fishery. When fishermen decide ex ante what to bring on their forthcoming 
fishing trip, they allow for a buffer in order to have flexibility for handling unforeseen events, 
such as less favourable stock conditions for instance. Organisational theorists have long 
recognised this type of slack, cf. Galbraith (1974) and Staber and Sydow (2002) and hence 
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this is not a new idea. However, no formal investigations of this type of decision making have 
been undertaken within fisheries to the knowledge of the authors3.  
 
To formalise, we can introduce uncertainty by including possible states of nature given by the 
set Ω∈ω . The setting considered now is therefore one where a DMU ex ante decides to use 
px +ℜ∈  inputs to produce qy +ℜ∈  outputs in the state of nature Ω∈ω . The technology of a 
DMU can be defined by the following input requirement set: 
 
 { }ωℜ∈=ω= + natureofstateinyproducecanxx);y(LL p  (9)
 
The presence of uncertainty can be thought of by considering the output y as given, say by 
the quota, and the state of nature as affecting the inputs required. If state ω1 is more 
favourable than state ω2, then the input requirement set is larger in state ω1, i.e. 
);y(L);y(L 21 ω⊇ω . 
 
Due to the ex ante decisions by the DMU about producing y outputs using x input resources, 
it may turn out ex post that not all of these are strictly needed, i.e. x∈L(y;ω)\ F(L(y;ω)) in the 
actual state of nature ω. Assume that the DMU picked );y(Lx 2ω= , because he wanted to be 
able to catch his quota in conditions at least as favourable as ω2. Now, if ω1 is realised, this 
gives the following slack: 
 
 );y(Lxs 1B ω−∈  (10)
 
which is the excess usage of inputs, when the DMU ex ante assumed to be in state ω2, but 
instead ended up in a more favourable state ω1. 
 
The interpretation and possible values of the slack depends on the ability of the DMU to 
adjust production procedures after the state of nature has been revealed. Two possibilities 
may arise, one where the production procedures cannot be modified and one where they can 
be adjusted. 
 
Assume firstly that the planned production procedures cannot be modified in the view of new 
information regarding the state of nature ω. In this case the excess usage of inputs can be 
thought of as an insurance premium that DMUs pay to be able to produce y in less favourable 
states. 
 
Assume secondly that the inputs x decided ex ante can be adjusted thus making the actual 
input usage equal to z, when the state of nature is known. This second possibility is more in 
                                                 
3 Chambers and Quiggin (2000) analyse state-contingent production choices under uncertainty proposing to use 
dual methods for estimations.  
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line with the spirit of the original rational inefficiency notion, because a bargaining situation 
arises about how to allocate these input factor savings. In fisheries, unused fuel can for 
instance be saved for the next trip and the savings can be paid out to the crew. 
 
The situation is illustrated in Figure 4 for a situation with two states of nature ω1 and ω2, 
where ω1 is assumed to be more favourable than ω2. The DMU decides ex ante to use x 
inputs in order to facilitate the production of y outputs, if the “worst” state of nature ω2 is 
realised. However, the state of nature instead becomes more favourable than expected and 
less inputs are therefore actually needed. If the input use cannot be adjusted, the DMU still 
uses x to produce y, but if it can be adjusted, the production plan is chosen within the shaded 
area in Figure 4. The actual placement herein is determined by the bargaining between the 
input factors. 
 
Figure 4 Slack as a buffer for uncertainty 
 
 
1.3 Further developments 
To further develop the idea of rational inefficiency as a buffer against uncertainty, we need 
more specific models to analyse the impact of state of nature on the technology. We will 
discuss two hypotheses here. 
 
One hypothesis is that the effect of uncertainty has a multiplicative or homothetic impact as 
given in the following form: 
 
 )y(L)(H);y(L ⋅ω=ω  (11)
 
where H(◦) maps the set of possible states Ω into positive real numbers +ℜ  and L  is a given 
base isoquant. In fisheries, the interpretation can be that the days at sea needed to obtain a 
given catch is uncertain, and the necessary variable inputs therefore must be expanded in a 
proportional fashion, if conditions are non-favourable. 
x2 
x-S(x;y,ω1) s2 
s1 
x 
L(y, ω1)
L(y, ω2)
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The marginal rates of substitution between the inputs in this technology are the same along a 
ray from the origin. This implies that the allocatively efficient input combinations in the 
different states of nature are also on a given ray, determined by the relative input prices. The 
situation is graphically illustrated in Figure 5. We can in this set-up interpret H(ω) as being 
the relative complexity of producing in state ω.  
 
Figure 5 Homothetic input requirement sets 
 
 
 
With such a technology, a DMU will always choose an allocative efficient input combination. 
The level of the input combination depends on his risk attitude4. A high level of technical 
inefficiency indicates a high level of risk aversion, while the opposite is the case for a low 
level of technical inefficiency. From this we can derive testable hypotheses. All DMUs shall 
locate approximately on the allocatively efficient ray. If this does not happen, the combined 
hypothesis of 1) rational inefficiency as a buffer against uncertainty and 2) homothetic impact 
of uncertainty must be rejected.  
 
An alternative hypothesis is that the effect of uncertainty has an additive structure instead of 
the previous multiplicative structure. A possibility is that: 
 
 )y(Lx)(h);y(L +⋅ω=ω  (12)
 
where h(◦) plots the set of possible states Ω into positive real numbers +ℜ  and x  is the input 
base translation of the base isoquant.  
 
                                                 
4 Several investigations have found fishermen to be risk averse, cf. for instance Larson, Sutton and Terry (1999), 
Pradham and Leung (2004) and Eggert and Tveterås (2004). However, some find that fishermen have a risk 
loving behaviour, cf. Holland and Sutinen (1999, 2000) and Dupont (1993). 
x2 
x1 
L(y, ω1) 
L(y, ω2) 
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A graphical illustration of this set-up is presented in the two graphs in Figure 6. In Figure 6.a, 
input x1 is the primary buffer against uncertainty, while x2 has this characteristic in Figure 
6.b. In informal terms, this can be thought of as the factor which can best mitigate uncertainty 
and thus is the most flexible production factor. 
 
Figure 6 Additive input requirement sets 
(a) (b) 
 
 
Under the assumption that the uncertainty effect has an additive structure, the rational DMU 
will still have incentives to choose an input combination x, such that x-h⋅ x  is allocatively 
efficient. The slack level is in this situation calculated as s=x-xa(y) with the latter term being 
the allocative efficient production plan. The size of h then reflects the risk aversion of the 
DMU, i.e. the larger the h, the higher risk aversion. 
 
Again, this leads to a testable hypothesis. From the slack values, an estimation of the input 
base translation can be derived by using the following formula: 
 
 
p,...1k,
s
sx p
1j
i
j
i
k =∑= =  (13)
 
If these vectors vary extensively between the DMUs, the technological and behavioural 
assumptions must be rejected, i.e. the impact of uncertainty is not a translation of isoquants, 
or the DMUs are not rationally inefficient, or both. However, if they do not deviate much, we 
can accept the hypothesis and the flexibility of the different resources can be evaluated using 
the x  vector. 
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2. Calculation of slack values 
In order to address the question of which input factors contribute most to the rational 
inefficiency, it is necessary to calculate the slack values for each input. The slack values can 
be estimated by comparing the present input use with the optimal input use. It is thus 
necessary to obtain estimations of the optimal input use.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) derived that a rational 
DMU will seek to produce the outputs in an allocative efficient way, where costs are 
minimised. A measure of the slack value is thus obtained as the difference between the 
allocative efficient input use and the observed input use. The purpose of this section is to 
present methods to derive these. 
 
For the ease of exposition, we start by presenting the different efficiency concepts. Because 
these concepts are dependent on the assumptions made about agent’s behavioural objectives 
(Coelli, Rao and Battese 1999), simply assume that the objective of the DMU is cost 
minimisation5. With this assumption, economic efficiency, also referred to as cost efficiency, 
measures the ability to produce a given output level at minimum cost for given input prices. 
 
Continuing with the objective of cost minimisation, the availability of input price information 
facilitates a further deduction of economic efficiency into technical and allocative efficiency, 
cf. Farrell (1957). Technical efficiency in an input-orientated approach measures the possible 
decrease in input use with a constant output level, while allocative efficiency measures the 
possible decrease in cost that can be obtained, if the right input mix is used given input 
prices.  
 
Before presenting a mathematical method to calculate technical, allocative and cost 
efficiency, it is instructive to give a graphical illustration of these, cf. Figure 7, where the 
best-practice frontier is given by the bold line. Technical efficiency is then measured by 
comparing the observed input use at point A with the use at the best-practice point B, thus 
measured as |0B|/|0A|. Including the dotted isocost line indicating the input price ratio, 
allocative efficiency is then measured as |0C|/|0B|, and cost efficiency is finally measured as 
|0C|/|0A|. Thus, while point A indicates the observed input usage, point D gives the allocative 
efficient input usage. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Other objectives could be revenue or profit maximisation. 
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Figure 7 Technical, allocative and cost efficiency  
 
Source: Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) 
 
 
With this verbal and graphical introduction of the efficiency concepts, the next step is to 
present how to mathematically calculate the levels of technical, allocative and economic 
efficiency in an empirical application. To do so, we propose to use Data Envelopment 
Analysis, cf. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978,1979)6.  
 
Assume that the DMU has both discretionary and non-discretionary inputs in the production 
and that this production is characterised by variable returns to scale. In this set up, the input-
orientated level of technical efficiency TE for DMU v′ can be found by solving the following 
linear programming problem, cf. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) and Banker and Morey 
(1986):  
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6 To obtain a more general overview of the method given here, readers are referred to for instance Charnes, 
Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994), Coelli, Rao and Battese (1999) and Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000). 
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where ym denotes output m, xn represents input n of which Ñ are discretionary and N-Ñ-1 are 
non-discretionary. The intensity variable λ measures the weight by which the activity of each 
DMU should be included when determining the input minimising frontier for DMU v′. If the 
observed value of a variable is used, this is indicated by the superscript obs. 
 
In the above problem, a variable d is furthermore included. This variable is a technical 
comparison vector indicating which other DMUs in the dataset that DMU v′ can be compared 
with (see Andersen and Bogetoft (2004) for further elaboration). 
 
Having found the minimising level of input use, the obvious next step is to find the cost 
minimising level of input use, if input prices are available. This is done by solving the 
following individual linear programming problem: 
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where wobs v′ denotes the observed input prices for each vessel v′. 
 
Compared to the technical efficiency problem, the input use is here allowed to change in 
different proportions as seen by the inclusion of the endogenous variable xn for each vessel v′. 
The optimal values of the inputs depict the allocatively efficient input combination. This is 
the combination that a rational inefficient DMU uses as the underlying production plan. 
 
Based on the minimum input use found in the above problem, the level of cost efficiency can 
be calculated as follows: 
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Finally, the level of allocative efficiency can be calculated as: 
 
 'v'v'v TECEAE =  (17)
 
These different efficiency measures will in the following be calculated by using the General 
Algebraic Modelling System, GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus and Raman 1998)7. 
 
 
3. Rational inefficiency and Danish Fisheries 
To illustrate at least some of the above ideas, a dataset has been compiled based upon the 
annual account statistics for a representative part of the Danish commercial fishery collected 
by the Food and Resource Economics Institute. In 2002, information was collected from 331 
fishing firms. However, specialised mussel and horse shrimp fisheries are excluded from the 
present dataset giving a total of 308 observations. Within this data set, several vessel types 
are represented, ranging from netters and Danish seiners to purse seiners and different types 
of trawlers. 
 
The information in the dataset for each vessel is extensive, including catch weight; catch 
value, several types of costs, investments, asset values and so forth. For practical purposes, 
we have chosen to include nine outputs, four variable costs and two fixed costs. The nine 
outputs measured in tonnes of catch weight are as follows: 1) cod, 2) other codfish, 3) plaice, 
4) other flatfish, 5) herring, 6) mackerel, 7) lobster and shrimp, 8) other consumption species 
and 9) industrial species. The variable costs measured in Danish kroner are: 1) fuel and 
lubricants, 2) ice and provisions, 3) sales and 4) crew. The two fixed costs are: 1) 
maintenance and 2) insurance and other services. 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the average values of catch weights, values and costs for the 
different gear types represented in the dataset. 
 
Table 1 Average catch weight (tonnes), catch value and costs in 2002 (1,000 DKK) 
  
Catch 
weight 
Catch 
value Fuel 
Ice and 
provisions Sales Crew 
Mainte-
nance 
Insurance 
etc. 
 Beam trawl 1,310 21,909 5,050 133 2,421 6,599 2,306 1,173
 Danish seine 572 7,940 377 134 922 3,953 1,026 635
 Net/line 324 5,759 284 85 590 3,590 613 492
 Multi-purpose 801 8,284 793 91 665 4,011 963 603
 Purse seine 8,583 25,465 1,792 151 586 7,586 3,780 2,079
 Trap 253 4.048 118 70 370 2,577 466 357
 Trawl 6,815 13,499 1,476 338 1,198 4,788 1,500 847
 Average, all 4,259 11,207 1,089 231 972 4,453 1,285 767
Source: Food and Resource Economics Institute 
                                                 
7 Several computer programs have been developed to calculate these efficiency measures. Examples are for 
instance OnFront (Färe and Grosskopf 2000) and DEAP (Coelli 1996). One can also model these programs in 
Excel or statistical programs such as SAS or SHAZAM. The applied GAMS programs are available upon 
request from the authors. 
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Based upon this dataset, the input-orientated technical, allocative and cost efficiency can be 
calculated using the approach presented above. The technical comparison vector secures that 
only vessels using the same gear type are compared. Descriptive statistics for these efficiency 
measures are found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Average efficiency scores 
 Technical efficiency score Allocative efficiency score Cost efficiency score 
 Beam trawl 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Danish seine 0.98 0.99 0.97 
 Multi-purpose 1.00 0.98 0.98 
 Net/line 0.93 0.90 0.84 
 Purse seine 1.00 0.99 0.99 
 Trap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Trawl 0.89 0.89 0.80 
 Average, all 0.92 0.91 0.85 
 
 
For several fleet segments we observe that although they are technically efficient they are not 
allocative efficient, and thus not cost efficient. The trawlers are the worst performers, because 
they have the lowest scores. This indicates that significant input and cost reductions can be 
realised, if the correct input use is implemented. 
 
The initial input use for each vessel can be subtracted from the allocative efficient input use. 
In this way, a measure of slack for each input is obtained. Given the theory discussed in 
Section 1, this slack can be seen as a measure of flexibility for the vessels, giving them the 
ability to deal with the uncertain environment they operate in. Table 3 gives the descriptive 
statistics for the slack values. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of slack values 
 Fuel Ice and provisions Sales Crew 
 Average 
Coefficient 
of variation Average 
Coefficient 
of variation Average 
Coefficient 
of variation Average 
Coefficient 
of variation
 Beam trawl 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
 Danish seine 9,778 4.49 14,589 3.29 20,379 3.90 139,274 3.08
 Multi-purpose 2,460 4.24 -1,730 0.00 -1,816 0.00 80,313 4.24
 Net/line 30,899 2.70 16,189 3.04 51,903 2.63 588,579 1.83
 Purse seine -12,315 0.00 -3,083 0.00 5,539 3.32 72,954 3.32
 Trap 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
 Trawl 251,746 1.60 33,092 3.88 147,947 1.79 782,707 1.51
 Average, all 146,539 2.22 22,923 4.36 95,304 2.27 585,844 1.82
Notes:  Coefficient of variation is calculated as standard deviation divided by average value, and measures the 
relative dispersion.  
 
 
From Table 3, it can be observed that the average slack value from all observations is the 
highest for crew, followed by fuel, sales and ice and provisions. This indicates that fishermen 
have a tendency to have excess crew when they are fishing, or that any savings in fuel, etc. 
are reallocated into higher crew payments. 
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A number of negative slack values are observed in contrast to the theory. There can be 
several reasons for this. One could be that the estimated allocative efficient input use is not 
the correct one. The number of negative slack values within each fleet segment is given in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Number of negative slack values 
 Fuel 
Ice and 
provisions Sales Crew Total 
 Danish seine 1    1 
 Multi-purpose  1 1  2 
 Net/line 8 10 9 2 29 
 Purse seine 1 1   2 
 Trawl 6 42 17 13 78 
 Total 16 54 27 15 112 
 
 
If one illustrates the slack values of the different cost types against each other, as done in 
Figure 8, one observes a clear pattern that crew has the highest slacks compared to the other 
three inputs. The pattern becomes fuzzier when comparing the other slacks with each other, 
except when fuel and ice/provisions are compared. 
 
Figure 8 Distribution of slacks on cost types 
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Figure 8 Distribution of slacks on cost types, continued 
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We have also estimated the more specific slack allocation models from Section 1.1. The 
values of the resulting relative importance factors are given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 Relative importance of input factors 
 Nash Bargaining Weighted Fairness Fair Gains 
 Fuel 0.17 0.11 -66,113 
 Ice and provisions 0.03 0.70 -189,730 
 Sale 0.11 0.17 -117,349 
 Crew 0.69 0.03 373,192 
 
 
It is observed that these utility function calculations support the previous findings. Excess 
resources or extraordinary savings go primarily to the crew. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have made some initial attempts to extend and apply the idea of rational 
inefficiency to an uncertain environment. The idea is simple. Ex post evaluation of decisions 
that are planned under uncertainty ex ante may potentially lead to misleading conclusions. 
What appears to be inefficiency may in fact be a rational choice of extra resources ex ante to 
protect against the unknown future. 
 
We have estimated the original rational inefficiency model for data from Danish fishery. This 
is to the best of our knowledge, except for an ongoing project by Asmild, Bogetoft and 
Hougaard (2004), the first attempt to implement the general ideas in Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003) in an actual application. 
 
The results do not in general contradict the rational inefficiency hypothesis, and the allocation 
of slack across inputs reflects in a natural way the relatively strong bargaining power of the 
crew.  
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We have also speculated on some further development of the theory by including more 
specific state-contingent technologies and by suggesting ways to estimate combinations of 
such technological and behavioural assumptions. 
 
Both the empirical and the theoretical discussions can easily be extended. One 
straightforward next step would be to test the extended state-contingent set-ups and the 
associated hypothesis on the same data. 
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Quota Trading and Profitability: 
Theoretical Models and Applications to Danish Fisheries 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we provide a framework to analyze the potential 
gains from quota trading. We compare the industry profit and structure before and after a free 
trade reallocation of production quotas. The effects of tradable production quotas depend on 
several technological and behavioural characteristics, including the ability to learn best 
practice (catch-up) and the ability to change the input and output composition (mix). To 
illustrate the usefulness of our approach, we analyze a dataset from the Danish fishery. We 
study the potential gains to the industry from tradable quota under each of four sets of 
technological and behavioural characteristics. 
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Introduction 
In theory as well as in practice, individual transferable (production) rights are useful to 
ensure optimal allocation of production. Popular applications are found within environmental 
and resource economics, where the usage of a resource by one agent implies negative 
externalities on the other agents. Pioneering work includes Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968), 
and Montgomery (1972) gives an early mathematical presentation. In a traditional externality 
interpretation, the regulator distributes the property right to the good causing the externality 
among the users of this good. Thereafter they are restricted from using more of the good than 
they own, but they are allowed to sell and buy these rights.  
 
The fishery is one of the economic sectors, where regulators in many countries use individual 
transferable rights. Applications are found in for example United States, New Zealand, 
Canada, Iceland and the Netherlands. Furthermore, several countries, including Denmark, are 
considering to use this instrument. In fisheries, the individual rights are quotas that define 
initial allowances to catch a certain amount of fish. In the literature, the rights are therefore 
referred to as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). The seminal papers by Arnason (1990) 
and Kaufmann, Geen and Sen (1999) provide further insights into the use of ITQs within 
fisheries. 
 
Any change in the regulatory framework is costly. Introducing ITQ requires that the regulator 
and the industry learn about and adapt to the new regime. Before moving from an incumbent 
regime to one based on ITQs, it is therefore important to estimate the likely gains from the 
resulting reallocation of the production. The potential gains (in a comparative static sense) 
should exceed the transition costs.  
 
This paper discusses different ways to model the reallocation of production following the 
introduction of ITQs. It uses these models to estimate the likely gains and structural 
implications from introducing ITQs in the Danish fishery. The potential gains from ITQs are 
estimated by comparing the profit under the current system of catch allocation with the profit 
under the optimal allocation of catches. We presume that the optimal allocation will 
eventually be realized, if we introduce free quota trade. 
 
Part of the challenge is that the available production data and behavioural patterns are the 
result of the incumbent regime. The technological adaptation and behavioural responses are 
therefore somewhat uncertain. We suggest several alternatives – varying in the extent to 
which individual fishermen can improve performance and change their catch mix - and use 
these to estimate a range of likely impacts. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is useful to model the underlying production structure in a 
reallocation study. DEA is essentially an activity analysis approach, where actual productions 
are used as activities. DEA estimates a production frontier from the best practices of the 
analyzed Decision Making Units (DMU). This frontier can be used to evaluate possible gains 
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from individual learning (catching up) as well as from reallocations among the DMUs. 
Moreover, by its reliance on Linear Programming, it is easy to formulate alternative research 
questions and to get numerical estimates from large datasets, as we shall demonstrate below. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 1 reviews some related literature. A brief 
introduction to DEA is given in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework and 
the ways in which reallocations can give rise to gains in general terms. The specific sectoral 
models are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the usage of the framework is demonstrated 
on a dataset from Danish fisheries. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. Related Literature 
There is a large micro-economic literature on the usage of tradable production rights. We 
shall not cover this here. Rather, we focus on the relatively few papers using DEA to estimate 
reallocation gains in a manner somewhat similar to our approach. Also, we briefly relate our 
approach to the usage of (Positive) Mathematical Programming to predict sectoral 
developments in agriculture and to the iterative multilevel planning problems found in 
divisionalized firms and planned economies.  
 
Brännlund, Färe, and Grosskopf (1995) and Brännlund, Chung, Färe, and Grosskopf (1998) 
study the Swedish pulp and paper industry using a DEA model with some non-discretionary 
inputs and some unwanted outputs (pollution). They use this model to estimate the cost of the 
existing transmission constraints at the individual units and the gains from reallocation of 
pollution rights.  
 
A related approach is used in Bogetoft and Wang (2005) and Bogetoft, Thorsen and Strange 
(2003). In these papers, the potential gains from mergers of consultancy units in the 
agricultural and forestry industries, respectively, are estimated. The reallocations are 
restricted to take place among geographical neighbours. Moreover, the gains are decomposed 
in learning, mix and size effects, and the corresponding organizational changes are identified. 
 
An attractive feature of these studies is the direct investigation of reallocations and the 
associated matching problems. The rights and obligations of the individuals are reallocated in 
a balanced manner to preserve the sector wide rights and obligations. This requires the 
solution of non-trivial matching problems, since a multiplicity of inputs and outputs in the 
production process must be accounted for. 
 
Also, the explicit formulation of the matching problems is in sharp contrast to the simpler, 
more naive but widely used production economic approach of measuring allocative 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency is typically defined as cost efficiency divided by technical 
efficiency. It therefore measures what can be gained by adapting to given prices in a complete 
and perfect market and it effectively ignores the matching issues in a finite economy. 
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A potential drawback of these studies, however, is that they all assume that the reallocation 
takes place at the frontier. This means that all units are assumed to adapt to the best practice 
before the reallocation. Although competition may work to drive out inefficient firms, it may 
be naive to presume technical efficiency up front. After all, efficiency studies of most sectors, 
including very competitive ones, have revealed that inefficiency is a persistent phenomenon. 
Also, even from a theoretical perspective, technical inefficiency may be a rational response as 
it may help compensate the employees, facilitate rent seeking behaviour or improve the result 
of strategic interactions with other firms on the market place, cf. Bogetoft and Hougaard 
(2003). 
 
The fact that reallocation and individual efficiency improvement may not go hand in hand 
was first suggested in Bogetoft, Färe and Obel (2001). There, we discuss how to measure 
allocative efficiency without presuming technical efficiency. Also, we compare the “new 
approach” with the “traditional approach” of assuming technical efficiency before measuring 
allocative efficiency. In particular, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions on the 
technology to ensure consistency between the new and the traditional measures. 
 
In this paper, we extend the traditional approach to allocative efficiency in DEA models by 1) 
working with genuine and direct reallocation estimates that take into account matching 
problems and sector wide restrictions and by 2) dispensing with the assumption of technical 
efficiency when the gains from reallocations are examined. Moreover, we 3) estimate the 
differences in an actual large-scale application. 
 
It is worthwhile also to relate our approach to the traditional use of mathematical 
programming in sector models. There is a large literature on such usages of mathematical 
programming in agriculture, cf. e.g. Hazell and Norton (1986). There is also a recent revival 
of this literature known as positive mathematical programming, cf. Howitt (1995), where the 
calibration to the real world outcome is done using non-linear objectives to avoid “jumpy” 
behaviour.  
 
In the sector models using mathematical programming, the individual firms may be more or 
less efficient. It basically depends on the activities we use to model their possibilities. Also, 
genuine reallocation problems may be studied. In this sense, the approach of this paper is 
certainly in line with the traditional mathematical programming approach to sector models. 
The way we deviate is primarily by working with a large number of firm types, one for each 
firm in the sector, and by modelling the individual firms based on an initial DEA based 
efficiency analysis. 
 
Another line of literature that share many similarities with the present usage of mathematical 
programming to study reallocations, is the so-called iterative, multilevel planning literature, 
cf. Dirickx and Jennergren (1979), Johansen (1977, 1978), Meijboom (1987), and Obel 
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(1981). The focus of this literature has been the coordination problem in a divisionalized firm 
or planned economy.  
 
An example involves a headquarters facing the problem of allocating resources among 
divisions so as to maximize overall profit. The headquarters lacks information about the 
profit functions of the divisions, i.e. about how the contributions of the divisions depend on 
allocated resources. Hence, it pays to acquire further information. Full disclosure is typically 
impossible or prohibitively costly, and iterative planning procedures are therefore considered. 
In such a procedure, the headquarters asks a sequence of questions about the values of or 
needs for resources, and hereby gradually learns about the profit functions of the divisions. At 
some point, the procedure stops and an allocation is chosen. This line of research has been 
concerned with the design of procedures that exhibit certain desirable properties like 
convergence, feasibility, monotonicity, and efficient use of information. In one interpretation, 
therefore, the multilevel literature studies the transition path from an incumbent allocation to 
a new allocation – and not just the resulting reallocation in a comparative static outcome.  
 
 
2. Data Envelopment Analysis 
In this section, we provide an introduction to the main ideas and constructs in Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a relatively simple approach to derive the relative 
efficiency of production units using linear programming. DEA was first introduced in the late 
seventies by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978, 1979). Subsequently, more than a thousand 
scientific papers have elaborated upon and applied DEA to almost every sector of the 
economy1. A brief introduction should therefore suffice to introduce new readers to this 
methodology2. 
 
Consider the case where each of V Decision Making Units (DMUs), v∈I={1,…,V}, 
transform N inputs to M outputs. Let N0
v
N
v
1
v )x,...,x(x ℜ∈=  be the inputs consumed and 
M
0
v
M
v
1
v )y,...,y(y ℜ∈=  the outputs produced in DMUv, v∈I. Also, let T be the underlying 
production possibility set: 
 
 T = {(x,y)∈ MN0 +ℜ |x can produce y} (1)
 
Some regularity assumptions are usually imposed on T. The classical assumptions are that for 
all x', x'' N0ℜ∈  and y', y'' M0ℜ∈ , we have: 
                                                 
1 See for instance www.deazone.dk for an updated bibliography. Alternatively, Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1993), Charnes, Cooper, Levin, and Seiford (1994) give examples of Data Envelopment Analysis applications 
to different sectors. 
2 For textbook introductions to DEA, see Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1994), Coelli, Rao and, Battese 
(1999) or Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2000). 
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A1 disposability: (x',y')∈T and x'' ≥ x' and y'' ≤ y' ⇒ (x'',y'')∈T  
A2 convexity:  T convex 
A3 s-return to scale: (x', y') ∈T ⇒ k(x', y')∈T for k∈K(s) 
 
where s corresponds to either constant (crs), decreasing (drs) or variable (vrs) return to scale, 
and where K(crs) = ℜ0, K(drs) = [0,1], and K(vrs) = {1}, respectively.  
 
For a given technology, (in)efficiency is the ability to reduce inputs without affecting outputs 
or to increase outputs without requiring more inputs. In the case of multiple inputs and 
outputs, the efficiency of a DMU, say DMUv, is often measured by the so-called Farrell 
(1957) efficiency measures: 
 
 Ev = Min {E∈ℜ0 ⎢(Exv , yv)∈T} or Fv = Max {F∈ℜ0 ⎪(xv , Fyv )∈T} (2)
 
where Ev is the maximal radial contraction of all inputs and Fv is the maximal radial 
expansion of all outputs that are feasible for DMUv in T. Note that 1-Ev is a measure of the 
(proportion of) inputs wasted on non-productive purposes. DMUv uses xv, but in fact Evxv 
would be sufficient. Similarly, Fv-1 is a measure of the proportional waste of output. DMUv is 
only producing yv but could have produced Fvyv. 
 
In many applications, the underlying production possibility set T is unknown. The DEA 
approach can be used to model and evaluate DMUs in such cases.  
  
Assume that N0
v
N
v
1
v )x,...,x(x ℜ∈=  are the inputs actually consumed and 
M
0
v
M
v
1
v )y,...,y(y ℜ∈=  are the outputs actually produced by DMUv, v∈I. The DEA approach 
estimates T from the observed data points and evaluates the observed productions relative to 
the estimated technology. 
 
The estimate of T, denoted as the empirical reference technology T*, is constructed 
according to the minimal extrapolation principle. T* is the smallest subset of MN0
+ℜ  that 
contains (envelop) the actual production plans (xv,yv), v∈I, and satisfies certain technological 
assumptions specific to the given approach. 
 
The (relative) efficiency of DMUv may then be measured in input or output space by using 
the Farrell measures above, with T* substituted for T. 
 
Different DEA models invoke different assumptions about the technology. Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1878, 1979) proposed the original constant returns to scale (crs) DEA model 
assuming A1, A2 and A3(crs). Banker (1984) developed the decreasing returns to scale (drs) 
model, while Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) outlined the (local) variable returns to scale 
(vrs) model using A1, A2 and A3(drs) and A1, A2 and A3(vrs), respectively. It is 
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straightforward to see, cf. the references above, that A1, A2 and A3(s) lead to the empirical 
reference technology: 
 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ Λ∈λ∑λ≤∑λ≥ℜ∈λ∃ℜ∈=
==
+ )s(,yy,xx:)y,x()s(T
V
1v
vvV
1v
vvV
0
MN
0
*  (3)
 
where Λ(s) equals either Λ(crs) = V0ℜ , Λ(drs) = {λ∈ V0ℜ | ∑v λv ≤ 1} or Λ(vrs) = {λ∈ V0ℜ |∑v 
λv = 1}. Since these are polyhedral convex sets, the Farrell efficiency programs become 
linear programming problems.  
 
The three classical assumptions A1-A3 have been relaxed in several respects. Deprins, Simar, 
and Tulkens (1984) proposed the free disposability hull (fdh) model, which invokes only A1. 
The structure of T*(fdh) therefore has the structure above with Λ(fdh) = {λ∈ V0ℜ |∑v λv = 1, 
λv ∈{0, 1} ∀v}. The free replicability hull (frh) model was briefly proposed in Tulkens 
(1993). The free replicability hull model invokes A1 and an additivity assumption A4: 
(x',y')∈T and (x'',y'')∈T ⇒ (x'+x'', y'+y'')∈T, giving T*(frh) the structure above with Λ(frh) = 
{λ∈ V0ℜ | λv ∈{0,1,2,3…} ∀v}. Partial relaxation of the convexity assumption A2 in DEA 
models is suggested in Petersen (1990) and examined by Bogetoft (1996). 
 
It should be noted that DEA by construction provides an inner approximation of the 
underlying production possibility set. The efficiency estimates can therefore be over 
optimistic and the potential input savings and output expansions thus underestimated. 
 
 
3. The effects of reallocations 
The effects of allowing reallocations within an industry depend on the reactions of the firms. 
In this section, we first develop a general framework to model the likely reactions and to 
measure the expected effects. Next, we discuss in more details some important extreme cases 
that we have implemented in the empirical section. 
 
The first crucial question is what can and what cannot be reallocated? To capture this we 
assume that inputs and outputs can be sub-divided into standard (S) goods, i.e. goods that can 
be acquired and sold at perfect markets, regulated (R) goods, i.e. goods than in principle 
could be transferred, but which are at present regulated, and fixed (F) goods, i.e. non-
discretionary goods which must be used and produced locally. In the case of fisheries, fuel is 
a typical standard good, quota a typical regulated but potentially transferable good, and 
capital a typical non-discretionary good in the short run. Let the inputs and outputs of DMUv 
be split up according to this classification: 
 
 )y,y,y,x,x,x()y,x( vF
v
R
v
S
v
F
v
R
v
S
vv =  (4)
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where vSx , 
v
Rx , 
v
Fx , 
v
Sy , 
v
Ry and 
v
Fy  are NS-, NR-, NF-, MS-, MR-, and MF-dimensional sub-
vectors with NS + NR + NF = N and MS + MR + MF = M. In a study of the likely consequences 
of introducing reallocation, the S goods are those that can be reallocated in the incumbent 
regime, while the S and R goods are those that can be reallocated in the new regime. 
 
Now, assume that the objectives of the DMUs are to maximize profit from the standard 
goods: 
 
 v
S
v
S
v
F
v
R
v
S
v
F
v
R
v
S
vv wxpy)y,y,y,x,x,x()y,x( −=π=π  (5)
 
where p is the price vector for standard outputs and w is the price vector for standard inputs.  
 
With the present regime and the observed inputs and outputs, (xobs v,yobs v), v=1,…,V, 
therefore, observed industry profit is: 
 
 ( ) [ ]∑ −=∑π=Π
==
V
1v
vobs
S
vobs
S
V
1v
vobsvobsobs wxpyy,x  (6)
 
Technical efficiency with non-discretionary variables can be measured as above, except that 
there is no contraction or expansion in the non-discretionary dimensions, cf. Golany and Roll 
(1993) and Charnes, Cooper, Levin and Seiford (1994). Therefore, the observed efficiency of 
DMUv can be calculated as: 
 
 Eobs v = Min {E∈ℜ0 ⎢(E vobsSx ,E vobsRx , vobsFx , vobsy )∈T} (7)
 
or 
 
 Fobs v = Max {F∈ℜ0 ⎪( vobsx ,F vobsSy ,F vobsRy , vobsFy )∈T} (8)
 
If we now allow the regulated goods to be transferred, the new industry profit will be: 
 
 ( ) [ ]∑ −=∑π=Π
==
V
1v
v
S
v
S
V
1v
vvnew wxpyy,x  (9)
 
where (xv,yv), v=1,…,V, are the inputs and outputs in the new regime with transferable, 
regulated goods. The difference Πnew-Πobs thus measures the effects of reallocation. 
 
To calculate the new industry profits and hereby the gains from allowing reallocation, we 
must predict how the firms will react to the allowed reallocation and thus what the new inputs 
and outputs of the firms will be. To model this, we assume very generally that the new 
outcome is determined by solving the following reallocation problem: 
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where Γ is a penalty function. In this program, we have used )E,y,y,x,x( RSRS to briefly 
refer to the standard and regulated inputs and outputs and the efficiency levels of all the units. 
That is, we stick to the convention of referring to a variable from all the vessels by 
suppressing the specific vessel numbers v.  
  
The interpretation of this program is that it determines reallocated standard and regulated 
goods and changed efficiency levels, )E,y,y,x,x( RSRS , so as to maximize profit and 
minimize the penalty Γ. The idea of the penalty function Γ is that it increases with growing 
distance between the new )E,y,y,x,x( RSRS and old )E,y,y,x,x(
obsobs
R
obs
S
obs
R
obs
S allocations and 
efficiency levels. It can therefore be interpreted in two ways. One can think of it as a 
technical way to calibrate the model in line with the positive mathematical programming 
tradition. Conversely, one can think of it as reflecting the costs of changing behaviour from 
one regime to another. The more the new allocations and efficiency levels deviate from the 
presently observed ones, the more complicated the transition. 
 
The constraints in the reallocation problem reflect that the reallocated goods must lead to 
feasible production plans under the assumed improvements in efficiency levels. Moreover, 
the reallocations must be balanced in the sense that the industry at large cannot use more of 
the regulated inputs nor reduce the regulated outputs. 
 
In the reallocation problem above we assumed that improvements in the technical efficiency 
would work on the input side, in the sense that the proportional (Farrell type) waste of 
(discretionary) inputs (1-E) will be reduced. Alternatively, one could assume that the 
technical efficiency improvements work on the output side and lead to a reduction in the 
waste (F-1) of discretionary outputs. This will result in the following reallocation problem:  
 
 
 
 124
( ) [ ])F,y,y,x,x()F,y,y,x,x(wxpymax obsobsRobsSobsRobsSRSRSV
1v
v
S
v
S
)F,y,y,x,x( RSRS
Γ−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡∑ −
=
 (11)
   
s.t. T)y,yF,yF,x,x,x( vobsFvRvvSvvobsFvRvS ∈  v = 1,…,V (11.a)
   
 vobsv FF1 ≤≤  v = 1,…,V (11.b)
   
 ∑≤∑
==
V
1v
vobs
R
V
1v
v
R xx   (11.c)
   
 ∑≥∑
==
V
1v
vobs
R
V
1v
v
R yy   (11.d)
 
In the next section, we solve a series of problems like the above. The problems correspond to 
different and rather extreme specifications of the penalty function Γ as indicator functions. 
The penalty is either zero or infinite, i.e. we only look at changes in allocations and efficiency 
levels that are either costless to introduce or impossible to undertake. The motives for the 
cases we consider is that some important determinants of the reactions to an ITQ system in 
the case of fisheries will be: 
 
• The extent to which the level of technical efficiency can be changed 
• The extent to which the output mix can be changed 
 
Numerous articles have investigated the level of technical efficiency for fishing vessels, 
including which factors influence this level and how it can be improved3. It is difficult to 
determine a priori whether a change in regulation system will give rise to a change in the 
level of technical efficiency. As a start, it is therefore useful to examine the two extreme 
situations, where changes in efficiency are either prohibitively costly or entirely costless, i.e. 
where efficiency can either not be changed or be changed entirely free. 
 
The output mix chosen by a fisherman is influenced by many factors, including the costs of 
changing the mix and the regulatory possibilities. With respect to costs, some vessels may be 
able to change their output mix without significant costs, while these may be large for others. 
The level of costs depends upon factors such as type of fishery conducted (pelagic, demersal 
or benthic), flexibility to re-rig, experience of the fisherman, etc. Of course, the mix will also 
depend on possible regulatory constraints imposed alongside the quota system. The exact 
formulation of the quota system (which catches can be exchanged for example), and the way 
a possible market for reallocating quotas is set up (how often is it possible to reallocate for 
example) will be important. Again, we consider only two extremes below, viz. the case of no 
mix restrictions and the case of fixed mixes such that a fisherman can only scale his 
operations up and down without altering the mix. 
                                                 
3 See for instance Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1998), Sharma and Leung (1999) and Pascoe, Andersen and de 
Wilde (2001). 
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Our applied framework thus consists of four models defined by the allowed technological and 
behavioural changes. The models including their acronyms are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 Sector models and their acronyms 
 Output mix fixed (MF) Output mix changeable (MC) 
Level of technical efficiency fixed (EF) Model EF-MF Model EF-MC 
Level of technical efficiency changeable (EC) Model EC-MF Model EC-MC 
 
 
The fisherman’s ability to change behaviour is thus most restricted in Model EF-MF and least 
restricted in Model EC-MC. The lowest trade gains are therefore expected in the former and 
the highest in the latter4. The two other models are intermediate and their profits cannot be 
ranked internally. 
 
We conclude this section by discussing how the reallocation in the different cases can 
generate improved profits. Three important effects can be identified, i.e. efficiency effects, 
scale effects and mix effects, respectively. Table 2 below illustrates which of these effects are 
effective in each of the four models. 
 
Table 2 Reallocation effects 
 Efficiency effects Scale effects Mix effects 
Model EF-MF X X  
Model EC-MF  X  
Model EF-MC X X X 
Model EC-MC  X X 
 
 
The efficiencies of the individual vessels play a role, when they cannot be changed. In such 
cases, reallocating quota from less efficient to more efficient vessels can generate trade gains. 
The scale of operations will also be important. If the underlying technology is a variable 
return to scale technology, it will in general be beneficial to move the vessels closer to the so-
called most productive scale size, cf. Banker (1984), where the output per input is maximal. 
This suggests that gains can be generated by giving more quotas to small units operating 
under increasing return to scale and by taking quota from larger units working above optimal 
scale size. Finally, if the mix of inputs and outputs can be changed, this can generate 
improved industry profits. By the convexity of the technology, it always pays to have non-
specialized or non-extreme compositions. The mix effect refers to the tradability gains arising 
from vessels changing their output mix towards a more productive direction of the product 
space. This effect is therefore only observed in the model where the output mix can be 
changed. For an extended discussion of efficiency, size and mix gains, see Bogetoft and 
Wang (2005). 
 
                                                 
4 The partial ranking follows from the principle sometimes referred to as Le Châtelier Principle (cf. Samuelson 
(1974)). It states that gains cannot increase, when an extra restriction is imposed. 
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4. Four sectoral models  
The mathematical representations of the model to calculate individual technical efficiencies 
and the four sectoral models to calculate industry profits under various technological and 
behavioural assumptions are given in this section. We assume in each model that the 
production technology is characterized by variable returns to scale on a yearly basis5.  
 
Using the output-oriented approach described in Section 3, the technical efficiency F of each 
vessel v' can be calculated by solving the following technical efficiency program, c.f. Färe, 
Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994): 
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where CPY is the catch per year in weight, VCPY is the variable (discretionary) costs per 
year, FCPY is the fixed (non-discretionary) costs per year, and λ is the intensity variable. As 
previously, the subscripts are respectively related to the output number (m) and the input 
number (n) and the superscript obs indicates that the observed values have been used. We use 
this notation in the forthcoming models as well. 
 
The level of technical efficiency is thus maximized under four individual restrictions for each 
vessel. The restrictions secure that the analyzed vessel is within the production possibility as 
estimated by minimal extrapolation from the observed vessels. 
  
Turning attention to the sector problems, each programming problem includes an objective 
function and a series of restrictions. The objective is to maximize industry profits. The 
restrictions relate both to the individual vessels and to the entire industry, and they ensure that 
the reallocated productions are technically feasible. 
 
                                                 
5 The sectoral models have also been formulated under the assumption of variable returns to scale on a daily 
basis, but these are not presented here. Further information can be obtained from the authors. 
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Given the estimated levels of technical efficiency Fobs for each vessel, the industry 
programming problem related to Model EF-MF can be formulated as follows: 
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where β is the output expansion variable, and P is the vector of output prices. 
 
Short run industry profits are thus maximized under four individual restrictions for each 
vessel and one overall industry restriction for each output. The first four restrictions ensure 
that the new cost-catch profile for each vessel is within the production possibility set 
estimated from all the vessels. The first restriction allows the output level, but not the output 
mix, to be changed via modifications in the parameter β. The second restriction tracks the 
corresponding changes in the variable costs. The changes in output and variable costs are 
however restricted by the presence of fixed costs as described in the third restriction. Finally, 
the total output of the industry, i.e. catch being the regulated good, is restricted by the last 
restriction to be equal or below the total observed output in the dataset. The profit 
improvements are therefore not generated by exploiting the natural resources more heavily, 
but come from the way the vessels allocate the use of the fish resources among each other. 
This unchanged utilization of the resource is also imposed in the subsequent programs. In 
more advanced applications, this could of course be changed and in particular, one could use 
the above program to determine the costs of the overall utilization constraints. 
 
By including the level of technical efficiency for each vessel in the industry profit function 
and the industry output restriction, the gains are generated without any improvements in the 
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individual efficiencies. The idea is that a vessel with an individual score of say 1.25 will 
always catch only a fraction (1/1.25=0.8) of his potential output. 
 
If vessels are allowed to change their level of technical efficiency, i.e. become technically 
efficient, the industry problem denoted Model EC-MF becomes: 
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Compared to Model EF-MF, all vessels are assumed to produce on the frontier. This implies 
that previously non-efficient vessels become more relevant to consider when maximizing 
industry profits. 
 
Instead of allowing the level of technical efficiency to change, it can be assumed that vessels 
can change their output mix, i.e. catch composition. The consequences of such an assumption 
can be analyzed by solving the industry program labelled Model EF -MC: 
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In the least restrictive model, it is assumed that the level of technical efficiency and the 
output mix can be changed. The industry problem related to this situation is denoted Model 
EC-MC and becomes: 
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Four industry models with different assumptions about production technology and behaviour 
have thus been formulated. Depending on the number of observations in the analyzed dataset, 
the number of equations in each model is equal to V×(M+N+1) + M and can therefore be 
substantial.  
 
By varying the assumptions about the flexibility, managers can by estimating these models 
obtain further insight into the possible gains, when going from one management system to an 
individual quota system. The expected gains rise with increased flexibility, with respect to 
behaviour and technology.  
 
 
5. An application to Danish fisheries 
In this section, we illustrate the framework above by estimating the potential gains from 
implementing an individual quota system in Danish fishery. It must be emphasized that the 
intention is to illustrate the application of the framework, and thus not to provide precise 
estimations of the plausible tradability gains, if an ITQ system was implemented in Danish 
fisheries. 
 
A dataset from 2001 covering 288 Danish fishing vessels is utilized6. Extensive economic 
information is available on these vessels, because they are used to develop the yearly account 
statistics for the Danish fishing fleet published by the Food and Resource Economics 
Institute7. 
 
The vessels in the dataset differ from each other in several respects. Most notably, the vessels 
vary from netters and Danish seiners to trawlers and purse seiners. This variation in types 
affects the catch and cost composition of the vessels. Larger trawlers, for example, are 
specialized to catch low-priced industrial species (sand eel, sprat etc.), Danish seiners, beam 
trawlers and netters catch higher priced consumption species (cod, plaice, herring etc.), while 
other vessels, for instance medium sized trawlers, catch both types of fish depending on the 
season. 
 
In the reallocation study, we have aggregated the number of outputs8 to nine output groups 
defined as: 1) cod, 2) other codfish, 3) plaice, 4) other flatfish, 5) herring, 6) mackerel, 7) 
lobster and shrimps, 8) other consumption species and 9) industrial species. All costs in the 
dataset have likewise been categorized as either variable or fixed, and thereafter combined 
into four types of variable costs and two types of fixed costs, respectively. Variable costs are 
thus considered to be expenses for: 1) fuel and lubricants, 2) ice and provisions, 3) landings 
                                                 
6 A fictitious observation is also included in the dataset with zero catches and costs in order to facilitate vessels 
to reduce their catches and costs to zero, i.e. lay-up. The actual number of observations is therefore 289. 
7 The statistics only cover the commercial part of the Danish fishing fleet, i.e. vessels with a total catch value 
above 219,202 DKK (≈21,225US$) in 2001.  
8 The original dataset included 45 species. 
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and sale9 and 4) crew, while fixed costs are divided between costs for: 1) maintenance and 2) 
insurance and different services. 
 
It is assumed that the allocation of catches observed in the dataset corresponds to a feasible 
allocation under the management system in 2001. The following analysis therefore reflects 
the gains that could be realized, if the 2001 catches were allocated optimally among the 
vessels. As above, we have made different assumptions about the production technology. 
Each model has been programmed and solved in the optimization software General Algebraic 
Modeling System GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus, and Raman 1998)10. 
 
Firstly, we estimate the level of technical efficiency for each vessel by solving the technical 
efficiency program11. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for the estimated scores.  
 
Table 3 Output-orientated technical efficiency scores  
 Mean value Standard deviation Maximum value 
Technical efficiency score F 1.22 0.38 3.45 
 
 
Interpretation of the results in Table 3 indicates that the vessels can increase their output by 
approximately 20% on average without increasing costs. For some vessels, the increase in 
output can even be more than three times their present output. The number of 100% 
technically efficient vessels is estimated to be 143, thus approximately half of the included 
vessels are on the frontier. However, there seems to be a tendency for sample size bias in the 
estimates as illustrated in Figure 1. The plots of technical efficiency against the total costs 
suggest that larger vessels may be categorized as technically efficient simply because there 
are a low number of these vessels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 This covers expenses for brokerage and harbor dues, collecting, sorting and auctioneering, packing chilling 
and freight and other landings costs. 
10 Each industry model consisted of 4,923 equations, and took around 15 minutes to solve on a Pentium IV (2.4 
GHz) processor. 
11 Due to the short run time horizon in the present analysis, we have as Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) chosen 
to assume that the production technology is characterized by variable returns to scale. 
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Figure 1 Technical efficiency as a function of total costs 
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With the above in mind, we now analyze the expected gains and the consequences on the 
fleet structure from introducing a quota market. Table 4 shows the increase in short run 
profits or earnings, defined as catch value minus variable cost. Exclusively reallocating 
catches without changing the level of technical efficiency and output mix, Model EF-MF 
estimates that earnings can be increased by 27%. Relaxing each of these assumptions 
separately implies that earnings can be increased by 38% compared to the earnings in the 
current regulation system. Thus, despite the obvious differences between allowing mix or 
efficiency changes, they approximately give rise to the same change in earnings. In the 
situation with the most flexible production technology, earnings are predicted to increase by 
45%, corresponding to 223 million DKK (≈32 million US$). 
 
Table 4 Earnings  
 Earnings (1,000 DKK) Change compared to initial earnings (%) 
Initial  494,447  
Model EF-MF 628,582 27.13 
Model EC-MF 685,563 38.65 
Model EF-MC 683,065 38.15 
Model EC-MC 720,515 45.72 
 
 
We define gross profits as earnings minus fixed costs, i.e. catch value minus variable cost 
minus fixed costs. This measure shows how much is left as rent on the invested capital and 
any extra payment to the vessel owner. The same pattern can be observed for gross profits as 
for earnings, cf. Table 5, although the relative changes are higher. In the most flexible 
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situation given by Model EC-MC, gross profits are estimated to increase by 87%, and are 
thus almost twice as high as in the initial situation.  
 
Table 5 Gross profits  
 Gross profits (1,000 DKK) Change compared to initial gross profits (%) 
Initial  260,270  
Model EF-MF 394,404 51.54 
Model EC-MF 448,888 72.47 
Model EF-MC 451,386 73.43 
Model EC-MC 486,338 86.86 
 
 
For both earnings and gross profits, we observe that over 50% of the expected gains in the 
most flexible model arise from simply reallocating quotas without allowing technological or 
behavioural changes.  
 
The increases in earnings and gross profits can primarily be related to the fact that catches are 
reallocated to vessels with lower variable costs, cf. Table 6. Only minor variation in the catch 
value is observed, because the price of each species is assumed the same for all vessels. This 
implies that the reallocation of catches between different vessel types does not alter the catch 
value12. The variations are thus solely due to matching problems resulting in unused catch 
possibilities13. Total variable cost is reduced by 30% from an initial level of 752 million DKK 
to 526 million DKK in the most flexible model, i.e. Model EC-MC. 
 
Table 6 Catch values and variable costs 
 Catch value (1,000 DKK) Variable costs (1,000 DKK) 
Initial  1,246,760 752,313 
Model EF-MF 1,233,210 604,629 
Model EC-MF 1,241,803 556,240 
Model EF-MC 1,246,760 563,695 
Model EC-MC 1,246,760 526,245 
 
 
The gains from implementing a system of ITQs would most likely be higher in a long run 
specification. In the short run, vessels without activity still have to defray the fixed costs, and 
can therefore only lay-up. In the long run, vessels would be able to decommission, and 
therefore do not have to pay the fixed costs. 
 
To get an idea of the quota market necessary to support the new allocations, it is interesting to 
look at the predicted trade patterns. Table 7 depicts the number of vessels that are net-buyers 
and net-sellers of quota, the total traded amount and the number of vessels ending up with 
                                                 
12 Introducing an ITQ system may result in increased prices due to a lengthening of the fishing season, which 
result in better qualities of fish being landed, cf. Herrmann (1996).  
13 The assumption of unchanged and equal prices may therefore be an over-simplistic assumption, but is 
considered acceptable for current illustration purposes. 
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zero catch. A vessel can - on the disaggregate level be - both a buyer and a seller, but here we 
only focus on the aggregate, net effects. 
 
Table 7 Activity on the quota market 
 Number of buying 
vessels 
Number of selling 
vessels 
Number of status 
quo vessels 
Traded amounts 
(tonnes) 
Number of 
vessels with 
zero catch 
Model EF-MF 124 124 40 112,520 24 
Model EC-MF 146 111 31 116,250 14 
Model EF-MC 119 169 0 729,066 25 
Model EC-MC 98 190 0 841,178 0 
 
 
We observe an interesting development, when allowing the output mix to change. First of all, 
every vessel becomes active on the market, i.e. there are no status quo vessels. Also, the 
number of selling vessels is higher than the number of buying vessels. This could indicate a 
possible tendency towards concentration on the market, a topic that we will return to in detail 
later. Last but not least, the possibility to change mix has a dramatic impact on the trade 
volume. In the two models with output mix fixed, the traded amounts are around 115,000 
tonnes, no matter whether technical efficiency is fixed or changeable. Allowing vessels to 
rearrange their catch composition leads to a factor increase of 6-7 in the trade volume. One 
interpretation of this is that the economies of scope are very important.  
 
To explore the structural implications and concentration further and the scope effects in 
particular we have calculated the angle between the output composition of each individual 
vessel in the dataset and the average vessel in the dataset14. 
 
Table 8 Output composition angles (degrees) 
 Initial Model EF-MF Model EC-MF Model EF-MC Model EC-MC 
Average angle 52.52 52.44 52.11 42.29 45.64 
 
 
As seen in Table 8, the initial average angle is approximately 52 degrees for the two models 
with fixed output mix. This is as expected, because the average vessel is only marginally 
changed. However, allowing the output mix to change results in a significant reduction in the 
average angle to 42 and 46 degrees, respectively. This can naturally be understood as an 
exploration of the economies of scope. In a convex production technology like the one 
                                                 
14 The angles have been calculated using ( )baba)(Cos b,a rrrr ⋅⋅=θ , where a and b refer to the output vector of 
the analyzed vessel and the average vessel in the dataset, respectively, and b,aθ  is the angle between them. To 
reflect the relative importance of the vessels, the average angle is a weighted average using ar as weight. 
Observe that in multiple dimensions, the average angles can be quite high in the positive orthant. For example, 
the angle between (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) and (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) is 70 degrees.  
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modelled by DEA, there are no gains from specialization in the mix, cf. also Bogetoft and 
Wang (2005) for an extended discussion. 
 
The tendency for vessels to adjust their size towards the average vessel is also supported by 
the figures in Table 9. We see that the average catch weight per vessel is approximately 
unchanged, while the standard deviation and maximum catch weight decrease.  
 
Table 9 Catch weight (tonnes) 
 Average Standard deviation Maximum Minimum 
Initial 2,157 3,996 21,959 9 
Model EF-MF 2,154 4,100 21,959 0 
Model EC-MF 2,156 3,992 21,959 0 
Model EF-MC 2,157 3,922 20,623 0 
Model EC-MC 2,157 2,998 17,662 11 
 
 
Conclusions 
The use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) is an interesting instrument in the regulator’s 
toolbox. It has attractive properties from a theoretical point of view. Changing an incumbent 
regulation to one based on ITQs, however, involves transition costs and it may take time 
before the effects are realized. It is therefore important to predict and analyze the potential 
economic gains from an ITQ system before it is implemented.  
 
In this paper, we have suggested a framework to estimate the gains that can be expected from 
implementing an ITQ system. We developed the framework in general terms, making it 
applicable to different economic sectors and different models of the production technologies. 
Moreover, we briefly introduced Data Envelopment Analysis and showed how this can be 
used as one way to operationalize the gains. In the framework, we allowed for different 
behavioural and technological assumptions regarding the ability to learn best practice and 
change the output mix. The reasons for reallocation can in these models be related to 
efficiency, scale and mix effects. 
 
Based on the general framework, we developed four sectoral models to capture the gains 
from introducing ITQs in fisheries. The models maximize industry profits without increasing 
the pressure on the harvested resources, and while respecting behavioural and technological 
restrictions on the individual vessels. 
 
To illustrate the proposed framework we finally presented an empirical example. We used a 
dataset of 288 Danish fishing vessels to estimate each of the sectoral models. The analysis 
reveals that for the included vessels, gross profits may be increased by at least 50%. 
However, if fishermen are able to change their level of technical efficiency and output mix, 
the gains may increase by up to 90% compared to the current level. The resulting quota 
market was briefly characterized. The traded volume – and hereby the amount of 
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reallocations – increased considerably when the output mix was allowed to change. Also, the 
structural implications were explored. As one would expect after reallocations, the vessels 
were less specialized suggesting that economies of scope play a significant role, at least when 
the behavioural and technological flexibility increases. 
 
There are several relevant extensions of the research reported here. In particular, it may be 
useful to examine the impact of alternative restrictions on the changes in mix and efficiency 
that are allowed. We have taken a somewhat stylized approach and analyzed only four 
different and somewhat extreme specifications of the general penalty function.  
 
In the empirical example, we have either fixed the catch composition entirely at the vessel 
level or we have allowed the vessels to alter their catch composition completely. The latter is 
an unlikely scenario in most fisheries - at least in the short run. It is unrealistic that a purse 
seiner, for example, that is highly specialized in catching pelagic species such as mackerel 
and herring can change to catch demersal species such as codfish. We have used the extreme 
assumptions to derive an interval of likely effects, but middle of the road assumptions could 
be introduced as well in order to obtain results that are more realistic. As suggested by 
Korhonen and Syrjänen (2001), this could, be done by allowing the output mix to change 
with only a certain percentage. Another approach would be to only allow vessels to change 
their output mix in accordance with the observed output mix of similar vessels. 
 
Alternative restrictions on the possible reallocations can also be derived from the design of 
the quota system. It may be too costly – or politically unacceptable – to operate a quota 
system with free trade of all types of catch. The industry implications of alternative designs, 
however, can be analyzed along the same lines as the technological and behavioural 
restrictions. It is hereby possible to extend the approach of this paper to analyze the trade-off 
between political costs, transaction costs and industry profits.  
 
It would also be relevant to investigate the transition path and the long run consequences 
from implementing an ITQ system. Grafton, Squires and Fox (2000) find that ITQs are often 
not used because there are high losses in the transition phase. Our analysis used a 
comparative static approach but by combining with the multi-level literature, it could 
potentially give information about the transition phase as well.  
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Potential gains from using Individual Transferable Quotas to 
regulate Danish fisheries 
 
by Jesper Levring Andersen and Peter Bogetoft 
 
Abstract 
Previous articles have shown that there are significant gains to be expected from 
implementing an Individual Transferable Quota system within fisheries. Andersen and 
Bogetoft (2003) developed a new approach to calculate expected tradability gains in such 
systems. Using Data Envelopment Analysis, linear programming problems were formulated 
to capture reallocation gains under two behavioural restrictions. This considers the ability to 
learn best-practice and to change output composition. In this paper, we extend the proposed 
method by focusing on a complex of restrictions, which can be included in order to obtain 
more realistic estimations, when applied to specific fisheries. 
 
In order to illustrate the applicability, a dataset covering the entire Danish commercial fishery 
is utilised. Based on this, we estimate the tradability gains in the most flexible situation to be 
an increase in gross profits of around 90%. However, we also show that the potential gains 
are significantly reduced, if the flexibility in vessel behaviour is restricted. A series of policy 
implications is analysed including concentration, specialisation, market activity, price 
changes, etc. Attention has often been drawn to these effects when the implementation of 
Individual Transferable Quotas in fisheries is discussed. Finally, we analyse the 
consequences of exogenous chocks and changes in management practice in form of mesh size 
increases. 
 
Keywords 
Fishery, Individual Transferable Quota, behaviour, reallocation, tradability gains, regulation. 
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Introduction 
An important aspect of environmental and resource management is to analyse the 
consequences of new regulatory measures. For a decision maker, many criteria may be 
relevant to consider when performing such analysis, including biological, social and 
economic performance measures. Economists have traditionally focused on the latter, even 
though they acknowledge the importance of biological and social measures. Traditionally, 
such measures are included as restrictions in the optimisation of the economic measure.  
 
One of the most popular regulatory instruments among economists is Individual Transferable 
Rights, when externalities are present. This instrument has been applied to regulate 
environmental problems, with the most prominent being the CO2 Kyoto agreement. However, 
it has also been applied to regulate resources such as fish. Several management regimes 
within fisheries are based upon Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), where fishermen are 
allocated the property right to a certain amount of catch and afterwards allowed to trade these 
rights. Making them transferable secures the highest possible profit. 
 
The two most famous examples of ITQ management within fisheries are Iceland and New 
Zealand. Furthermore, other countries including Denmark are currently considering using this 
regulatory instrument for other species besides herring, which is currently regulated with 
ITQs. However, from an economic point of view the implementation of a new regulatory 
regime triggers a necessary investigation into whether the gains exceed the costs of doing so. 
Since the seminal paper from 1991 by R. Arnason about ITQs, there have been several 
attempts to estimate possible gains from implementing such a system in fisheries. The 
approaches to evaluate the gains are very different ranging from descriptive statistics to more 
complicated mathematical treatments1.  
 
Squires and Kirkley (1995) analysed the bottom trawl fishery in the continental slopes waters 
off Northern California and Southern Oregon. They estimated that an increase of around 50% 
in industry resource rents would be likely, if thorny heads and sablefish were jointly 
regulated using ITQs. Based on trip data covering Danish vessels from Esbjerg and Thyborøn 
primarily fishing in the North Sea and/or Skagerrak, Vestergaard (1998) estimated that short 
run rents would increase by 17% in a limited ITQ system covering cod, sole and saithe. 
Weninger and Waters (2003) considered the reef fish fishery in the northern Gulf of Mexico 
and their estimations of long run profits indicated a possible increase from $–4,646 to $6,640 
million, resulting from a 49% increase in revenue and 75% decrease in costs2. 
 
                                                 
1 Grafton et al. (2000) review several methods to perform economic evaluation of ITQ systems. 
2 Other empirical analyses can also be found. One example is Lindner, Campbell and Bevin (1992), who use 
descriptive statistics to evaluate the generation of resource rent derived from regulating the entire New Zealand 
fishery with ITQs in 1986. Another example is the analysis of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog 
fishery by Weninger (1998). 
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None of the above methods are however straightforward to apply in analysis of other 
fisheries. Andersen and Bogetoft (2003) therefore developed a flexible framework to estimate 
the potential gains from implementing an ITQ system. In this framework, different types of 
flexibilities were included to account for behavioural changes by the fishermen. These were 
individual learning and choice of output composition. In an illustrative application, we 
showed how profit gains from implementing an ITQ system are affected by the behavioural 
assumptions. However, the flexibility allowed in Andersen and Bogetoft (2003) may for 
many fisheries be an inadequate approximation of reality. The consequence is an 
overestimation of the tradability gains and thus regulatory decisions being made on the wrong 
basis. 
 
In this paper, we therefore extend this approach by considering methods to make it more in 
agreement with the situation in an actual fishery. Based on these theoretical considerations, 
we estimate the potential gains from implementing an ITQ system in Danish fisheries. This is 
done using empirical data collected by the Food and Resource Economics Institute, which 
covers the total commercial fleet in Denmark. Furthermore, we consider how the framework 
can be utilised to address other topics within management of fisheries such as gear 
restrictions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 gives a brief review of the framework presented 
in Andersen and Bogetoft (2003). In Section 2, the types of additional restrictions to make it 
more applicable in an actual fishery are discussed, while the applied dataset is described in 
Section 3. Using the previous sections, estimations of tradability gains under various levels of 
flexibilities are performed in Section 4. The estimations thus indicate the gains to be 
expected, if Danish fisheries were regulated by ITQs instead of the current regulation. Based 
on the empirical analysis, some policy implications are derived in Section 5 and some final 
remarks close the paper in Section 6. 
 
 
1. Framework to estimate tradability gains 
The framework presented in Andersen and Bogetoft (2003) used Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to model the fishermen’s production structure. DEA is a non-parametric method, 
which can be used to estimate the empirical reference technology, when the underlying 
production possibility set is unknown. Using the best-practice observations, the empirical 
reference technology thus reflects the production frontier. Comparing actual production of a 
given fisherman with the production frontier, a measure of his efficiency can be obtained.  
 
Efficiency measures can be derived in many ways. Here we opt for an output-oriented 
traditional Farrell (1957) measure. This measure seeks to identify the radial increases of all 
outputs that will make the fisherman technically efficient, i.e. produce at the frontier. The 
(in)efficiency F for vessel v (v=1,…,V) is thus determined as: 
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 Fv = Max {F∈ℜ0 ⎪(xobs v,Fy obs v )∈T*} (1)
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are the observed outputs produced and T* is the empirical reference technology.  
 
The empirical reference technology T* is the smallest subset of MN0
+ℜ  that contains or 
envelops the observed production plans (xobs v,yobs v) for all vessels v∈V, and satisfies certain 
technological assumptions specific to the given approach. It is thus constructed according to 
the minimal extrapolation principle (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984). 
 
Different DEA models invoke different assumptions about the technology. Here we follow 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), and invoke free disposability and convexity of T*. The 
empirical reference technology hereby becomes the so-called variable returns to scale3 DEA 
model: 
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Since these are polyhedral convex sets, the Farrell efficiency measurement programs become 
linear programming problems. 
 
In Andersen and Bogetoft (2003), the basic principles from DEA were used to set up a profit-
maximisation problem with individual restrictions for each vessel and industry restrictions for 
each output. Modelling the individual restrictions in the DEA set up, we were able to account 
for different flexibilities in the framework. These included the individual vessel’s possibility 
to learn and to change its output composition. Depending on the analysed fishery, managers 
can allow for none, one or both of these flexibilities to exist, and thus evaluate the importance 
of these. 
 
Inputs and outputs can be divided into three types of goods. These are standard (S), regulated 
(R) or fixed (F) goods. A standard good is defined as a good that can be bought and sold at 
perfect markets. A regulated good is currently not traded, but could in principle be transferred 
between vessels. Finally, a fixed good is defined as being produced and used locally, and is 
thus non-discretionary and non-transferable. For vessel v, we thus have:  
 
 )y,y,y,x,x,x()y,x( vF
v
R
v
S
v
F
v
R
v
S
vv =  (3)
                                                 
3 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978,1979) proposed the original constant returns to scale DEA model assuming 
free disposability, convexity and free scaling of a given production plan, i.e. (x,y)∈T*⇒k⋅(x,y) ∈T* ∀k≥ 0. 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) also developed the decreasing returns to scale model by assuming free 
disposability, convexity, and free down scaling, i.e. (x,y)∈T*⇒k⋅(x,y) ∈T* ∀k∈[0;1]. 
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where vSx , 
v
Rx , 
v
Fx , 
v
Sy , 
v
Ry and 
v
Fy  are NS-, NR-, NF-, MS-, MR-, and MF-dimensional sub-
vectors making the total number of inputs N equal to NS + NR + NF and the total number of 
outputs M equal to MS + MR + MF. 
 
If the individual objective of each fisherman is to maximise his profit π from the standard 
goods, we have for each vessel (v∈V) that: 
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where p is the price vector for standard outputs and w is the price vector for standard inputs.  
 
The observed industry profit Πobs under the current regulation system can be found as:  
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Changing the current regulation system to one based upon individual transferable goods 
implies that the regulated goods become transferable. This gives the fishermen the possibility 
to change their production, which was previously limited by the regulated goods. The new 
industry profit Πnew therefore equals: 
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where the use of inputs and outputs in the new management system with transferable 
regulated goods is given by (xv,yv), v=1,…,V. Note that the possible revenues and costs from 
trading the previously regulated goods cancel each other out at the industry level. The total 
gains from reallocation can therefore be calculated as the difference between observed and 
new industry profit, i.e. Πnew-Πobs. 
 
From a management perspective, it is important to be able to predict how fishermen will 
react, when previously non-transferable regulated goods are allowed to be transferred, and 
thus what their new input and output use will be. However, costs may arise, due to changed 
behaviour from one regulatory regime to another. A penalty function Γ is therefore 
introduced to reflect these costs. It is in this function assumed that transition costs increase, 
the more the new inputs, outputs and efficiency levels deviate from the historical levels. 
 
Several behavioural changes can be a likely consequence of a new management system. In 
Andersen and Bogetoft (2003), we focused on individual learning and changes in output mix. 
If both are allowed to change, the new industry profit can be calculated by solving the 
following reallocation problem: 
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where Γ is the penalty function. In the penalty function, we have furthermore used 
(xS,xR,yS,yR,F) to refer to the standard and regulated inputs, outputs and efficiency levels of 
all the vessels. The reallocation problem thus determines the optimal distribution of standard 
and regulated goods in order to maximise industry profit and minimise transition costs. 
 
Several constraints are included. First, it is required that the reallocated production plans are 
within the production possibility set and therefore feasible under the assumed improvements 
in efficiency levels. The last two constraints secure that the total use of regulated inputs 
cannot be increased and that the total use of regulated outputs cannot be reduced.  
 
The penalty function can be utilised to allow or exclude behavioural changes. This is 
facilitated by setting the penalty for individual learning and/or output mix changes to either 
zero or infinity. Changing the level of technical efficiency via individual learning is allowed, 
if the penalty is equal to zero, while it is not facilitated with an infinite penalty. Likewise can 
changes in the output mix be included or excluded through the penalty level. A distinction 
can thus be made between four basic models, which are separately characterised by the level 
of vessel flexibility, cf. Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1 Four basic models 
 Changes in output mix impossible 
(yv obs≠ βyv ⇒ Γ = ∞) 
Changes in output mix possible 
Individual learning penalty impossible 
(Fv < Fv obs ⇒ Γ = ∞) 
- Technical efficiency fixed 
- Output mix fixed 
- Technical efficiency fixed  
- Output mix changeable 
Individual learning penalty possible - Technical efficiency changeable 
- Output mix fixed 
- Technical efficiency changeable 
- Output mix changeable 
Note: β is a scalar and change in the size of catch is thus facilitated. 
 
 
Depending on the specific model, the industry level tradability gains from implementing an 
ITQ system can be attributed to efficiency effects, scale effects and/or mix effects, cf. 
Andersen and Bogetoft (2003). Efficiency effects refer to less efficient vessels selling to more 
efficient ones, scale effects refer to vessels adjusting their production towards the most 
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productive scale size, while mix effects refer to vessels changing their output mix towards a 
more productive direction in the production possibility space. 
 
 
2. Restrictions on vessel flexibility 
The framework presented in the previous section assumed either none or complete flexibility 
in the possible vessel behaviour. It hereby models only rather extreme cases. To obtain more 
realistic estimations it is often necessary to include a series of further restrictions, before 
solving the industry programming problems. If not, regulatory decisions may be taken on the 
wrong basis, and thus result in a loss of welfare. 
 
Several restrictions can be thought of. Here we focus on restrictions regarding: 
 
• best-practice 
• individual learning 
• output mix 
 
For instance, in a fishery where vessels use different gear types, it is not reasonable to assume 
that the best-practice frontier is the same for all these. Instead, a frontier could be determined 
for vessels using the same gear types, or gear types based on similar technology. Vessels may 
also be able to change their level of technical efficiency through individual learning, but it 
may not always be reasonable to assume that a fully technical efficient level can be achieved. 
In some situations, there may even be efficiency regress. Allowing vessels to completely 
change their output mix - or not to change it at all - can also be unrealistic, especially when 
vessels use different gear types, but sometimes also when the same gear types are used. The 
importance of the different restrictions must obviously be based on specific knowledge about 
the analysed fishery. 
 
 
2.1 Restrictions on determination of best-practice frontier 
Analysis of technical efficiency issues in fisheries (and other areas as well) is traditionally 
based on datasets consisting of production units, i.e. vessels in our case, using the same type 
of technology. However, an ITQ system can cover one or several outputs produced by vessels 
using distinctively different production technologies. For instance, the technologies used by a 
trawler and a netter differ, but because they catch some of the same species, they are 
regulated by the same ITQ system. Thus, when estimating the tradability gains in ITQ 
systems using the industry models, it can be necessary to account for differences in 
production technologies. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates in a two-output situation, the difference between assuming that all 
vessels have the same best-practice frontier or group wise best-practice frontiers. If the best-
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practice frontier is estimated using the combined observations for trawlers and netters, the 
frontier becomes the combined line due to the convexity assumption. However, if the 
estimation is performed group wise, i.e. for trawlers and netters separately, the best-practice 
frontier becomes the two individual lines. Trawler 1 will thus be compared to point B instead 
of point A, when evaluating its level of technical efficiency. 
 
Figure 2.1 Comparing group wise with combined best-practice frontiers 
 
 
A general way to formalise restrictions on the determination of best-practice frontier is to 
include a dummy vector for each vessel indicating which other vessels use the same 
production technology. Thus, the technological comparison vector D has the following form 
for vessel v′ (v=1,…,V): 
 
 )d,...,d,...,d(D V'vv'v1'v'v =  (8)
 
where dv′v has a value of 1 or 0 depending on whether the two vessels v′ and v use similar 
production technologies or not. The matrix D={Dv′v;v′∈V,v∈V} is symmetric. 
 
To specify the comparability is a potentially complicated exercise involving specific 
knowledge about the industry. Also, one may rely on statistical techniques. Cooper, Seiford 
and Tone (2000) for example present a statistical method to compare the production 
technologies of different vessel types within the framework of DEA. The method proceeds in 
three steps. In the first step, efficiency estimations are performed for the vessels within each 
of the two vessel types to be compared, and the non-efficient ones are projected to the 
respective efficient frontiers. Thereafter in step two, the now efficient vessels are merged into 
one dataset and a new estimation of efficiency is performed. The final third step uses a 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test to test whether the vessels can be considered to have 
the same production technology. 
 
The comparison vectors can be included in the industry-programming problem presented in 
Section 1. Assuming for instance that individual learning and change in output mix is not 
Trawlers Netters 
Output 2 
Output 1 
Combined 
B 
A 
1 
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possible due to high costs, the programming problem assuming variable returns to scale 
becomes: 
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where the subscripts indicate the outputs m and inputs n, while the superscript ‘obs’ specifies 
that observed values have been used. Furthermore, CPY denotes the catch per year in weight; 
VCPY the variable (discretionary) costs per year and FCPY the fixed (non-discretionary) 
costs per year. β is the radial output change parameter and the intensity variable λv′v identifies 
the extent of which each included vessel v is used to construct the piecewise linear frontier 
approximation that envelops the data for a given vessel v′. As previously, F denotes the 
output efficiency level and P the output prices. Observe that there are Ñ variable inputs and 
(N-Ñ) fixed inputs. Observe also that by including F and β, we do not allow the included 
vessels to alter their level of technical efficiency and output mix (relative catch composition). 
 
The appeal of the above problem is that a vessel is only compared to vessels with similar 
technology, but still facilitating trades with vessels using other production technologies. 
 
Instead of using dummy variables to account for technological differences, restrictions could 
be imposed upon the intensity variables or weights. The form of the included restriction 
would then be λv′v⋅(1-Dv′v)=0, ∀v′,v, and the comparison vector D in the other equations can 
be removed. An extensive literature exists on this topic and an overview can be found in 
Allen et al. (1997). 
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2.2 Restrictions on individual learning 
Changes in management are likely to influence the individual vessels level of technical 
efficiency. Depending upon the type of management change and the flexibility in vessel 
behaviour, this may result in either an improvement or deterioration in the individual vessels 
level of technical efficiency. 
 
In the present context, the change from an unspecified ex ante management system to a 
system based upon ITQs is of primary interest. This change may allow skippers to utilise 
their skills better, resulting in improved levels of technical efficiency. However, deterioration 
may also be observed, if skippers seek to explore more profitable fisheries, in which they - at 
least in the short run - do not have much experience. 
 
Assuming in the basic model from Section 1 that the level of technical efficiency can be 
changed, it results in all vessels becoming fully efficient. However, technical inefficiencies 
seem to be a persistent problem within fisheries as well as other production sectors. We will 
therefore show an easy method to impose restrictions upon individual learning such that 
vessels’ technical efficiency may improve (or deteriorate), but not necessarily to a fully 
efficient level. 
 
The method we use is a two-step procedure. In the first step, the expected new level of 
technical efficiency is determined, and in the second step this new level of technical 
efficiency is included in the reallocation problem. The expected change in technical 
efficiency due to individual learning is thus not calculated internally within the reallocation 
model, but is instead considered externally.  
 
Using an output-oriented approach, the method implies that the observed level of technical 
efficiency for each vessel Fobs is firstly changed with a given percentage α giving rise to a 
new level Fnew i.e.:  
 
 ( ) vobsvvnewvobsvvnew F 11,1F,F1F −≤α≥⋅α−=  (10)
 
This formulation allows for both improvement and deterioration in the level of technical 
efficiency. Improvement will be the outcome if α is between zero and one, while 
deterioration follows if α is below zero. 
 
Individual learning can hence be permitted in the industry-programming problem by 
exchanging Fobs with Fnew. For instance, in the programming problem given by equation set 
(9), the objective function, cf. equation (9), is changed to: 
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while the industry restriction on total catches, cf. equation (9.g), is replaced by: 
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Having described the way to impose restrictions upon individual learning in the reallocation 
models, the next step is to quantify the level of changes in efficiency. Managers must 
consider the potential of individual learning in order to impose relevant restrictions reflecting 
the actual potential for each vessel or subgroup of vessels. The more precise these restrictions 
are, the more trustworthy the estimated consequences become. Generally, the choice of 
approach depends among other things on the characteristics of the analysed fishery and the 
availability of usable data. 
 
A simple but imprecise approach is to test the consequences of allowing different levels of 
individual learning. This can be viewed as a sensitivity analysis. A more appropriate but also 
more time-consuming approach is to first investigate the fishery in question. The natural 
starting point is to identify the reasons for the presence of technical inefficiency. A review of 
the relevant literature reveals that many factors influence the level of technical efficiency.  
 
Weninger and Waters (2003) make a distinction between external and internal factors that 
influence the level of technical efficiency. Examples of external factors are variations in fish 
stocks (Campbell and Hand 1998), weather and regulatory restrictions (Pascoe, Andersen and 
de Wilde 2001). Internal factors include vessel/engine size (Pascoe and Coglan 2002), vessel 
age (Sharma and Leung 1998), skipper skills/experience (Kirkley and Squires 1998) and 
judgments by the crew (Weninger and Waters 2003). While some of these factors are almost 
costless to alter, others may only be altered at significant costs. It may also be relevant to 
consider the variation in efficiency over time in order to identify any relevant trends, as done 
in Andersen (2002). 
 
Having identified the relevant reasons for inefficiency in a specific fishery, the next step is to 
evaluate which of these can be expected to change, and by how much, for each vessel or 
group of vessels due to the change in management system. Determination hereof may require 
discussions with technicians, regulators and fishermen in order to settle on the expected 
improvement level, i.e. individual learning. 
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2.3 Restrictions on changes in output mix 
It is not a straightforward task for a fisherman to decide upon the most profitable output mix. 
As it was the case with individual learning, several factors may influence his choice of catch 
composition. Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) mention family traditions, preferences, fishery 
specific knowledge, skills and uncertainty about net returns for different output mixes. 
Besides these internal factors, several external factors can also be added. Examples hereof 
could be weather, refitting possibilities, regulatory and seasonality considerations. The 
restrictions may therefore not only be related to the vessel, but to individual species as well.  
 
Investigations of vessels flexibility with respect to choice of output mix exist in the literature. 
For instance, Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe (2003) analyse the UK beam trawlers and otter 
trawlers. Their findings indicate that flexibility increases with vessel size. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that the beam and otter trawlers can make some but limited adjustments 
between their two most important species, which are plaice and sole for the former, and cod 
and haddock for the latter. Squires and Kirkley (1991) analyse the multispecies Pacific coast 
trawl fishery and find, as Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe (2003), that the flexibility for 
vessels to reorganise their output mix is low. Flexibility in the choice of output mix is also 
investigated by Jensen (2000) were an analysis of the Danish North Sea and Skagerrak 
pelagic trawl fishery indicates that some flexibility is present between choosing to catch 
regulated herring or other unregulated species, while no substitution possibilities is likely 
between regulated mackerel and other unregulated species. 
 
The assumption of unlimited flexibility in the choice of output mix is thus questionable even 
in a longer time perspective. It is necessary to consider flexibility restrictions in the choice of 
output mix, when we calculate the tradability gains. This can be done by assuming that the 
fishermen can change their output mix, but within some boundaries indicating some 
reasonable proportions between the species caught. We thus have the following: 
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where γ and η denote the upper and lower allowed change in output composition of each 
species caught by vessel v.  
 
The share of each species is thus allowed to vary within an upper and lower bound given as 
the observed share multiplied with the allowed change. To include these bounds in the 
industry programming problem given in equation set (9), equation (12) can be reformulated 
as the following two linear restrictions for each individual vessel in the analysis: 
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The intuition behind the inclusion of restrictions on output mix can be graphically illustrated 
assuming two outputs and for easiness the boundaries to be the same for each species, cf. 
Figure 2.2. The boundaries can of course vary for each species and vessel, depending on the 
knowledge about the included vessels and their flexibility. 
 
In Figure 2.2(a), the situation is analysed on a ‘per output’ level. For simplicity reasons we 
define the initial share of output 1 as s1=CPY1/(CPY1+CPY2) and the initial share of output 2 
as s2=CPY2/(CPY1+CPY2) for vessel v. Allowing the shares to vary within the allowed 
bounds, vessel v can choose to produce at one point on the bold line, on which it is ensured 
that s1+s2=1. 
 
Figure 2.2 Restricting change in output composition 
(a) (b) 
 
 
 
The problem becomes more complicated when absolute catches are used to illustrate the 
situation, cf. Figure 2.2(b). Compared to the previous boundaries (1+γ) and (1-η) used in 
Figure 2.2(a), it is now necessary to correct these with a factor. However, the boundaries are 
still linear, because only observed values determine the factor. In the two extreme situations, 
catches can either be changed proportionally in size or decided freely. In the former, catches 
must thus be a point on the prespecified ray illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 2.2(b), 
while catches can be at any point within the area 0ABCD in the latter case. Be restricting the 
flexibility of choosing the output mix, the vessel can now only alter its output within the area 
0BC. The boundaries of this area are determined by the choice of γ and η.  
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3. The Danish dataset 
The Food and Resource Economics Institute has since 1995 published yearly account 
statistics for Danish fisheries. The publication is based upon information gathered from a 
representative part of the commercial fishing fleet4. In the statistics, the term fishing firm is 
used instead of fishing vessel, because some of the received information is from fishermen 
who own more than one vessel. However, considering that the majority of fishermen only 
have one vessel, we will continue to use the term vessel instead of firm in the following. 
 
From the database, a dataset has been prepared to fulfil the objective of this paper, i.e. to 
calculate the tradability gains from implementing ITQs in Danish fisheries. The dataset is 
from 2002, which is the newest available year in the database. With exclusion of all vessels 
participating in licensed fisheries for blue mussels and common shrimps, the total number of 
vessels in the dataset is 3085. This number of vessels corresponds to approximately 20% of 
the total commercial fishing fleet in Denmark. The distribution of the 308 vessels with 
respect to gear type and length category is shown in Table 3.1. It is observed that a wide 
variety of gear types and lengths are represented in the dataset. 
 
Table 3.1 Number of vessels 
 <12m 12-15m 15-18m 18-24m 24-40m >40m Total 
Beam trawl     4  4 
Danish seine  3 6 15   24 
Net/line 38 15 10 8   71 
Multi-purpose 6 6 2 3 1  18 
Purse seine      11 11 
Trap 10      10 
Trawl 5 33 29 39 50 14 170 
Total 59 57 47 65 55 25 308 
Note: A multi-purpose vessel is capable of switching between net, Danish seine and trawl. 
 
 
To extend the gathered information to cover the whole Danish commercial fleet of 1,321 
vessels, an enumeration factor (weight) is attached to each of the selected vessels. This factor 
is found by using a restricted least squares regression model. In the model, a restriction is 
included to secure that the number of vessels within each length category is equal to the 
number of vessels in the total population. Furthermore, the deviation from other restrictions 
such as distribution on homeports, fishermen’s age and catch revenues is sought to be 
minimised. The statistic therefore reflects the commercial fleet with respect to key 
characteristics in the best possible way, given the included vessels. 
 
The enumeration factor reflects each vessel’s importance in the representation of the 
statistics. For instance, a vessel factor of 10 implies that 10 vessels on average have revenues 
                                                 
4 A vessel is considered commercial, if it in 2002 had total catch revenue above 219,202 DKK (1 DKK≈ 7.43 €). 
5 In order to facilitate that vessels can lay-up, a fictitious vessel with zero revenues and costs is included in the 
dataset, bringing the total number of vessels to 309. 
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and costs like this vessel. For simplicity reasons, we have multiplied the revenues and costs 
of each selected vessel with the attached weight, instead of including bundles of similar 
vessels. The revenues and costs of the 308 vessels are thus able to describe the total revenues 
and costs of the 1,321 vessels in the total commercial Danish fishing fleet.  
 
The average enumeration factor per vessel is displayed in Table 3.2. It is for instance 
observed that the average factor in the length category below 12 metres is higher compared to 
those for vessels above 40 metres. This does not however imply that the vessels below 12 
metres are more important than the ones above 40 metres. The reason is that each of the small 
vessels represents a higher number of vessels in the total population compared to the larger 
vessels. Thus, the selection percentage is generally increasing with size. 
 
Table 3.2 Average enumeration factor per vessel 
 <12m 12-15m 15-18m 18-24m 24-40m >40m 
Beam trawl     1.75  
Danish seine  7.33 4.50 3.07   
Net/line 7.24 5.53 4.60 3.88   
Multi-purpose 6.83 6.50 5.00 3.00 4.00  
Purse seine      1.00 
Trap 6.40      
Trawl 6.80 5.18 4.07 2.97 2.68 2.36 
 
 
To obtain sensible results in the forthcoming estimations, it is necessary to reduce the initial 
number of 45 outputs. Based on the importance of the individual species and the technology 
used to harvest these, a deduction has therefore made between 9 outputs. These are as 
follows: 1) cod, 2) other codfish, 3) plaice, 4) other flatfish, 5) herring, 6) mackerel, 7) lobster 
and shrimp, 8) other consumption species and 9) industrial species. In Table 3.3, the 
economic importance of the different outputs is depicted.  
 
Table 3.3 Relative catch revenue composition (%) 
 Cod 
Other 
codfish Plaice 
Other 
flatfish Herring Mackerel
Lobster 
and 
shrimp
Other 
species 
Industrial 
species 
Total catch 
value 
(1,000 DKK)
Beam trawl 5 4 66 25 0 0 0 0 0 87,636
Danish seine 35 6 48 11 0 0 0 0 0 190,565
Net/line 57 5 14 18 0 0 1 4 0 408,879
Multi-purpose 37 21 11 12 1 0 15 1 3 149,106
Purse seine 0 0 0 0 38 51 0 1 11 280,111
Trap 38 1 10 14 1 0 1 36 0 40,482
Trawl 10 5 3 5 9 4 19 0 44 2,294,872
Total 18 6 9 7 9 7 14 1 31 3,451,650
 
 
Some vessels are very dependent on a single species, while other vessels have a more 
diversified catch composition. For instance, beam trawlers have a high proportion of plaice, 
while net/line vessels have a considerable cod dependency. Danish seiners are on the other 
hand highly dependent upon cod and plaice, while trawlers have industrial species as their 
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main species with a series of other commercial species giving a significant contribution to the 
catch revenue. 
 
Vessels obtain different prices for their landings for many reasons, with fish quality being 
one of the most important, cf. Table 3.4. There are many explanations of why a vessel is able 
to catch a high quality of fish, including gear type, fishing area and initial processing. Despite 
the observed variations for all species in price between the gear types, it is especially 
prominent for the industrial species. The background for this high variation is the fact that for 
instance netters and trappers only catch small amounts, which most often are used for 
consumption purposes, thus obtaining a higher price.  
 
Table 3.4 Average prices (DKK/kilo) 
 Cod 
Other 
codfish Plaice 
Other 
flatfish Herring Mackerel
Lobster 
and 
shrimp 
Other 
species 
Industrial 
species 
Beam trawl 19.93 22.02 13.68 34.42 0.00 0.00 18.40 16.54 9.88 
Danish seine 18.11 9.92 12.91 11.43 0.00 3.45 24.94 16.41 15.30 
Net/line 14.91 10.00 12.26 17.49 1.79 9.56 73.39 22.50 0.90 
Multi-purpose 17.46 16.19 12.19 35.37 2.90 7.36 32.32 17.90 6.56 
Purse seine 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 3.05 7.40 0.00 1.54 0.78 
Trap 16.72 19.01 11.67 21.48 1.46 4.29 28.88 20.10 12.03 
Trawl 15.15 8.46 12.64 17.50 2.63 6.03 48.96 8.52 1.00 
Total 16.31 9.09 12.79 20.63 2.75 6.83 49.40 11.20 0.99 
 
 
Vessel costs are divided into variable and fixed costs. The variable costs are subdivided into 
four types. These are: 1) fuel costs, 2) costs for ice and provisions, 3) sales costs6 and 4) crew 
payments. Table 3.5 shows the relative distribution of the variable costs for the primary 
gears, which is the main reason for variation in the relative distribution as opposed to vessel 
size. Table 3.5 also includes the distribution of fixed costs, which are divided into 1) 
maintenance costs7 and 2) other costs8.  
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of variable and fixed costs (%) 
Variable costs Fixed costs 
 Fuel 
Ice and 
provisions Sales Payment
Total  
(1,000 DKK)
Mainte-
nance 
Other 
 costs 
Total  
(1,000 DKK)
Beam trawl 36 1 17 46 56,808 66 34 13,917
Danish seine 7 2 17 73 129,255 62 38 39,867
Net/line 6 2 13 79 322,950 55 45 78,446
Multi-purpose 14 2 12 72 100,102 61 39 28,188
Purse seine 18 1 6 75 111,262 65 35 64,454
Trap 4 2 12 82 31,353 57 43 8,235
Trawl 19 4 15 61 1,325,960 64 36 399,046
Total 16 3 14 66 2,077,691 63 37 632,153
                                                 
6 Costs for brokerage and harbour dues, packing, chilling and freight and other unspecified landing costs. 
7 Costs for maintenance of hull, engines, winches, electronic equipment and repair of fishing gears. 
8 Costs for plant and equipment rent, insurance and administration. 
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Crew payments comprise the largest part of the variable costs, followed by fuel costs, sales 
costs and costs for ice and provisions. However, several interesting observations can be 
made. For instance, vessels using beam trawl are the most fuel intensive, while vessels using 
net/line and trap are the least fuel intensive. Beam trawlers do however have the lowest cost 
share for ice and provisions, while trawlers have the highest share. Vessels using Danish 
seine are the ones using the highest proportion of their variable costs for sales purposes, while 
purse seiners use the lowest. Finally, the highest share of crew payment is observed for the 
vessels using traps, while vessels using beam trawl have the lowest. With respect to the fixed 
costs, approximately two-thirds of the fixed costs are for maintenance, while other costs thus 
make up the rest. This distribution is relatively stable across the gear types. 
 
In Table 3.6, the total revenues, variable and fixed costs are presented. Furthermore, earnings 
and gross profits are calculated. Earnings are defined as revenue minus variable costs, while 
gross profits are defined as earnings minus fixed costs. Gross profits thus indicate the amount 
left to rent, the invested capital and any excess payment to the vessel owners. 
 
Table 3.6 Key economic total values in 2002 (1,000 DKK) 
 Catch revenues Variable costs Earnings Fixed costs Gross profits 
Beam trawl 87,636 56,808 30,828 13,917 16,911
Danish seine 190,565 129,255 61,310 39,867 21,444
Net/line 408,879 322,950 85,929 78,446 7,483
Multi-purpose 149,106 100,102 49,003 28,188 20,815
Purse seine 280,111 111,262 168,849 64,454 104,394
Trap 40,482 31,353 9,129 8,235 894
Trawl 2,294,872 1,325,960 968,911 399,046 569,865
Total 3,451,650 2,077,691 1,373,960 632,153 741,807
 
 
It is apparent from Table 3.6 that the trawlers give rise to the main part of the total earnings in 
the Danish fishing fleet. Over 75% of the total gross profits come from these vessels. These 
initial values will in the following be compared with the estimated values of the different 
models in order to evaluate the consequences of implementing an ITQ system. 
 
 
4. Tradability gains from implementing an ITQ system in Danish fisheries 
To illustrate the sensitivity of the estimated tradability gains with respect to restricting best-
practice, individual learning and choice of output mix described previously, we apply the 
dataset presented in Section 3, thus assuming prices to vary between the gear types. The 
obtained results will thus indicate the expected range of gains had the Danish fisheries been 
regulated using an ITQ system in the Danish fishery in 2002. 
 
This section will proceed in four steps. First, the consequences of restricting the best-practice 
frontier for the individual vessels will be analysed. Based on this, we will proceed with 
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separate investigations of restricting individual learning and changes in output mix. Finally, a 
comparison is made between different flexibility regimes. 
 
In order to investigate the consequences of restricting the individual vessel’s best-practice 
frontier, it is necessary to set up the comparison vector. For simplicity, we only analyse the 
situations where all vessels can be compared and where only vessels using the same gear type 
can be compared. The output-oriented level of technical efficiency assuming variable returns 
to scale in each of the two situations can be estimated using a traditional technical efficiency 
program, cf. Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994). Descriptive statistics for the estimated levels 
distributed on gear types is displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Estimated level of technical efficiency 
 
Best-practice: 
Beam 
trawl 
Danish 
seine 
Multi-
purpose Net/line
Purse 
seine Trap Trawl Total 
Average Unrestricted 1.00 1.09 1.36 1.32 1.01 1.20 1.30 1.28 
 Restricted 1.00 1.02 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.19 1.13 
Standard deviation Unrestricted 0.00 0.15 0.46 0.46 0.02 0.28 0.50 0.46 
 Restricted 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.32 
Maximum Unrestricted 1.00 1.61 3.01 2.77 1.08 1.81 3.56 3.56 
 Restricted 1.00 1.25 2.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.32 3.32 
 
 
When we only allow vessels using similar gear types to be compared, the average level of 
technical inefficiency is reduced as expected. The improvement in technical efficiency 
indicates that output can only be expanded by 13% on average, in contrast to 28% in the 
unrestricted case.  
 
Including the new estimations of technical efficiency in the industry programming problems, 
it becomes possible to evaluate the economic consequences of restricting the determination of 
the best-practice frontier. For the two extreme assumptions about individual learning and 
changing output mix, Table 4.2 displays the effect on revenues, costs, earnings and gross 
profits. 
 
Table 4.2 Impact of restricting best-practice frontier determination (1,000 DKK) 
    2002-level 
Technical 
efficiency and 
output mix fixed
Technical 
efficiency 
unrestricted, 
output mix fixed
Technical 
efficiency fixed, 
output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical 
efficiency and 
output mix 
unrestricted 
Revenue  3,451,650 3,451,406 3,475,931 11,439,348 12,315,054
Variable cost 2,077,691 1,672,854 1,485,976 1,561,004 1,485,411
Best-
practice 
unrestricted Earnings 1,373,960 1,778,552 1,989,955 9,878,344 10,829,643
  Gross profits  741,807 1,146,399 1,357,802 9,246,191 10,197,490
  Change (%)  54.54 83.04 1,146.44 1,274.68
Revenue  3,451,650 3,366,479 3,422,133 3,467,546 3,483,018
Variable cost 2,077,691 1,709,798 1,637,619 1,439,973 1,428,406
Best-
practice 
restricted Earnings 1,373,960 1,656,681 1,784,513 2,027,573 2,054,613
  Gross profits  741,807 1,024,528 1,152,360 1,395,420 1,422,460
  Change (%)  38.11 55.35 88.11 91.76
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Looking at the models with best-practice as well as choice of output mix determined without 
any restrictions, we observe a very high increase in gross profit. From Table 4.2, it can be 
seen that the increase mainly comes from a rise in revenue. The primary reason is that the 
catch of industrial species in these models is allocated towards vessels obtaining high prices, 
e.g. Danish seiners and trappers. In reality, these reallocations are unlikely, because the high 
price for industrial species cannot be obtained for all catches, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
 
If the determination of best-practice is restricted, but the output mix can be chosen freely, the 
reallocation of catches decreases significantly. Danish seiners can in this situation not be 
compared to trawlers and are thus restricted from obtaining the same catch/cost profile as 
these vessels. Such vessels can therefore not have a high share of industrial species in their 
catch and obtain the higher price. Despite this, gross profits are still above the level in 2002, 
and under the most flexible assumption about vessel behaviour, gains of 90% in gross profits 
are expected to be derived. 
 
Comparison of the gross profits under assumption of unrestricted and restricted determination 
of best-practice is thus hampered when choice of output mix is unrestricted. However, a 
reduction is as expected observed in the models with the output mix fixed. The reduction is 
attributed to the lack of flexibility for the vessel’s choice of catch/cost profile, thus resulting 
in lower revenues and higher costs in the restricted models. Had the output prices been 
assumed equal across vessel types, the tradability gains obtained with unrestricted output mix 
would have been almost unchanged in the models with different assumptions about the 
determination of best-practice.  
 
Despite comparison problems, gross profits are influenced by restricting the determination of 
best-practice frontier. The next step is to evaluate the consequences of allowing individual 
learning, but not to the level where 100% technical efficiency is obtained. We illustrate this 
by decreasing inefficiency by 25%, 50% and 75% respectively9. When solving the 
reallocation problems, we assume that best-practice is determined on the basis of only similar 
production technologies. The consequences on revenues, variable costs, earnings and gross 
profits are displayed in Table 4.3. 
 
                                                 
9 Technical efficiency is thus calculated as Fv(α=0.25) =(1-0.25)⋅Fobs v, Fv(α=0.50)=(1-0.50)⋅Fv(α=0.25) and 
Fv(α=0.75)=(1-0.75)⋅Fv(α=0.50). Thus, if α equals one, all vessels become fully efficient. 
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Table 4.3 Restricting improvement in technical efficiency (1,000 DKK) 
   Assumption about technical efficiency  
    2002-level Fixed 
Improved  
by 25% 
Improved  
by 50% 
Improved  
by 75% Unrestricted
Revenue  3,451,650 3,366,479 3,370,580 3,376,515 3,389,345 3,422,133Output mix 
fixed  Variable cost 2,077,691 1,709,798 1,689,079 1,669,156 1,649,834 1,637,619
 Earnings 1,373,960 1,656,681 1,681,501 1,707,359 1,739,511 1,784,513
  Gross profits 741,807 1,024,528 1,049,348 1,075,206 1,107,358 1,152,360
  Change (%)  38.11 41.46 44.94 49.28 55.35
Revenue  3,451,650 3,467,546 3,472,511 3,476,534 3,477,887 3,483,018Output mix 
unrestricted  Variable cost 2,077,691 1,439,973 1,439,481 1,437,473 1,432,467 1,428,406
 Earnings 1,373,960 2,027,573 2,033,029 2,039,062 2,045,420 2,054,613
  Gross profits 741,807 1,395,420 1,400,876 1,406,909 1,413,267 1,422,460
  Change (%)  88.11 88.85 89.66 90.52 91.76
 
 
Imposing restrictions upon individual learning does as expected result in levels of gross 
profits that range between the technical efficiency fixed and unrestricted cases. With output 
mix restricted, catches are allocated towards vessels with lower catch revenues, but also 
having lower costs. If output mix is unrestricted, catches are allocated towards vessels with 
higher catch revenues, but at the same time having lower cost. However, it can generally be 
concluded that the gains primarily originate from allocating catches towards vessels with 
lower cost. 
 
As expected, the tradability gains rise with increasing levels of technical efficiency. With the 
output mix fixed, we observe that reallocation alone will result in increased gross profits of 
38.11% compared to the 2002-level, rising to a total increase of 55.35% with all vessels being 
technical efficient. Allowing output mix to be determined without restrictions implies that the 
initial gross profits increase by 88%, but only rising by 92% in the fully technical efficient 
situation. Thus, the highest impact on gross profit from improved efficiency is observed with 
output mix fixed, but the highest level of gross profit is observed with output mix 
unrestricted. 
 
Looking at the different levels of improvement, we observe “marginally increasing gross 
profits”, i.e. the higher the technical efficiency level, the larger marginal increase in gross 
profits. This can be attributed to the fact that as inefficiency decreases, the catch/cost profile 
of the previously inefficient vessels becomes relevant with respect to allocation of catches, 
thus resulting in increased gross profits.  
 
In the previous models, the flexibility with respect to output mix was observed to be of 
significant importance. Imposing restrictions upon the output mix is therefore most likely 
going to have a considerable impact on gross profits. To illustrate this, we have imposed 
boundaries of ±25%, ±50% and ±75% for changes in the output composition for each vessel. 
Solving the reallocation problem, we obtain the revenues, variable costs, earnings and gross 
profits shown in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4 Restrictions on changes in output composition (1,000 DKK) 
   Assumption about output mix  
    2002-level Fixed 
Changeable 
by ±25% 
Changeable 
by ±50% 
Changeable 
by ±75% Unrestricted
Revenue  3,451,650 3,366,479 3,380,669 3,352,103 3,345,136 3,467,546
Variable cost 2,077,691 1,709,798 1,636,445 1,551,495 1,508,017 1,439,973
Technical 
efficiency 
fixed  Earnings 1,373,960 1,656,681 1,744,224 1,800,608 1,837,119 2,027,573
  Gross profits 741,807 1,024,528 1,112,071 1,168,455 1,204,966 1,395,420
  Change (%)  38.11 49.91 57.51 62.44 88.11
Revenue  3,451,650 3,422,133 3,395,408 3,393,338 3,388,755 3,483,018
Variable cost 2,077,691 1,637,619 1,548,156 1,504,873 1,468,771 1,428,406
Technical 
efficiency 
unrestricted Earnings 1,373,960 1,784,513 1,847,252 1,888,466 1,919,984 2,054,613
  Gross profits 741,807 1,152,360 1,215,099 1,256,313 1,287,831 1,422,460
  Change (%)  55.35 63.80 69.36 73.61 91.76
 
 
We observe that increasing flexibility with respect to choice of output composition results in 
rising gross profits. However, it is interesting to observe that the gains are primarily obtained 
when allowing the first and the last 25% increments of output flexibility. When the output 
flexibility is between 25% and 75%, it does result in higher gross profits, but the marginal 
increase is not as high as for the first and last 25%. Except for the situation with unrestricted 
output mix, the increase in gross profits comes from reduced variable costs and not increased 
catch revenues. 
 
In the previous tables, only the total figures have been presented. However, these figures do 
not reflect the consequences for the different groups of gear types. We have therefore 
included Table 4.5, which shows the change in gross profits for each of the seven gear types 
in the analysed models. 
 
Table 4.5 Change in gross profits compared to 2002-level (1,000 DKK) 
Assumption about: 
Technical efficiency Output mix 
Beam 
trawl 
Danish 
seine 
Multi-
purpose Net/line
Purse 
seine Trap Trawl 
Fixed Fixed 0 3,132 4,253 62,887 2,537 3,404 206,510
Unrestricted Fixed 0 7,615 1,321 89,157 2,280 3,325 306,857
Fixed Unrestricted 1,996 3,984 23,091 149,437 -15,810 13,298 477,618
Unrestricted Unrestricted 1,996 12,585 25,302 181,637 -31,342 13,298 477,178
Improved 25% Fixed 0 4,068 4,253 66,810 2,421 3,404 226,587
Improved 50% Fixed 0 5,044 2,276 71,941 2,482 3,404 248,254
Improved 75% Fixed 0 6,320 2,276 78,942 2,420 3,404 272,192
Fixed Changeable ±25% 1,069 6,806 7,518 81,860 6,193 4,021 262,799
Fixed Changeable ±50% 1,544 7,384 8,389 96,244 9,774 4,358 298,957
Fixed Changeable ±75% 1,766 7,327 11,105 109,345 9,821 4,932 318,865
Unrestricted Changeable ±25% 1,046 9,217 -4,923 107,236 3,908 3,532 353,276
Unrestricted Changeable ±50% 1,544 8,601 1,814 123,740 6,875 4,154 367,779
Unrestricted Changeable ±75% 1,766 6,683 5,649 137,904 7,135 4,646 382,243
Improved 25% Unrestricted 1,996 6,947 23,279 155,025 -15,810 13,298 474,335
Improved 50% Unrestricted 1,996 8,422 23,334 160,926 -30,950 13,298 488,076
Improved 75% Unrestricted 1,996 10,001 23,092 168,756 -31,342 13,298 485,659
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Based on Table 4.5, the conclusion must be that all groups of gear types generally obtain 
increased gross profits compared to the 2002-level with some exceptions. For instance, when 
the output mix is fixed, the beam trawlers do not get higher gross profits, while the purse 
seiners obtain lower gross profits with an unrestricted choice of output mix.  
 
It can also be observed from Table 4.5 that some gear types obtain a lower gross profit in a 
model with high flexibility compared to a model with low flexibility. The reason for this is 
the overall catch restriction for each of the included species limiting the total amount of 
catches taken. Thus, allocating catches to one gear type will necessarily imply that other gear 
types cannot take these.  
 
Based on data covering Danish fisheries in 2002 we have thus applied the theoretical 
framework previously discussed under different assumptions of flexibility for the individual 
vessels. We have calculated the possible gains to be derived if Danish fisheries had been 
managed by ITQs in 2002. We have shown how the size of the tradability gains is influenced 
by the flexibilities and that almost all gear types earn higher profits. However, because of the 
included overall catch restriction, some gear types earn a lower gross profit compared to the 
2002-level. It is also a general observation that the increases in gross profits are primarily 
driven by allocating catches towards vessels with lower costs and not vessels (gear types) 
obtaining higher prices.  
 
 
5. Policy implications 
In the previous section, we focused on the industry wide economic impacts of ITQs. 
However, when analysing the consequences of ITQs, a series of other effects are also 
relevant. Through time, discussions about ITQ systems have also included topics such as 
concentration, specialisation, market activity and price levels. These topics will be considered 
in this section. Furthermore, we will consider how to analyse the consequences of exogenous 
chocks and management changes. In order to limit the size of the included tables, we only 
analyse these topics under the extreme assumptions about the vessel’s behavioural flexibility. 
 
 
5.1 Concentration and specialisation 
The accumulation of ITQs among fewer vessels is from a strict economic point of view not 
problematic, because marginal fishermen will sell the quota to more profitable fishermen, 
resulting in higher rent of the invested capital. However, there may still be reasons for 
evaluating the intensity of accumulation. One reason is that it can result in vessels obtaining 
market power, making them able to hamper the flexibility of the market, cf. Anderson (1991). 
Another is from a socio-economic point of view that small communities can become deprived 
of their primary source of income.  
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In order to approach the topic of accumulation, a distinction can be made between horizontal 
and vertical accumulation. The former, which we call concentration, refers to a situation 
where ITQs are distributed among fewer and larger vessels in certain regions. The latter 
refers on the other hand to a situation where ITQs are distributed among certain gear types. 
This type of accumulation we call specialisation.  
 
The dataset does not allow us to investigate regional concentration. Nevertheless, larger 
vessels must locate themselves in larger ports to have sufficient water depths. Looking at the 
number of active vessels in the different length groups, we therefore get some indication 
about this possible development. The number of active vessels, i.e. vessels with quota, is 
presented in Table 5.1 for the different models. 
 
Table 5.1 Distribution of active vessels on length groups 
Assumption about: 
Technical efficiency Output mix <12m 12-15m 15-18m 18-24m 24-40m >40m Total 
2002-level 414 315 201 202 145 44 1,321 
Fixed Fixed 377 274 201 200 145 44 1,242 
Unrestricted Fixed 365 287 201 199 145 44 1,242 
Fixed Unrestricted 400 234 159 178 138 44 1,153 
Unrestricted Unrestricted 389 289 196 198 132 41 1,245 
 
 
Table 5.1 indicates some tendencies towards higher concentration. The total number of 
vessels is generally reduced by between 6% and 14%, and this reduction is primarily found 
for vessels below 15 metres. Due to the short time horizon used in the analysis, no increase in 
the number of vessels is observed. However, had the analysis been for a long time horizon, 
the possibility to build new vessels, and thus to change the fleet structure more significantly, 
could have been facilitated. 
 
A distinction can be made between two types of specialisation. One is specialisation towards 
certain gear types and another is specialisation towards certain species.  
 
Specialisation towards gear types is analysed in Table 5.2, where the number of active vessels 
is distributed among the different gear types. It is observed that no changes in the number of 
beam trawlers, Danish seiners and purse seiners are expected following implementation of an 
ITQ system. The number of vessels using the remaining gear types varies, depending on the 
assumptions made about individual learning and change in output mix.  
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Table 5.2 Distribution of active vessels on gear type groups 
Assumption about: 
Technical efficiency Output mix 
Beam 
trawl 
Danish 
seine 
Multi-
purpose Net/line
Purse 
seine Trap Trawl 
2002- level 7 95 103 435 11 64 606 
Fixed Fixed 7 95 77 417 11 43 592 
Unrestricted Fixed 7 95 75 407 11 43 603 
Fixed Unrestricted 7 89 103 430 11 64 449 
Unrestricted Unrestricted 7 95 103 435 11 64 530 
 
 
Specialisation towards certain species is analysed in Table 5.3. Of course this requires that 
the output mix is allowed to change. The distribution of catch weights on the different species 
for the given gear types are provided. 
 
Table 5.3 Output composition, catch weight (%) 
Assumption about: 
 
Technical 
efficiency 
Choice of 
output mix Cod 
Other 
codfish Plaice
Other 
flatfish
Her-
ring 
Mac-
kerel 
Lobster 
and 
shrimp 
Other 
species 
Indu-
strial 
species
2002-level 4 3 80 12 0 0 0 0 0 Beam 
trawl Fixed Unrestricted 3 3 80 14 0 0 0 0 0 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 3 3 80 14 0 0 0 0 0 
2002-level 27 8 52 13 0 0 0 0 0 Danish 
seine Fixed Unrestricted 10 15 70 5 0 0 0 0 0 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 10 15 70 5 0 0 0 0 0 
2002-level 26 21 9 7 4 0 2 1 30 Multi-
purpose Fixed Unrestricted 11 76 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 14 71 6 6 0 0 0 2 0 
Net/line 2002-level 58 6 20 9 2 0 1 4 0 
 Fixed Unrestricted 65 0 23 12 0 0 0 0 0 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 66 0 22 11 0 0 0 0 0 
2002-level 0 1 0 0 37 20 0 1 41 Purse 
seine Fixed Unrestricted 0 0 0 0 47 32 0 0 22 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 0 0 0 0 47 39 0 0 15 
Trap 2002-level 36 1 14 10 10 0 0 29 0 
 Fixed Unrestricted 31 0 1 8 0 0 0 61 0 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 31 0 1 8 0 0 0 61 0 
Trawl 2002-level 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 0 88 
 Fixed Unrestricted 2 1 0 1 7 1 1 0 88 
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 1 1 0 1 7 1 1 0 88 
 
 
No significant changes are observed for the beam trawlers’ output composition. Plaice is still 
the most important species. The Danish seiners specialise towards having a larger proportion 
of their catch weight being made up of plaice and other codfish, instead of cod and other 
flatfish. The flexible multi-purpose vessels also specialise significantly towards catching 
other codfish in place of all other species. The netters and liners seem not to specialise 
significantly, while the purse seiners focus more intensively on the pelagic consumption 
species, i.e. herring and mackerel, while reducing their dependency on industrial species. 
Instead of catching flatfish and herring, trappers are expected to increase their proportion of 
other species, while still catching a high proportion of cod. The trawlers on the other hand are 
not expected to specialise in an ITQ system. 
 165
To conclude, we find that had the Danish fisheries been regulated with an ITQ system in 
2002, the larger vessels would make up a higher proportion of the active vessels, thus 
indicating tendencies towards concentration. With respect to specialisation, we observe that 
the preferred gear types depend on the flexibility assumptions. However, when analysing 
within each gear type, we find significant specialisation tendencies. Only beam trawlers and 
trawlers do not seem to specialise.  
 
Should the regulatory authority find these effects undesirable, they can take measures against 
accumulation of ITQs. Possibilities are for instance the setting of a maximum amount of 
quota a vessel can own, or a minimum level that must be owned by vessels in specific 
harbours. By including these extra restrictions in the programming problem, regulators can 
get an impression of the economic losses such restrictions will give, enabling them to 
evaluate whether these are acceptable or not. 
 
 
5.2 Market activity 
High activity on the quota market is seen as important for the success of an ITQ system. The 
reasons are among others that 1) high activity indicates that gains are being derived and 2) 
high activity secures that “true” prices are obtained. In order to have a well functioning 
market, it is necessary for the regulators to set up the facilities for making low cost 
transactions. These facilities could for instance include: 1) low transaction costs, 2) a central 
market, where all trades take place10, 3) security about ownership and length hereof for the 
ITQs, 4) setting up an independent board to deal with changes11 and 5) type of actors and 
instruments allowed on the market12. 
 
Table 5.4 displays the traded amounts, including who are buyers and sellers. Looking firstly 
at the traded shares, we observe, not surprisingly, that when the output mix is restricted to the 
composition in 2002, the traded amounts are minor, and in some of the models there is more 
quota for sale than demanded on the market, resulting in unused quota. However, when the 
output mix can be chosen without restrictions, the traded amounts rise considerably, 
especially for cod, other codfish, herring and other species.  
 
                                                 
10 Using a central market instead of a decentralised market makes it easier for the fishermen to find each other, 
thus reducing transaction costs. Furthermore the regulator has complete information about who owns what and 
how much. 
11 An independent board is necessary to avoid any doubts about changes in the total quotas, which may give rise 
to asymmetric information between the fishermen. Such asymmetric information will result in a non-optimal 
distribution of the ITQs. 
12 Besides fishermen, other actors can also be allowed to operate on the ITQ market. Non-governmental 
organisations and middlemen are common examples. Allowing the former can be problematic, because these are 
not necessarily willing to sell the ITQs at the market price, while the former can be beneficial, because they help 
fuel the market, reducing transaction costs. Different types of instruments such as futures, options, leasing and 
banking of ITQs can also be allowed on the market in order to increase the flexibility and reduce risk. 
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Table 5.4 Amount of quota bought and sold (tonnes)  
Assumption about: 
 
Technical 
efficiency 
Choice of 
output mix 
Beam 
trawl 
Danish 
seine 
Multi-
purpose
Net/ 
line 
Purse 
seine Trap Trawl Unused 
Traded 
share 
(%) 
Cod Fixed Fixed 0 -115 -108 -1,612 0 -417 -113 -2,365 7
 Unrestricted Fixed 0 29 -185 -242 0 -541 940 0 3
 Fixed Unrestricted -76 -2,336 -1,967 104 0 -152 4,427 0 12
 Unrestricted Unrestricted -76 -2,178 -1,440 1,817 0 -152 2,029 0 10
Fixed Fixed 0 -19 -5 -176 0 -13 -1,647 -1,860 10Other 
codfish Unrestricted Fixed 0 0 -18 -133 0 -13 -2,330 -2,496 13
 Fixed Unrestricted -37 1,036 8,962 -1,342 -783 -14 -7,823 0 47
 Unrestricted Unrestricted -37 1,290 8,146 -1,340 -783 -14 -7,262 0 44
Plaice Fixed Fixed 0 58 -332 -621 0 -78 -41 -1,014 5
 Unrestricted Fixed 0 174 -450 -437 0 -78 525 -265 4
 Fixed Unrestricted -441 2,638 -248 147 0 -327 -1,770 0 12
 Unrestricted Unrestricted -441 3,795 -313 456 0 -327 -3,170 0 18
Fixed Fixed 0 -35 -177 -252 0 -15 -132 -611 5Other 
flatfish Unrestricted Fixed 0 -6 -229 -69 0 -18 322 0 3
 Fixed Unrestricted 11 -1,092 -51 328 0 -75 879 0 10
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 11 -1,009 -55 449 0 -75 679 0 9
Herring Fixed Fixed 0 0 -28 0 14 0 13 0 0
 Unrestricted Fixed 0 0 -28 0 -58 0 85 0 0
 Fixed Unrestricted 0 0 -558 -490 -6,088 -245 7,380 0 7
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 0 0 -558 -490 -11,518 -245 12,811 0 11
Fixed Fixed 0 0 0 0 28 0 -28 0 0Mac-
kerel Unrestricted Fixed 0 0 0 0 -14 0 14 0 0
 Fixed Unrestricted 0 3 0 -2 131 -10 -120 0 0
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 0 2 0 -2 -125 -10 136 0 0
Fixed Fixed 0 0 -32 -62 0 -7 100 0 1
Unrestricted Fixed 0 0 -112 -68 0 -7 187 0 2
Lobster 
and 
shrimp Fixed Unrestricted 0 -2 -294 -180 0 -8 484 0 5
 Unrestricted Unrestricted 0 -2 -294 -180 0 -8 484 0 5
Fixed Fixed 0 1 -15 -8 0 53 -124 -93 4Other 
species Unrestricted Fixed 0 1 -16 20 0 48 -147 -95 4
 Fixed Unrestricted -3 1 -14 -840 -1,082 799 101 -1,038 70
 Unrestricted Unrestricted -3 4 222 -840 -1,082 799 822 -78 52
Fixed Fixed 0 1 0 -1 -9 0 8 0 0
Unrestricted Fixed 0 2 0 0 -48 0 46 0 0
Fixed Unrestricted 0 -50 -4,341 -6 -25,491 0 29,888 0 3
Indu-
strial 
species 
Unrestricted Unrestricted 0 -50 -4,339 -6 -31,504 0 35,900 0 3
 
 
Looking at the models with unrestricted choice of output mix, we observe for cod that the 
most important actors on the market are trawlers buying quota from especially Danish seiners 
and multi-purpose vessels. The multi-purpose vessels and Danish Seiners do on the other 
hand buy quota for other codfish from trawlers and to some extent netters/liners. Danish 
seiners furthermore buy plaice from primarily trawlers, who in return buy other flatfish from 
them. Herring is primarily traded between purse seiners and trawlers, while only minor 
transactions of mackerel also take place between these two segments. Lobster and shrimp are 
bought by trawlers from multi-purpose vessels and netters/liners. Trappers buy significant 
amounts of quota for other species, but their buying does not correspond to the supply, thus 
resulting in unused quota. Industrial species are solely bought by trawlers, primarily from 
purse seiners. 
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5.3 Price levels 
Having described the expected trade patterns on the market, the next step is to estimate the 
prices prevailing for the different species. Shadow prices are suitable for such analysis. These 
show the increase in earnings, if one extra unit of quota for each species were allowed for one 
year, i.e. the marginal willingness to pay. Table 5.5 gives the shadow prices for each of the 
included species assuming different levels of flexibility. In the situation with unused quota 
for sale on the market, cf. Table 5.4, the imposed catch restriction does not become limiting, 
and the shadow prices are in these cases therefore zero13. 
 
Table 5.5 Shadow prices for individual species (DKK/kilo) 
Assumption about: 
Technical 
efficiency 
Choice of 
output mix Cod 
Other 
codfish Plaice 
Other 
flatfish Herring
Mac-
kerel 
Lobster 
and 
shrimp 
Other 
species 
Indu-
strial 
species
Fixed Fixed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 3.55 18.61 0.00 0.42 
Unrestricted Fixed 0.59 0.00 0.00 1.51 1.16 3.73 40.14 0.00 0.48 
Fixed Unrestricted 8.58 2.52 1.63 10.49 2.16 3.07 40.12 0.00 0.46 
Unrestricted Unrestricted 9.64 3.15 3.76 10.17 2.22 3.35 41.58 0.00 0.51 
 
 
From Table 5.5 it is observed that the shadow price varies significantly with the flexibility 
assumptions. Take for instance cod, an important species in Danish fisheries. With fixed 
levels of technical efficiency and output mix, there will be some unused quota. However, 
allowing all vessels to become technically efficient will result in the price of an extra kilo of 
cod quota to be 0.59 DKK, which is very low compared to a sales price of an average 16.31 
DKK, cf. Table 3.4. In this model, the vessels with an interest in buying extra cod have high 
costs of catching an extra unit, which therefore reduces their willingness to pay for such an 
extra unit. In the situation with free choice of output mix within the given technology, it 
becomes possible for the low cost vessels to catch an extra unit of cod, which therefore 
results in a significant increase in the shadow price to around 9 DKK. 
 
An obvious question is whether these prices are realistic. Currently, the Danish herring 
fishery is, as the only one in Denmark, regulated by ITQs. The system is installed for a test 
period of five years from 2003 to 2008, and the price in 2003 for a kilo of herring is around 7 
DKK. Because the price given in Table 5.5 is the shadow price for a one year permit to catch 
an extra kilo, we can calculate the price for a five year permit using an 8% discount rate to be 
between 4.35 DKK and 8.86 DKK, depending on the flexibility assumptions. The estimated 
shadow prices do therefore not seem unrealistic, when comparing with the current prices14. 
                                                 
13 For some species there are buyers and sellers, but still also some unused quota, cf. ‘other species’ in Table 
5.4. These trades will take place at a zero price, but information about the marginal profits for the buying vessels 
can be obtained by for instance including an extra restriction in the programming problem. This restriction limits 
the allowed total catch of ‘other species’ to be marginally below the level wanted by the buying gear type 
groups. However, this will not be investigated any further here. 
14 Ideally, we would have to compare the market price of a kilo of herring quota to the shadow price calculated 
in a system where only herring quotas are tradable.  
 168
Shadow prices can be used for many purposes by the regulatory authority. When discussing 
quota trades with for example other nations, they indicate which species should be bought 
and sold and at which proportions. For instance, in the situation with unrestricted individual 
learning and choice of output mix, the most valuable quota is lobster and shrimp. Thus, 
assume that Denmark wants to buy some quota of these species from the United Kingdom. 
The Danish negotiators should then at most be willing to trade with 4.3 kilo of cod 
(41.58/9.64), 11.1 kilo of plaice (41.58/3.76) or 81.5 kilo of industrial species (41.58/0.51), 
cf. Table 5.5. 
 
 
5.4 Exogenous chocks 
The regulatory authority can also analyse the consequences of different exogenous shocks on 
the economic gains, prices of the ITQs, etc. Several types of exogenous chocks can be 
relevant to consider, and this is relatively straightforward to do in the proposed framework. 
The method to apply is comparable to the two-step procedure used in Section 2.2. First, the 
new values are determined for the parameters expected to be influenced by the exogenous 
chock, and then the programming problems are solved again. 
 
For illustrative purposes, we will focus on two likely examples. In the first example, we 
assume that the global price of cod increases by 10% for all gear types. Including a new price 
matrix in the programming problem and solving this, the key economic indicators become as 
shown in Table 5.6 together with the shadow prices in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.6 Consequences of a 10% price increase for cod (1,000 DKK) 
  
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output  
mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
 2002-price
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price 
Cod price 
+10% 
Revenue 3,366,479 3,434,832 3,422,133 3,481,926 3,467,546 3,531,846 3,483,018 3,543,716
Cost 1,709,798 1,749,168 1,637,619 1,663,367 1,439,973 1,464,830 1,428,406 1,450,437
Earnings 1,656,681 1,685,664 1,784,513 1,818,559 2,027,573 2,067,017 2,054,613 2,093,279
Gross profits 1,024,528 1,053,512 1,152,360 1,186,406 1,395,420 1,434,864 1,422,460 1,461,126
 
 
As expected the total revenues will increase following the 10% increase in cod price. 
However, the total costs will also increase, because the increased cod price makes it 
profitable to reallocate catches of cod towards vessels which have higher costs. As expected, 
it is primarily vessels with a high proportion of cod in their catches, which realise an increase 
in their gross profits, i.e. vessels using Danish seine, net/line or multi-purpose gear.  
 
Turning attention to the shadow prices in Table 5.7, a considerable increase is observed for 
the one related to cod. However, for most of the other species, the shadow prices are expected 
to decrease. The reason is that the reallocations following the 10% increase in cod price result 
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in some catches of other species being allocated towards vessels with lower profitability for 
these species. This is however profitable, because these vessels are able to offset this by 
increased profits from the cod catches. 
 
Table 5.7 Shadow prices following a 10% price increase for cod (1,000 DKK) 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output 
mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
  2002-price 
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price
Cod price 
+10% 2002-price 
Cod price 
+10% 
Cod 0.00 0.00 0.59 2.17 8.58 10.15 9.64 11.16
Other codfish 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.52 2.67 3.15 3.18
Plaice 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.63 1.36 3.76 3.46
Other flatfish 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 10.49 10.28 10.17 9.91
Herring 1.09 1.07 1.16 1.24 2.16 2.18 2.22 2.24
Mackerel 3.55 3.68 3.73 3.50 3.07 2.92 3.35 3.28
Lobster and shrimp 18.61 19.13 40.14 39.95 40.12 39.96 41.58 41.34
Other species  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industrial species 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.50
 
 
In the second example, we assume that the fuel price increases by 10% due to some 
exogenous events. Thus, the values in the vector containing fuel costs are increased by 10%. 
After solving the new programming problems, we get the results presented in Table 5.8. 
Because a fuel cost increase influences all vessels equally, it will only lead to minor 
reductions in catch revenue. The total cost will on the other hand be increased, and logically 
this increase will be relatively larger for vessels using gear types that are fuel intensive, such 
as beam trawlers and trawlers.  
 
Table 5.8 Consequences of a 10% price increase on fuel (1,000 DKK) 
  
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output  
mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
 2002-price
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price 
Fuel price 
+10% 
Revenue 3,366,479 3,364,119 3,422,133 3,422,055 3,467,546 3,466,983 3,483,018 3,483,017
Cost 1,709,798 1,735,703 1,637,619 1,664,334 1,439,973 1,463,288 1,428,406 1,450,438
Earnings 1,656,681 1,628,417 1,784,513 1,757,720 2,027,573 2,003,695 2,054,613 2,032,580
Gross profits 1,024,528 996,264 1,152,360 1,125,567 1,395,420 1,371,542 1,422,460 1,400,427
 
 
The influence on the shadow prices following a 10% price increase in fuel costs is more 
complex. The general trend is a decrease in shadow prices, but increases are observed for 
some species, especially herring, when comparing with unchanged fuel prices, cf. Table 5.9. 
To explain the increased shadow price for herring, we take the model assuming that technical 
efficiency is unrestricted and output mix is fixed as an example. The reallocation of herring 
catches is solely from purse seiners to trawlers. The increase in fuel costs influences, on 
average, purse seiners more than trawlers. Despite trawlers obtaining a lower price for 
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herring, the result is that profitability for catching one kilo of herring becomes higher for 
trawlers compared to purse seiners.  
 
Table 5.9 Shadow prices following a 10% price increase on fuel (1,000 DKK) 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output 
mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
  2002-price 
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price
Fuel price 
+10% 2002-price 
Fuel price 
+10% 
Cod 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.55 8.58 8.38 9.64 9.64
Other codfish 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.52 2.48 3.15 3.14
Plaice 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.63 1.62 3.76 3.82
Other flatfish 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.28 10.49 10.41 10.17 9.77
Herring 1.09 1.03 1.16 1.24 2.16 2.17 2.22 2.24
Mackerel 3.55 3.75 3.73 3.50 3.07 2.91 3.35 3.28
Lobster and shrimp 18.61 17.42 40.14 39.96 40.12 39.82 41.58 41.34
Other species  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industrial species 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.50
 
 
Other types of exogenous chocks can also be relevant to evaluate before one implements a 
system of ITQs. An obvious example within fisheries is changes in stock sizes. The stock 
level of the different species is influenced by many factors besides the actual fishing activity, 
including weather conditions, migrations, pollution, etc.  
 
Accounting for changes in stocks have traditionally been troublesome, because of lacking 
knowledge about the size of these, and how they influence the fishermen’s catch rates. In the 
presented framework, a short run time horizon has been assumed, thus excluding the 
possibility of such changes. Allowing for changes in stock sizes will necessarily influence a 
lot of the parameters in the model. If the stock size of e.g. plaice increases, vessels catching 
this species will obtain a higher catch with the same effort (costs). The total allowable catch 
will likely be increased, which furthermore will influence the prices of plaice in a downward 
direction, depending on the global demand situation. It is also likely that other vessels will 
start to catch plaice, increasing competition for the plaice quota. Changes in stocks may 
therefore have significant consequences, and the modelling framework is currently not set up 
to account for such exogenous shocks. 
 
 
5.5 Management changes 
In Section 2, we presented a method to account for individual changes in technical efficiency, 
and we applied this in Section 4 to a situation where the inefficient vessels had increasing 
levels of technical efficiency. However, one could also imagine situations where changes in 
management reduce fishermen’s ability to catch fish, for instance through mesh size changes, 
closed areas, etc. These changes can either influence all vessels or only a specific gear type or 
vessel size. The framework can be set up to account for such changes. 
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In this section, we will analyse the consequences of increasing mesh size in the flatfish 
fishery, i.e. outputs of plaice and other flatfish. We assume for simplicity that the 
consequence hereof is that 10% of the flatfish escapes through the larger meshes, i.e. when 
previously 1 kilo was caught, only 0.9 kilo is now caught. For correct modelling of such 
regulatory changes, it will in practice be necessary to consult with biologists and gear 
technicians in order to use the right value of catch reduction following mesh size change.  
 
To model this, a new variable G must be included in the programming problem, stating the 
reduction in catches. Because we use an output-oriented approach, G is assumed to be equal 
to or larger than one (if equal to one, no mesh size changes are made). The objective function 
given in equation (11) thus becomes:  
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where G is determined for each individual vessel v per output m. 
 
The restriction on total catches cf. equation (11.g) is likewise converted to be as follows: 
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Because the individual vessel equations in the programming problem are not influenced, the 
estimated best-practice frontier is unchanged.  
 
Having reformulated the industry programming problems to facilitate evaluation of mesh size 
changes, we reestimate all the models using the example of increased mesh sizes in the 
flatfish fishery with G equal to 1.1. The economic consequences of the larger mesh size are 
displayed in Table 5.10 for the different behavioural assumptions. It can be observed that the 
reductions in gross profits are expected to be between 60 and 80 million DKK. The highest 
reductions are observed when it is assumed that the output mix cannot be changed.  
 
Table 5.10 Consequences of increased mesh sizes (1,000 DKK) 
  
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output  
mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
  
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
Revenue 3,366,479 3,305,603 3,422,133 3,360,626 3,467,546 3,447,927 3,483,018 3,464,173
Cost 1,709,798 1,726,013 1,637,619 1,652,414 1,439,973 1,486,211 1,428,406 1,468,928
Earnings 1,656,681 1,579,590 1,784,513 1,708,212 2,027,573 1,961,716 2,054,613 1,995,245
Gross profits 1,024,528 947,437 1,152,360 1,076,059 1,395,420 1,329,563 1,422,460 1,363.092
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In order to explain the economic effects of such mesh size increases, it is beneficial to include 
Table 5.11, which displays the catches of flatfish and total catches under the behavioural 
assumptions. The table shows that catches of flatfish are significantly reduced with a fixed 
output mix, while catches of other species are only reduced to a minor extent. With the output 
mix unrestricted, only small reductions in the flatfish catches are observed, if any. 
 
Table 5.11 Catch amounts with increased mesh sizes (tonnes) 
  
Technical efficiency 
and output mix fixed 
Technical efficiency 
unrestricted, output mix 
fixed 
Technical efficiency 
fixed, output mix 
unrestricted 
Technical efficiency 
and output mix 
unrestricted 
  
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
2002-mesh 
size 
Mesh size 
increase 
Flatfish 34,029 30,600 35,383 31,587 35,654 34,824 35,654 35,654
Total 1,305,937 1,301,878 1,309,012 1,305,134 1,310,997 1,309,765 1,311,324 1,310,409
 
 
By increasing mesh sizes, each vessel will have to endure higher costs to obtain the same 
catch. However, at some point this is not economically viable, and catches are therefore 
reduced instead. This effect is also observed in the results above, where total catches and total 
revenues are reduced, while total costs increase. Allowing for flexibility in the choice of 
output mix, these effects are to some extent counteracted by reallocation towards vessels with 
the ability to catch the species at a lower cost. This implies that catches and thus catch 
revenues are reduced to a lesser extent than previously, but also that costs increase more. An 
increased mesh size will thus result in lower gross profits, and it is as expected that vessels 
using gear types such as beam trawl, Danish seine or net/line will primarily be influenced by 
this. The reason is that these vessels have a high proportion of flatfish in their catches.  
 
 
Final remarks 
Obtaining precise estimations of the economic consequences following regulatory changes is 
important in order to take economically sound decisions. In Andersen and Bogetoft (2003), 
we investigated a situation where the management system in a fishery is changed from a 
given unspecified one to one based on Individual Transferable Quotas. To perform such 
estimations, a series of industry models based on linear programming was set up in allowing 
the fishermen flexibility with respect to individual learning and choice of output mix.  
 
In this paper, we have modified this framework in several ways. Firstly, we considered how 
to restrict the determination of the best-practice frontier in order to secure that vessels using 
the same technology (gear type) are compared, but still included in the industry programming 
problem together with vessels using other technologies. This can be achieved by including a 
comparison vector consisting of dummy variables equal to zero or one. Secondly, we focused 
on how to facilitate individual learning, but at the same time assuring that fishermen do not 
necessarily become fully technically efficient. To accomplish this, we proposed a method 
where the plausible efficiency increase following individual learning was calculated outside 
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the model and afterwards included herein. Finally, we considered how to allow for some 
flexibility in the choice of output mix instead of none or full flexibility. Upper and lower 
bounds can be utilised to restrict this type of flexibility.  
 
To evaluate the consequences of these theoretical derivations, we applied a dataset covering 
the entire Danish commercial fishery in 2002, excluding licensed fisheries for mussels and 
shrimps. Based on these figures, we calculated gross profits to rise from 742 million DKK to 
1,422 million DKK under the most flexible assumptions. Thus, had Danish fisheries been 
regulated by an ITQ system in 2002, gross profits could have increased by 92%. The gains 
are primarily derived, when the choice of output mix becomes flexible, and restricting this 
flexibility does thus also have the most pronounced effects compared to restricting individual 
learning.  
 
Setting the restrictions are of course essential for obtaining realistic results. In this paper, we 
used some illustrative levels of these restrictions. However, to obtain more realistic 
restrictions and thus results, discussions with fishermen, managers, biologists and gear 
technicians could provide valuable knowledge. This is a resource demanding task, and has 
not been performed in this paper. 
 
Finally, we focused on a number of policy implications, which can be important to consider 
before implementing an ITQ management system in fisheries. Previously, topics such as 
concentration, specialisation, activity on the market and price determination have been 
discussed in the literature. These topics were therefore also considered in this paper, and 
methods to investigate these were proposed. Furthermore, we displayed how the industry 
programming problems could be changed in order to investigate exogenous chocks and 
management changes. Based on this, examples were given in the form of increased prices of 
cod, increased fuel prices and increased mesh sizes in the flatfish fishery. 
 
We have in the present paper modified a previously derived framework for calculation of 
tradability gains from implementing an individual transferable quota system within fisheries. 
Considering several different modifications, we have displayed the flexibility of the 
framework, and by applying it to a dataset, we have demonstrated its empirical capabilities. 
Furthermore, we have shown how it can easily be used to analyse a range of topics, including 
the consequences of management changes. 
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